

PESH MERGA

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THE KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP)

PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP

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1 June 1978

AN OPEN APPEAL

The Kurdish inhabitants of the remaining populated villages within the 20 km (15-25 km) border area on the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey frontiers have been served notice to prepare themselves for deportation in June 1978 from their villages to other places designated by the regime.

Pro-government tribal chiefs who voluntarily evacuate their villages are paid for their properties whereas the rest, the overwhelming majority, are forcibly deported without any compensation.

This measure is the final phase in the implementation of the basic policy objective of the ruling Ba'th regime, the policy outlined by Saddam Tikriti, Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council and Vice-President of Iraq, in his speech later published in a booklet; he states that this policy requires the Kurds' "deportation from the borders to a depth of 20 km so that infiltration does not take place, the founding of apparatuses for the thorough investigation of information and evil tendencies, the stationing of the army in the (Kurdish) area and its deployment into special camps and the opening of roads in the mountains... etc." (One Trench or Two Trenches, Dar al-Thawra, Baghdad, 1977, pp 34-35)

This act is also contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a violation of the UN's 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The policy aims at fighting legitimate and just Kurdish national, democratic and cultural aspirations and rights. It is an integral element in the Ba'th regime's overall "carrot and stick" policy of not permitting the "Kurdish problem to arise in this or future generations".

This policy is resented and opposed by our Kurdish people and by progressive forces in Iraq. Forcible deportation, compulsory resettlement and "cluster villages" have been tried before by the colonialists in Malaysia and Angola, the racists in Rhodesia, and US imperialism in Vietnam to achieve certain military-political objectives. The dictatorial Iraqi regime's measures are designed to undermine Arab-Kurdish fraternity and solidarity and are aimed at the subjugation of the Kurdish people in Iraq.

On behalf of the tens of thousands of Kurds affected by these inhuman measures, which, in addition to the great economic and social dislocations they entail, are the cause of deep psychological hardships, we appeal to you to voice your concern about the violation of our people's right to live a normal life in peace and security in their places of domicile or where they choose to live.

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE MAY REVOLUTION

On 26 May 1976, the Kurdistan Democratic Party — Provisional Leadership — resumed the armed struggle to achieve our people's legitimate national and democratic rights. This development was partially unwittingly engendered by the Iraqi regime who, upon having, absolutely unopposed, the upper hand in Iraqi Kurdistan, resorted to callous and insensitive measures directed not only against those who had carried arms, but also against the entire Kurdish people, especially the peasantry. These measures were numerous and varied but the one that hit the Kurds hardest was the mass deportation and resettlement plan.

The May revolution constitutes a new phase in our political struggle. It is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the previous uprisings of our people. It is different in its strategy, thought and methods. Its main and only source of strength is the Kurdish people of Iraq, the entire Kurdish nation everywhere. the people with whom we co-exist and all progressive and democratic forces in the Middle East and the world over, especially the national liberation movements, the working people and the socialist forces.

We have identified the enemies of our people to comprise the local Kurdish reactionaries, tribal and compromising elements, the repressive regimes controlling our homeland and the reactionary, racist and imperialist circles.

The May revolution represents a very high degree of consciousness and sacrifice on the part of our Kurdish people in Iraq and of selflessness, fraternity and solidarity among the Kurdish nation all over Kurdistan.

However, our party has not lost sight of the reactionary elements' attempts to steer the new movement away from its adopted course; it has successfully foiled many such conspiracies and will continue to beat all efforts to link our movement to the power game going on in the Middle East area, especially the Shah's attempts — and those of other similar forces — to infiltrate our ranks.

On the second anniversary of the May revolution, we solemnly salute and hail our brothers who have sacrificed everything for the sake of our people's just cause and keep fresh the memory of our fallen comrades and compatriots.

We fully realise that the tasks that lie before us are formidable, numerous and varied in nature. We also realise that our foes and enemies, their cunning, deception, quibbling and double dealing, are not to be overlooked or under-estimated. But our people's and party's resolution, sacrifice and learning from previous faults and mistakes are bound to overcome these difficulties.

* * *

RADIO VOICE OF KURDISTAN on the Air

Radio VOICE OF KURDISTAN began broadcasting on 26 May 1978, the second anniversary of the May Revolution. The station transmits every day at 0730 hours local time on the 49 meter band. To prevent people from listening to this broadcast, the Iraqi authorities have resorted to intensive jamming.

The station is located inside Iraqi Kurdistan and is run by our party.

The monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in its Summary of World Broadcasting, Part 4 The Middle East and Africa, Second Series ME/5830 of 5 June 1978, states that the VOICE OF IRAQI KURDISTAN was intercepted at 1635 gmt on 2nd June broadcasting in Kurdish on 5950 kHz (49 meter band), adding that reception was "poor to very poor".

* * *

THE BA'THIST CLIQUE EXECUTE 27 ICP MEMBERS

News coming from Iraq indicates that 27 members of the Iraqi Communist Party (member of the so-called "Progressive National and Nationalist Front" and participant in the government with two ministers) have recently been executed in great secrecy. 36 have already been sentenced to death.

The Beirut English language "The Middle East Report" says that a campaign of large-scale detention of communist leaders and rank and file is currently underway and that this campaign is on a scale never experienced in Iraq since the coup d'etat of 8 Feb. 1963. (1500 have so far been detained).

In an editorial on 28 May, the semi-official Ba'thist daily "Al Thawra" obliquely admitted to the hanging, stating that death awaits all who try to conduct activities in the armed forces, which the Ba'thist leadership consider their exclusive domain.

Our party denounces the oppressive measures adopted by the Iraqi dictatorship against progressive and democratic forces and demands the immediate release of all political prisoners and an end to the execution of Iraqi patriots, both Araba and Kurds.

KURDISH NATIONALISM IS A REALITY THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED AND OUR ARMED STRUGGLE WILL BE PROTRACTED

Every revolution has its own features and characteristics that stem from its soil, people, intrinsic forces, the forces of counter-revolution and its surrounding international circumstances. The Kurdish revolution, as a living process interacting with numerous internal and external factors and being influenced by them all both directly and indirectly, is no exception to this rule. The purpose of this article is to discuss and analyse these factors, their outcome and what should be done in order to weaken the influence of the negative factors and increase the effectiveness of the positive ones and of their influence on the continuation, development, path and ultimate results of the revolution.

First: The revolution takes place on the soil of Kurdistan. Kurdistan has a mountainous terrain, which is very suitable for guerilla warfare. The revolution covers the entire Kurdish country, almost from north to south, in an 800 km long arc. This mountainous area is covered with many forests which constitute a fairly good cover against air raids. The mountain ranges are separated by green, fertile valleys and plains that produce most of the foodstuffs needed.

The economy of Kurdistan is an agrarian one, based to a great extent on small holdings which maintain their cultivators at subsistence level and the poorer groups at even lower levels. About half the Kurdish people live in cities and towns both within Kurdistan and outside it. However, urban centres in Kurdistan are dependent and economically weak. Most of their inhabitants are petit bourgeois groups, and both permanent and seasonal workers. Most incomes of these groups and classes derive from government expenditure. The privileged group is composed of bureaucratic Ba'thists and those who serve the ruling Ba'th party apparatus.

Kurdistan's oil has become a curse on our people since its discovery at the beginning of this century. The Kirkuk oilfield was among the first to be exploited in this part of the world. The colonialists and the ruling racist bureaucracy in its turn have enjoyed the benefits accruing from oil revenues, but our Kurdish people's share has come in the form of bullets and guns that kill them and destroy their villages. These revenues should instead have been used for the benefit and prosperity of the Iraqi people in general. Our masses have for a long time been aware of these facts.

It should not be forgotten that the dynamism of the Kurdish revolution lies in the Kurdish liberation movement being the expression of the aspirations of an ancient people, a people who are aware and conscious. The phenomenon of Kurdish nationalism has grown and developed as a reality, supported by scientific observations, over a long period. It has been strengthened by and has flourished since the September revolution, over many years and varying phases. It struggles to realise these legitimate aspirations, but is confronted by conspiracies, war, international pacts, forcible deportation and compulsory resettlement of its

masses in the worst forms of racism. We can say without exaggeration that our entire people are now in a mood of anger and resentment and despise the Iraqi regime with its racist and dictatorial measures. Our people yearn for the day when they will overthrow the present regime, its injustices and tyranny the like of which Iraq has never experienced during its history. Our people embrace their vanguards who have hoisted the banner of national democratic revolution, in the same way in which a mother embraces her child.

The two factors of terrain and people are greatly to our advantage in the effect on the war situation.

Second: The Iraqi regime is a dictatorship representing the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie ruling the country from north to south through the Ba'th party apparatus. Its entire policy stems from one fundamental aim to which everything else is secondary, namely to remain in power. The regime has concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1972 for this very purpose. It agreed, or rather begged for the conclusion of the treacherous Algiers Agreement of 1975 with the regime of the Shah, and with the blessing of the American Administration, realising that this was the only way to prolong its life.

Repression has always been and still is the most effective weapon in the hands of the regime; this weapon is directed against Arabs and Kurds alike and includes everyone opposing or disagreeing with its official policy. Therefore, repression has struck at all democrats, at KDP members and sympathisers, communists, nationalists, Ba'thists and even members of the ruling party apparatus itself.

The second weapon in the hands of the regime is the enormous source of money from oil revenues, which are used for tempting people and solving problems that repression alone cannot solve. These revenues are employed to absorb part of the popular resentment and to cover up the economic and administrative failures of the state agencies. They are also spent on enlarging the apparatuses of repression, to foment plots, and to meet the costs of demagogic propaganda in Iraq and abroad. Because of the vast increase in these revenues, the Iraqi armed forces have doubled in number as compared with the period which preceded the increase in oil prices. These forces are supplied with the most advanced arms, especially anti guerilla weapons. It should be emphasised in this context that the main task of these forces has for years been to fight our revolution by concentrating troops in Kurdistan and building bunkers and outposts on top of every mountain peak and at every road junction; many of these bunkers and outposts can only be supplied by helicopter. The number of troops deployed to fight our partisans now exceeds 6 army divisions, apart from units of the air force.

The regime uses oil sales and that part of the oil revenues allocated for imports as a means of pressure in the international field, a pressure directed against our revolution and even to harass Kurdish refugees abroad.

The leaders of the regime practise a considerable degree of evasion and deception and are experienced in the arts of cunning. But we believe they have been exposed and that their methods have become known both in Iraq and abroad. It can be said that the regime is, by and large, strong in Iraq. But we can also state that its strength has been declining and diminishing since 1976. The Kurdish revolution has been resumed under national, progressive thought and modern methods. It's wishful thinking (as well as that of some other people) that Kurdish resistance "has ended once and for all" notwithstanding, the regime has paid a dear price at the cost of Iraq's sovereignty for the suppression of the revolution. This experience has only shown that those who compromise with the foreigner in order to liquidate a popular movement in their own country are the ultimate losers.

The May revolution has been the factor stimulating all national forces in Iraq to resume and increase their struggle. The violence of the popular uprising in Karbala and Najaf at the beginning of 1977 was clear evidence of the isolation of the racist and sectarian regime and a true expression of the widespread resentment growing among the masses that challenged its repression and resisted its tanks, aircraft and armoured helicopters. On the other hand, conspiracies within the regime itself are continuing; as soon as one is foiled another is hatched.

As for the oil revenues, the revolution saps a major part of them, either in forcing the regime to purchase arms or by keeping six army divisions pinned down in Kurdistan. Besides the nature of the regime, its vast and constantly increasing non-productive spending consumes another major part of the oil revenues. Moreover, world inflation has reduced the real value of oil revenues. The level of living (in real terms) for the popular masses is now sharply declining as a result of the rate of inflation, now running at 25-30%, in Iraq, by comparison with the far smaller increase in wages and salaries.

The strength of the regime is failing, though it is still strong. The continuation of the revolution and the development of all its activities will guarantee the consumption of the main part of the financial, military, administrative and psychological resources of the regime.

It is a great mistake to fear or dread the enemy; but it is equally wrong to underestimate or disregard him.

Third: The Kurdistan Democratic Party — Provisional Leadership — is the biggest national institution of struggle in the modern history of the Kurds. The party is the real leader of the revolution. Despite numerous and some enormously grave mistakes committed during its long march of struggle up to 1975, this march has witnessed great sacrifices, heroism, experiences and lessons.

The important thing in this respect is that while keeping its positive national heritage, non-compromise of the rights of the people and its broad popular line, the party has simultaneously adopted a new path which is reflected in its programme; a clear, progressive and socialist path that has no vagueness.

The party has achieved qualitative leaps in its revolutionary activities in the process of re-organisation and, in the field of information and international publicity which has so upset the regime

that it resorts to all possible means in order to silence it.

Meanwhile, we must admit that our party has not yet rid itself of all the sediments of the past with their burdens and ideas and the interests behind them. But we sincerely believe that the new outlook of our party and its march during the past two years, have been sound and in accordance with the new outlook. The effective elements within the party and around it function in this direction. It is political naiveté to imagine that the inner and outside reactionary forces would drop their weapons as soon as we carried progressive slogans and adopted national programmes, especially since the issue is no longer theoretical but concerns and is linked to a popular revolution that affects many interests. Therefore, the highest degree of vigilance and caution must be exercised, the most important thing in this respect being the broadest possible participation of the party rank and file in the drawing and implementation of its policies, the education and mobilisation of the masses of the party, the revolution and the people.

As its progressive path and socialist programme become clearer, its organisation firmer and more conscious, its leading vanguard role in the revolution more crystallised, the party could play a broader and deeper, more positive role in the war presently raging between the Kurdish partisans and the regime of Baghdad.

It is appropriate to emphasise here that we have not advocated and still do not advocate a one-party situation in Kurdistan. On the contrary, we see the establishment of a Kurdistan front of struggle as an objective necessity, which it is folly and dangerous to ignore, for it will certainly come into being sooner or later. The front is not a substitute for our party or any other force; but its establishment will add strength in the field of battle in favour of the revolution and to the disadvantage of the insolent enemy.

Fourth: The army of the revolution (the partisans) is small in number in comparison with enemy troops, its weapons are few and simple, living conditions are difficult but tolerable, its supplies of arms and ammunition few though increasing — securing them is difficult and achieved through fierce encounters with the troops of the regime. But the patriotic partisans are strong in their national beliefs and progressive thought which the party constantly spreads among them; they are firm in their organisation, conscious organisation giving them added strength; and they are determined to win victory, however dear the sacrifices required of them may be. They have tasted, during recent history, both the pride of triumph and the bitterness of setback. They are the inheritors of long traditions of struggle and notable military battles. They have within their ranks cadres experienced in all kinds of fighting. And they can continue the fight, modernising and developing it. Their numbers and equipments will increase, their training develop, and their political, party and military education will improve and deepen. They can multiply the losses inflicted on the forces of the enemy and sap more of his energies and neutralise his capabilities. As an indicator to this fact, we can mention that for every 20 casualties among enemy troops, the partisans suffer one casualty.

However, their small number in comparison with

enemy troops and their few and simple arms in comparison with the huge arsenals of the enemy, make the achievement of a decisive victory on the battlefield impossible under existing conditions.

Fifth: The oppressors of the Kurdish nation in the neighbouring countries, who are supported by colonialism, aid the Baghdad regime in preventing the Kurdish people from achieving decisive victory in Iraq, even if they try to exploit the Kurdish revolution for tactical reasons to gain territorial, political or economic advantages at the expense of Iraq and its people. The Iraqi regime meanwhile is prepared to offer every concession demanded in return for these countries' assistance against the Kurdish revolution. The presence of Iranian liaison officers in the two Iraqi Kurdish towns of Ranya and Qala Diza is new evidence to this fact. This does not mean that Iran will not, on the other hand, try to interfere in the affairs of the revolution or to escalate disagreements among the Kurds themselves. Iran is expert in the cunning of grazing with the lambs and feasting with the wolves. Everyone working in the national field, and especially those who have a relationship with the armed men, must not forget recent as well as remote history; they must know that wolves do not eat the flesh of wolves, but all wolves eat the meat of the lamb. Therefore, they must avoid opening any gaps in the revolution from which its strategic enemies may benefit. The role of the oppressors of the Kurdish nation and their cooperation amongst themselves against it has been and still is a great negative factor against the revolution.

Sixth: However, the previous factor is counterbalanced by the national dimension of the revolution. This is a factor which was greatly neglected in the past, but which assumes greater significance with the increase and spread of consciousness and education among the Kurds. The role of the national dimension must be deepened and widened so that the masses of the Kurdish nation and their political parties become props for the revolution, its invisible soldiers, its armoured shield against all those who try to commit acts of aggression against it.

The national dimension can prevent the encirclement of the revolution, which the enemies of our people try to bring about, from being successful and complete; this dimension is an inexhaustible source of genuine aid to the revolution.

With the creative forces of the Kurdish nation, we will withstand all the efforts of our nation's enemies to close the pincers around the revolution.

This process cannot be attained overnight. But it must be given the attention it deserves, strengthened and consolidated constantly like the process of continuous construction. It is worth mentioning here that the progressive path of our party, which is not viewed with satisfaction by the reactionary and imperialist enemies of our nation, will cement the national relations of the revolution with the struggling Kurdish parties and masses.

Seventh: The Middle East region has for a long time remained the primary scene of international struggle and competition, firstly because of its enormous oil resources; secondly, the Arab Israeli conflict; and thirdly, its strategic position. It can be concluded, therefore, that every political-military power has its own military-political equation for the region. We, as a liberation movement,

stand firmly by the side of the peoples of the region, their struggle and their national liberation movements and against reaction and imperialism. We back the Palestinian people and the Arab nation for the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and support the Palestinian people's right of self-determination in their land and the establishment of their independent state.

This progressive, internationalist face of our party and revolution, in addition to our organised activities among the international public opinion quarters which greatly annoy the dictatorial regime in Baghdad, is bound to win over to our just revolution the masses of the Arab nation and their struggling progressive forces, world public opinion and all progressive and socialist forces.

We must not forget that the enemies of our people constitute an international dimension for the Iraqi government; moreover, our progressive path is bound to make these enemies instruct their agents and mercenaries to intensify their fight against us.

What can be concluded from all these factors which play their roles in the war presently being fought between the revolution and the regime of Baghdad?

More importantly, what is the total net outcome of all these factors?

On the one hand, from the following factors: (1) the readiness and ability of the Kurdish people to sacrifice and struggle; (2) the Kurdistan Democratic Party with its new path and as a leader of the revolution; (3) the national partisan movement; (4) the Kurdish nation and its support of the revolution, and (5) the correct move in the region within the framework of its volatile situation and the winning over of world public opinion through our organised activities, we conclude that the revolution has all the prerequisites of steadfastness, continuity and success. If well mobilised and invested, these factors will strengthen the revolution both numerically and in equipment, and both materially and morally. Any strength the revolution gains simultaneously weakens the enemy and leads to the further exhaustion of his energies and sapping of his resources. However, any serious mistakes the revolution's leadership may commit can greatly weaken the revolution itself.

On the other hand, the following factors: (1) the strength of the Iraqi regime; (2) the relatively small size at present of the partisan forces; (3) the fact that the revolution is surrounded by the imperialist supported oppressors of the Kurdish nation, and (4) the use of oil by the regime as a weapon against the revolution and the support it gets from the conservative regimes of the region, all render difficult the achievement of a quick and total victory over the Iraqi government.

It follows from all this that ours is a protracted and long term armed struggle. This fact is the net outcome of both the above mentioned positive and negative factors.

Those who fail to understand the protracted nature of the Kurdish revolution will commit grave mistakes, whether as a result of "leftist" or "rightist" opportunism, one of its features being fleeing from the field of struggle, or the desire to throw oneself into the laps of the enemy for short term personal gains.

The other aspect of this armed struggle is that it

is a war of attrition, the burdens of which the enemy cannot shoulder and sustain without interruption for a long time. The enemy will resort to evasion and cunning and all forms of compromise, except a genuine solution to the Kurdish issue; he is, as a matter of fact, unable, from both the vested interest and ideological viewpoints, to realise such a solution.

THE IRAQI REGIME'S DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

One of the fundamental causes of conflict between the ruling Ba'th regime of Iraq and the Kurdish national liberation movement is the reluctance of the former to locate economic projects, especially industrial projects, in the Kurdish area. Since one of the KDP's main objectives — as reflected in its programme — is to introduce socio-economic changes into the Kurdish region and Kurdish society for the benefit of the entire population, particularly the poorer classes, the workers and peasants, this unwillingness on the part of the government has stemmed from two motives. First, to discredit the Kurdish national liberation movement by putting the blame for the non-location of economic projects in Kurdistan on the movement, accusing it of hindering the introduction of such projects in the region by waging its war of liberation. Second, to disguise its own policy objective of introducing into Kurdistan only the minimum of projects that is politically feasible and desirable from the regime's point of view — namely a few show projects involving housing and road building. At the same time, the regime contrives to appear to be taking action through the introduction of some "cosmetic" changes in the socio-economic reality of the region although keeping the status quo actually untouched.

Although data and the breakdown of data governorate by governorate are almost impossible to come by that would permit a comparative study of the real funds allocated to various projects on a regional level, official information that is available is indeed confusing. Such confusion is created by the following practices of the regime and its agencies:-

1. There is very little published data on the industrial and agricultural sectors, or on schools, health, transport and communications, housing, water supplies and electricity on the governorate or regional level.

2. Figures which are occasionally released under pressure of events or to achieve propaganda objectives are quoted as overall aggregates but not on a per capita or percentage basis. Thus, comparisons are either meaningless or impossible. For example, suppose that the central government once allocated ID 10m. a year for schools in the Kurdish region and now has raised the figure to ID 20m. The Kurdish region would seem to be better off by 100%. If we stop here, we are misled and will mislead others. Only if we find out how much the total allocation for schools throughout Iraq has been increased may we have a realistic picture of the situation. If the total has doubled, the Kurdish

The final conclusion from the above analysis that Kurdish nationalism (in its modern, progressive sense), which has formed as an historical process, whose existence and development is supported by scientific observations, and which is the expression of the aspirations of the Kurdish nation in many forms (especially the armed revolution), cannot be liquidated. It will ultimately certainly be victorious.

region is then in the same position as before; but if the total has increased by, say 200%, then the Kurdish region is worse off by comparison with the rest of the country. Available data does not afford the possibility of making such a comparison at present. There is a deep suspicion that this is done on purpose.

The significance of using percentages is that first, it reveals the share of the region to the total in the country (this can be considered an indicator of the degree of equality among the various areas of Iraq), and secondly, it points out whether the regime is serious in its claims of bringing the Kurdish region to a level of economic, social and cultural development comparable to the general level in Iraq (the regime admits that the Kurdish region has suffered greatly in the past due to the lack of development projects), and thirdly, it reveals the presence or absence of the scientific tools of regional studies, planning and implementation within the general economic policies of the central government and to what degree, if any, the so-called "autonomous authorities" play a role in this field.

3. Government officials and apologists now speak of the "autonomous area" and now of the "north". The two do not mean one and the same thing in official parlance. The former is far more limited than the latter. The "autonomous area" includes the governorates of Sulaimaniya, Erbil and Dahok only, whereas the "north", in addition to these areas, includes the governorates of Nineveh (Mosul), Tammim (Kirkuk) and others.

Despite these elements causing a great deal of confusion, a look at the data published by the authorities indicates that the government's efforts and state funds are being concentrated on industrial projects located or to be located in the central and southern areas of Iraq. Most of these projects belong to the group of "propulsive industries" or "linked industries", whose establishment leads to the setting up of a wave of other related industries, ancillary projects attached to the main establishments, and the accompanying housing, infrastructure and other services. In contrast, the Kurdish region has no such projects, even though raw materials and labour are available there. Instead, there are a number of road building projects whose main purpose is to serve the quick movement and despatch of large Iraqi land forces into and within the region in case of unrest. For this project, ID 164m. was allocated at the end of last year.

The Iraqi regime's supportive Arab language

weekly 'al Nahar al-Arabi wa-Dawli', published in Paris, carried in its 18 March 1978 issue an article by its Baghdad correspondent on the "autonomous area" of Iraq in which it admits that "... the opening of roads to all border villages has made it easy for the security forces to reach any village, however remote it may be; this was impossible in the past."

Another type of project being implemented in Kurdistan is the "cluster villages" programme for which ID 182m. was allotted at the end of last year. This includes houses being built in certain areas within the region that are of special design and planning and can be easily kept under surveillance and control and quickly sealed off. The purpose of their construction is to prevent any contact between their inhabitants and the guerilla fighters in the region. Apart from these two types of projects, which are basically military, the remainder involve small consumer goods industries in the category of "ubiquitous establishments" relating to the beverage industry or to various branches of

agriculture, such as the establishment of chicken farms. Such projects are of little consequence to the development of the region and its population, to incomes, standard of living and general progress as the experience in many other countries and regions of the world has shown.

Therefore, the hotchpotch of published figures and data on the Kurdish region aims only to confuse the outsider, but at the same time falsely portrays the regime as being "concerned" and doing what it can to achieve social progress.

The following list of projects pertaining to 1977 shows clearly where government efforts are concentrated and state funds allocated — namely, outside the Kurdish region. Industrial investment in the Kurdish region is, to say the least, very insignificant. This has already led to anomalous industries, inequalities among regions with respect to income, services and levels of living, and to tension and violence. The pursuance of this policy by the government is bound to breed more tensions and violence.

<i>Project</i>	<i>Allocation (in millions)</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Project</i>	<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Location</i>
Automobile industry	ID 120	Eskanderiyah - Hilla (Babil)	(2m. tonnes)	ID 243	Southern Iraq
Air conditioning equipment	\$5	Baghdad	28 Quays	ID 300	Southern Iraq
Chemical Fertiliser Plant	\$592	Zubair, Basra	Chemical Fertiliser Complex	ID250	Qa'im
Petro-chemical Plant	\$2,264	Basra	" " "	ID 27	(Akshat part)
Chemical Fertiliser Plant (expansion)	ID 33	Basra	C.F.C. (water supply system)	ID 18	
Slaughter houses, meat processing, and associated meat handling facilities	\$102	Diwaniya & Kurkuk	C.F.C. roads for plant	ID 14	
Aluminium smelter	ID 28	Nasriyah	Total with ancillary projects	ID 309	
Aluminium fluoride and cryolite production plant (equipment & services only)	\$16.3	Qa'im	Paper mill	-	Haditha, Ramadi
Thermal Power Station	\$372	Hartha-Basra	Cement plant	-	Hamman al-Alil
Power Station expansion project	\$16.6	Daura-Baghdad		-	Nineveh
East Baghdad EHV Station	\$17	Baghdad	Cement plant	500,000 tonnes	Badosh
Baghdad Medical City	\$100	Baghdad	Cement plant	-	Falliya, Ramada
Shoe Factory	\$2.4	Baghdad	Paper mill	-	Basra
Lubricating Oil Refinery	ID 40	Basra	Iron and steel industry	-	Khor al-Zubair, southern Iraq
Spinning & Textile project	ID 2.1	Baghdad	Power station	-	Zubair, Basra
Cycle Tyre Factory	ID 1.3	Kufa, Karbala	Gas cylinder plant	-	Kut
Brick Plant	ID 8	Amara	Topping plant	-	Simawa, Diwaniya
Liquid Gas Production project	\$17	Basra	Topping plant	-	Baiji, north of Tikrit
A series of small scale Natural Gas Treatment plants	ID 43.8	Basra	Hexane production plant	-	Taji, Baghdad
Agro-Industrial Complex's			Grain silo	15,000 tonnes	Suwaira, Kut
Water Purification & Treatment Plant	ID 5.3	Dujaila	Grain silo	15,000 tonnes	Diwaniya
Onion and Potato Cold Stores	ID 3.5	Yusufiyah, Baghdad	Grain silo	40,000 tonnes	Baghdad
Printing House	ID 17.5	Baghdad	Grain silo	45,000 tonnes	Um Qasr, Basra
Oil Refinery	ID 2.5	Simawa, Diwaniya	Oil refinery	3.5-7m. tonnes	Basra
2 Chicken Farms & Meat Processing plants	\$72	south of Baghdad	Crude oil and natural gas pipeline (North Rumaila to the new Nasriya power station)	-	Nasriya
Computer Centre for Ministry of Interior	ID 8	Baghdad	Aluminium fabricating plant	-	Nasriya
Cement Production Plant			Thermal generating station	800m.W	Taji, Baghdad
			Project for doubling Basra oil refinery capacity from 3½m. to 7m. tons.	7m. tons	Basra

Total funds allocated to these projects is \$7,770 (\$3,576.3 + \$4,194 (the equivalent of ID 1,165)). What figures and data can the government show in respect of funds allocated to industrial projects in the Kurdish region? The only figure we could come by is the ID90m. (\$324m.) allocated for "industry" in the "autonomous area"; most of these industries

are linked with agriculture, dairy and animal projects. The purpose of the establishment of these industries is to serve the large urban centres in Iraq, mainly Baghdad and Basra in central and southern Iraq respectively. What proportion of these allocated funds has actually been spent is not known by us.

Although the above data is neither comprehensive nor systematic and does not include the cost of all projects listed, they may nevertheless serve as a rough indicator.

The proportion of funds allocated to industrial projects in the "autonomous area" as opposed to the total allotted to industry in the rest of Iraq as shown in the above rough data, is less than 4%, whereas the proportion of the Kurdish population to the total population of Iraq is at least 25%. This large difference is only one indicator of the extent of inequality between the Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq, and of the discrimination to which the Kurdish region has been and still is being subjected in the economic and especially the development field.

Other forms of inequality and discrimination are in the field of social overheads in services such as schools, hospitals, running water, electricity, etc. In education, discrimination is most striking as the Iraqi regime has repeatedly disrupted the education process by changing the medium of instruction at schools several times since March 1970. Sometimes, as happened in Dahok Province in 1974/75 and 1975/76, the medium was changed several times over within a single year. But the most

serious blow dealt to the process of education by the authorities — with all the resultant economic losses, such as the cost of books and other dislocations — came in October 1977 when the RCC decided to reduce the native language of the "autonomous area" to the status of a foreign language, thus once again disrupting the normal process of education — apart from its being discriminatory and contrary to the March 1970 agreement and the government's own "Autonomy Law" of 1974.

The displacement of the Kurdish population through forcible deportation and compulsory resettlement elsewhere has entailed such enormous economic dislocations, apart from the detrimental social, political and psychological effects, that the consequences still cannot be estimated or even envisaged at this stage.

Confirmation of our assertion of lack of seriousness on the part of the regime to tackle the economic difficulties in the Kurdish region has come from the government coalition partner, the ICP, who demand "... sufficient allocations, especially in the field of industry" for dealing with the problem of underdevelopment in the region, (ICP report of 10 April 1978).

* * *

MALTREATMENT OF NATIONAL FRONT PARTNER BY THE RULING PARTY

The second largest and only other viable partner in the "National and Nationalist Progressive Front" of Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party, approved its 'Political Report' in an ordinary plenary meeting of the party's central committee on 10 April 1978. The report emphasised that "our party organisations, comrades, friends and press suffer from discrimination and from various forms of harassment; these have increased in 1977 ..."

* * *

ICP CRITICISES GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES TOWARDS IRAQI KURDS

In the same document, the ICP refers to the "difficulties, negativisms, shortcomings and wrong practices in dealing with the Kurdish masses and in the implementation of the autonomy."

"From our party's viewpoint, among the important measures and moves are: granting to the institutions of autonomy their full responsibilities and authority; strengthening them through competent and sincere cadres; allotting the necessary funds for this purpose in order to enable them to carry out their duties; caring for the national sentiments of the Kurdish people and all national minorities in the fields of education, culture and the demographic composition of the area; establishing democratic relations with the Kurdish masses ... And endeavouring to deal with the historically inherited underdevelopment in Kurdistan through increased efforts and sufficient allocations, especially in the field of industry.

* * *

THE KURDISH PEOPLE CELEBRATE NAWROZ

Nawroz, meaning the "new day" and marking the beginning of the spring season, has become the symbol of our people's unity and resistance against their oppressors. Every year on 21 March, people flock to the freshly green pastures, light bonfires, play music and dance. Kurds, as well as other peoples, such as the Farsis, Baluchis, Aziris and Afghans, everywhere celebrate this national occasion, in rural areas and urban centres throughout Kurdistan and in the neighbouring countries.

Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan, whether in their own country or living as refugees abroad, celebrated this occasion as usual this year. Social gatherings were arranged which were attended by large numbers of Kurds and their guests, many supporters of the Kurdish movement, during which various activities were presented, including Kurdish music and dancing performed by both Kurdish men and women in their bright, colourful national costume. Kurdish food was also offered. These evening celebrations were well organised, our friends and guests took part in the activities and the occasion was highly successful.

We take this opportunity of wishing all Kurds and friends of the Kurdish people a happy Nawroz.

THE KURDISH PEOPLE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

The present government of Turkey assumed power on 7 January 1978, following a series of parliamentary ploys by the present Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit. Like its predecessor coalition government of Suleyman Demirel, this government have as their priority the interests of big business, more especially its export segment and the military-industrial complex.

Mr Ecevit was able through his plots to win over 11 members of parliament from the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi (AP)), and persuade them to sever their ties with their party in exchange for portfolios in his cabinet. Such buying off of members of parliament is nothing new in Turkey. For this very reason, the membership of the new cabinet rose from 22 to 35: 22 from the Republican People's Party (AP), 1 from the Democratic Party (DP), and 1 from the Republic Security Party (Cumhuriyetci Guren Partisi (CGP)).

Despite all his efforts during the election campaign of summer 1977 to win a majority in parliament, Ecevit only managed to gain a few seats less than half the total but his CHP emerged as the strongest single party. As a result, he formed a minority government but failed to win a vote of confidence in parliament. Thus, he was forced to resign. Whereupon, the other three parties, namely the National Action Party (Milliyetci Haraket Partisi (MHP)), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)), and the Justice Party (AP) formed a coalition government which won a vote of confidence and remained in power until the end of 1977.

Why did Ecevit's party emerge as the strongest party in the last elections? The answer lies in the fact that the coup d'état of March 1971 led to the prohibition of all democratic and progressive parties and forces; the detention of all leading figures in these parties and forces; and the arrest of tens of thousands of their members. Thus there was no viable alternative to his party among the liberal and leftist parties.

The US Administration found no comfort in the existence of a military junta in Turkey (and another in Greece at the time); world public opinion also could not stomach these juntas. Therefore, the US Government, aware of existing conditions in Turkey, advised the junta to allow elections in order to avoid violent reactions at home and abroad to the existence of two such undemocratic members of NATO, both friends of the US Government.

In the meantime, Ecevit was able to exploit the miserable economic and political situation in the country for his own ends. He carried certain popular slogans such as Peace, Freedom of Thought, the Release of Political Prisoners (there were thousands of people in detention). As a result, a number of people voted for him in the hope that he would put these slogans into practice so that their sons, daughters and relatives could be freed at least to enjoy their liberty at a time when all other rights were virtually lacking.

Thus, Ecevit won the votes that were to make his party the strongest in Turkey and enabled him,

to form a coalition government from his own CHP party and the MSP. An amnesty followed, though limited in scope, for some of the political prisoners from the democratic and progressive forces. The deep differences between the democratic and progressive forces in Turkey and the disunity among them left the masses of the people no alternative but to vote for Ecevit once more in 1977. It is worth noting that the slogans carried by Ecevit worked like sedatives or palliatives for the Kurdish people in Kurdistan, since he won many votes in the Kurdish region in both the 1974 and 1977 elections. But the slogans he has carried in the past and continues to carry are contradicted by his acts.

The leftist wing of Ecevit's party genuinely wanted to bring about radical changes in Turkish society, more particularly extensive democratic freedoms. This wing had advocated such a programme before 1974 and 1977. But Ecevit had always struck out at this wing until he managed virtually to destroy it before the 1977 elections. For example, he struck off the names of all the Kurds who had national and progressive leanings from his party's list of candidates, those who had won substantial initial votes which indicated their certain victory. He did the same to a number of Turkish progressive candidates. This action led to the loss of many votes for his party. Many of the patriotic and progressive Kurds were therefore compelled to stand alone as independents in the elections; and a number of them were subsequently elected to parliament.

Another example was his blocking of many Kurdish candidates in the municipal elections, although despite his efforts, 150 progressive and patriotic Kurds were elected either as city mayors or village Mukhtars who had run as independent candidates. Meanwhile, Ecevit opened wide the doors of his party to Kurdish landowners and others who had cooperated with various previous Turkish governments in oppressing their own Kurdish people.

Ecevit's attitude towards the Kurdish people in Turkey stems from the thoughts of the founder of his party, Mustafa Kemal, namely the denial of the existence of the Kurdish people, their liquidation by force, their forcible assimilation and the denial of their national identity. For example, during the demonstrations which were organised by Ecevit's party in the cities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir during the 1977 campaign and were addressed by Ecevit himself, those Kurds who carried such slogans as Freedom for the People and Freedom for the Kurdish People, were harassed by Ecevit's followers upon his own instructions. He aimed at creating an electrified atmosphere between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples. During these gatherings, he shouted that those who carried slogans of Freedom for the Peoples were fascists. What a strange thing! Who really are the fascists? Are they those who carry slogans demanding Freedom for the Peoples?

The present government is in fact a civilian junta drawing its support from the industrial

establishment. Two of the deputy premiers are staunchly anti-democratic, one of these being Faruk Sukan, who was Minister of Interior in Demirel's cabinet from 1965-1970, the man responsible for forming the notorious "riot control" apparatus for controlling popular demonstrations and the arrest of innocent civilians. He is the man who had said in parliament when addressing the anti-democratic elements, "Do not be afraid because we know even how the left in Turkey breathe". He meant to indicate that Turkish police were watching every step taken by democrats and progressives in the country. He is the man who, having become deputy prime minister in Ecevit's present government, issued an order to all the governors of Turkey's provinces to allow only Kemal Ataturk's speeches to be posted on walls.

The present Minister of the Interior is a former general in the 1971 junta.

The Minister of Education is an ex-head of the Turkish secret service, MIT.

One of the deputy premiers was a senior police chief in Istanbul.

Mr Ecevit has abandoned many of the promises he made during the election campaign; in his speech marking the formation of his cabinet and in his working programme, he did not mention any of the promises which he had pledged. He has not mentioned anything about the amnesty for political prisoners who number more than 1000; about the repeal of Articles 141 and 142 which forbid the formation of national and class orientated parties; about the freedom of thought; and about the amnesty for political refugees abroad. Instead, he emphasised his insistence on keeping Turkey as a member of both NATO and CENTO, strengthening relations with the USA and West European countries. Despite his government's promises to put an end to political assassination and violence, Turkey's neo-fascist party has actually continued virtually unopposed to commit acts of political assassination against progressives, democrats and leftists — both Turks and Kurds. According to official figures, the number of people assassinated during Ecevit's reign is much larger than those murdered during Demirel's regime.

Turkey's economy is in bad shape. The treasury's foreign assets are dwindling; foreign debts have reached \$3,500 million. Strict restrictions have been imposed on travel abroad for tourists. As a result, the Turkish Government have asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for increased loans; the IMF in turn has imposed certain conditions, among them the revaluation of the Turkish Lira by 35% (the Turkish authorities have actually revalued it by 30%). The revaluation will hit hardest at the poor in rural areas and urban centres. But it will benefit the bourgeoisie in the export-import business. Other conditions imposed by the IMF were the reduction of the growth rate from 8% to 5% pa and the curtailment of imports to a large extent.

The economic crisis through which Turkey is now passing is the worst in the country's history and the deficit in the balance of payments has reached \$4,000 million.

The rate of unemployment has also reached unprecedented heights. Total unemployment — including the so-called "disguised unemployment" —

is estimated at one quarter of the total labour force of the country.

Large sums have been spent on the importation of weapons, oil and electric power. Bulgaria has twice stopped the export of electric power to Turkey because of failure to pay its dues — estimated at \$10 million.

There is a de facto energy crisis in Turkey. Oil reserves can meet the needs of only three days' consumption. Electric power is regularly cut off for 3 hours each day almost throughout the entire country. Due to high oil prices, many industrial establishments in the country have been forced to reduce their working days by several hours each day. Moreover, because of the heavy burden of foreign debts and the huge deficit in the balance of payments, many an industry finds it difficult to procure raw materials on a regular basis to meet their production requirements.

The largest portion of the state budget is being spent on the armed forces to meet both the NATO and CENTO commitments, and Turkey's occupation of 40% of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 — though the Cypriot Turks did not exceed 18% of the island's population. One outcome of this occupation has been the deportation or exodus of an estimated two hundred thousand Cypriots from their homes. There are strong indications that this occupation took place with the tacit approval of the US Government which wanted to make the island a base for the US and NATO. What is worth noting is the present US Administration's attempts to lift the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the US Congress in order to freeze the present situation on the island. The occupation of the island and arms imports will drain the little remaining reserves in the Treasury which the country desperately needs in other fields.

The Turkish government continues its forcible deportation of Kurds from their homes on the pretext of danger from earthquakes. Some have been compulsorily resettled in Cyprus, thus increasing their suffering (a similar forced deportation and compulsory resettlement of Kurds is taking place in Tikrit's Iraq). But the Kurdish people resist these measures by every means available to them. For example, 26 Kurds have refused to go with the Turkish occupation troops to Cyprus. They were court martialled, sentenced to death and executed in August 1974.

The Kurdish people in Turkey are estimated to constitute approximately one quarter of the total population of the country, i.e. nearly 10 million, while the region they inhabit is about one third of the area of Turkey. All these original inhabitants are deprived of their national rights. Every liberation movement since World War I has been brutally suppressed by the central government in Ankara. The situation of the Kurdish people and their region vis à vis the central authorities is exactly the situation of a colony vis à vis its metropolitan centre. All the means followed by colonialism and neo-colonialism towards their colonies have been and are being pursued against the Kurdish people in Kurdistan.

The various governments controlling Kurdistan try to excel over each other in their attempts to consolidate their colonialist intentions in Kurdistan. For example, the Turkish government began in the mid 1960s to open dormitories, attached to elementary and secondary schools, for

pupils from the countryside where they are being educated "in the Turkish way". They are taken away from their families and relatives. What is most striking is that out of a total of 75 such boarding schools all over Turkey, there are 72 in Kurdistan — by contrast to the disfavoured position of the region in all other branches of education. The purpose of these boarding schools is obviously to assimilate the Kurds at the earliest possible stages and prevent their participation in their people's struggle to attain their legitimate rights.

Turkish governments have ignored all international treaties that they signed and ratified, such as the UN Covenants on Political and Civil Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights — especially Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 37 of the Helsinki Final Act, together with Section 4 of the latter on national minorities and regional cultures.

Ecevit's government do not honour these commitments. They will continue to ignore them and go on persecuting the Kurdish people in order to satisfy the conservative right wing faction of his party from which he draws most of his strength. Turkey is now the only state in Europe that has anti-democratic legislation. Spain was the last citadel of fascism in Western Europe; but that system has fallen and democratic liberties have been restored. Even the Communist Party of Spain has been

legalised and now functions in the open. Catalonia and the Basque country have gained their national rights, even though on a limited scope. But in Turkey, not only is the Communist Party outlawed, but even other democratic and progressive forces are illegal. The non-Turkish nationalities, as the Kurds, are forbidden by law to form their own political parties, let alone to enjoy recognition of their national rights by the state. The Kurds are still called "mountain Turks".

However, the Kurdish people will continue their struggle to win their national and democratic rights, in the same way that all oppressed and colonised peoples have done or continue to do. There is no force that can stop the march of history or prevent the Kurdish people from steadfastly struggling for their national rights.

Our Kurdish people call upon all peoples and democratic and progressive forces everywhere to support and back their struggle for their national and democratic rights and for putting an end to the anti-democratic and conservative regime in Turkey, which is supported by the imperialists and the multi-national companies. Our struggle is to bring about a genuinely democratic system which serves the people, especially the poor, toiling classes, and which recognises the legitimate national rights of our Kurdish people.

FREQUENT EXCHANGE VISITS AMONG OFFICIALS OF THE IRAQ AND IRAN REGIMES

The past 9 months have witnessed an unprecedented spate of visits by Iraqi and Iranian officials to each other's capitals.

4 - 9 July 1977

The Iraqi Minister of Interior headed a high ranking delegation to Teheran on a 6 day visit from 4-9 July 1977. Six agreements were signed. The joint press statement issued in Baghdad and Teheran at the end of the visit stated that "Izzet Ibrahim (Iraqi Interior Minister) expressed his admiration for the progress made by Iran in all fields, achieved through the efforts of the Shahanshah's Government under the leadership of the Shahanshan Aryamehr."

3 August 1977

On 3 August, the Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Acting Foreign Minister received the Iranian National Defence Academy delegation visiting Iraq and briefed the delegation on Iraq's foreign policy.

27 August 1977

On 27 August, The Iraqi Health Minister returned to Baghdad from a visit to Iran during which he signed an agreement with his Iranian counterpart.

27 September 1977

On 27 September 1977, the Chairman of the Iraqi General Corporation for Exports returned to Baghdad with members of his delegation after a week's visit to Iran. Together with the head of the Iranian Centre for the Encouragement of Exports, he signed the joint minutes dealing with economic matters and trade cooperation.

31 October 1977

On 31 October 1977 the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Airforce left for Baghdad to head a military delegation to Iraq. During a two day visit he met with the Iraqi President, Vice-President, Defence Minister and other Iraqi officials.

27 November 1977

The Director of the Political Department of the Iranian Interior Ministry arrived in Baghdad on 27 November 1977 to meet with high ranking Iraqi officials during a week's visit.

3-5 December 1977

From 3-5 December 1977, the Iraqi ceremonial Vice-President, Taha Muhiddin Ma'ruf, visited Iran where he met the Shah and assured him that the Baghdad regime was faithfully fulfilling all commitments as laid down in the 1975 Algiers agreement. At the conclusion of Ma'ruf's visit, a joint communiqué was released in Baghdad and Teheran on 5 December stating that "... During the audience Taha Muhiddin Ma'ruf expressed his admiration for the achievements of Iran in various domains, achievements which resulted from the efforts of the Iranian Government under the leadership of his Majesty the Shahanshah."

"... Regarding bilateral relations, the sides declared their unequivocal determination to implement fully the agreements concluded between the two sides. The two sides welcomed the serious efforts made to implement the provision of the Algiers agreement. ..."

Moreover, during his press conference at Teheran airport before his departure, Ma'ruf said, "... Our bilateral relations are the best that can be between two neighbouring countries. Each of the two sides carefully and fully adhered to the spirit of the Algiers declaration issued in March 1975, the subsequent treaty on international borders and good neighbourliness, the protocols appended to this treaty, and numerous agreements which regulate the relations between Iraq and Iran in various domains."

20 December 1977

On 20 December 1977, a 10-member delegation from the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines left Teheran for Baghdad at the invitation of the Commercial and Industrial Union of Iraq.

13 February 1978

On 13 February 1978, the Iranian Chief of Staff arrived in Baghdad at the head of a delegation on a 9 day visit, during which he met the Iraqi President, Vice-President, Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior and his Iraqi counterpart. The Iranian Chief of Staff also visited certain areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

26 February 1978

On 26 February 1978, the Iranian Foreign Minister set out on a 5 day visit to Iraq to discuss with prominent Ba'th officials methods of consolidating relations and cooperation between the two regimes. At the end of this visit, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated in a joint press statement that "the two sides stressed their common determination to continue to implement to the full the Algiers agreement and the Teheran protocol on relations between the two countries. . . The heads of the Iraqi and Iranian delegations had exchanged instruments of ratification of an agreement on cooperation between the two countries' Ministries of Interior. . ."

5 March 1978

The Director General of the Iraqi Interior Ministry arrived in Teheran on 5 March 1978 for a week's visit. On 12 March he stated that "... the discussions during this visit dealt with the . . . co-ordination of the work of the border commission under the 1975 agreement signed between Iraq and neighbouring Iran."

23 April 1978

The Iraqi news agency reported from Teheran on 23 April that the Iraqi Air Force Commander had arrived in the Iranian capital at the start of a five day visit to Iran.

15 May 1978

An Iranian civil aviation delegation, led by Mahdi Haj Moniri, head of the civil aviation organisation and deputy War Minister of Iran, left for Baghdad on 15 May to discuss expanding air services between the two countries.

The purpose of these numerous visits has been to coordinate the efforts of the two regimes to crush "subversive elements" in both countries, to strengthen "the security of the borders" between the two, and to find new areas of cooperation between them in a number of fields — intelligence, police, transportation, tourism, fisheries and other enterprises. One of the basic objectives is to fight Kurdish nationalism, and the May Revolution by

all means. Iranian military liaison officers are stationed in Ranya and Qala Diza, both towns in Kurdistan of Iraq situated within 50 km of the Iraqi/Iranian border. On the Iranian side of the frontier, Iraqi military liaison officers are stationed in Khana and Sardasht. Coordination between the Iraqi and Iranian regimes is being achieved and their concerted efforts to liquidate the Kurdish revolution and the KDP are already in the implementation phase.

In an interview with the London Sunday Times correspondent published on 16 April 1978, the Shah admitted, "Yes, we do have very good relations with Iraq."

In addition, the following agreements have been signed or ratified by the Iraqi Ba'th with the Shah's regime:

(1) 9 July 1977

The Iraqi Minister of Interior signed 6 agreements in Teheran — 1 - a cultural agreement; 2 - a trade agreement; 3 - an agreement for cooperation in tourism; 4 - an agreement on cooperation between the Interior Ministry of Iraq and the Interior Ministry in Iran; and 6 - an agreement connecting the Iraqi and Iranian railway systems.

(2) 2 October 1977

The RCC ratified the cooperation agreement between the two Interior Ministries signed in Teheran on 9 July, "in a desire to develop relations between the Iraqi and Iranian Governments" (Iraqi News Agency, 30 October 1977).

(3) 6 November 1977

An agreement to set up trade centres in Baghdad and Teheran.

(4) 6 November 1977

An agreement to coordinate the two countries' export policies for the supply of dates to the world markets and cooperation in finding new markets for dates.

(5) 8 November 1977

Iraq's Revolution Command Council (RCC) ratified the Iraq-Iran military agreement for linking the two countries' railway systems, signed on 9 July 1977.

(6) 20 December 1977

INA reported the ratification by RCC of a comprehensive agreement for cultural cooperation between Iraq and Iran signed in Teheran on 9 July.

(7) 12 April 1978

Radio Teheran reported that the Iraqi Government had agreed to the establishment of an Iranian export board in Baghdad.

(8) 2 May 1978

A tourism cooperation agreement was signed between Iraq and Iran in Baghdad on 2 May. (INA, 2 May 1978)

* * *

INSIDE TIKRITIS' IRAQ

1 When a Ba'thist reaches the rank of "vertical leadership", his privileges greatly increase. He is given a house, a car, a monthly allowance of ID30.00 (about £55) for petrol, a monthly salary and other allowances and prerogatives.

2 In every government department and office, there is a "security man" whose duty it is to watch over his colleagues' political activities, pin point their views and report these to his "national security" superiors. The "security man" is an ordinary official, but one who enjoys more power than his administrative superiors within the department; in addition to his salary, he is granted allowances.

3 The regime has inculcated such fear and distrust among the citizens that one even begins to doubt one's own brothers and friends.

4 One worker at the Iraqi Commercial Company (Karim A.S. Hassan) was detained for "spreading biased and false rumours." (vide Iraqi News Agency 18 January 1978)

5 The families of Murad Ridha, Ali Ridha and Musa Ridha, numbering 29 members, suffer from not being given the "certificate of citizenship", even though they all have citizenship books and the young among them have performed their compulsory military service. (Tariq al-Sha-ab daily, 18 January 1978).

6 The RCC has decreed that "members of the armed forces, of the internal security forces, of the general intelligence Ri'asa" are admitted at "all universities, colleges, institutions and schools and are exempted from all admission rules regarding age, average marks, year of graduation, and attendance proportion." (INA, 11 January 1978)

7 Any Iraqi citizen who obtains a grant or a scholarship from a foreign source without the

previous consent of the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research is liable to the following punishments: a) the degree he or she obtains is disregarded; and b) he or she faces a prison term of 5-15 years. The RCC decree applies retroactively. (The decree was published in the Iraqi press and was dated 29 October 1975).

8 The semi-official daily, al-Thawra, reported on 1 February 1978 that "the security apparatuses have uncovered an agent spreading biased rumours and propaganda." On this occasion, the General Directorate of Security issued a statement "urging the citizens to cooperate with us by quickly informing the concerned authorities about such opportunist elements in order to present them to justice, to obtain the punishment and to block the way before the agents and saboteurs." (al-Thawra, 1 February 1978, p.4)

9 Admission to the following colleges at all Iraqi universities has become the exclusive privilege of the ruling Ba'th party members and those approved by the party:

- a The College of Education
- b The College of Arts
- c The College of Physical Education
- d The Academy of Fine Arts
- e Teachers' institutes
- f Fine Arts institutes

If all applicants cannot be absorbed, those not admitted are usually sent abroad at the expense of the state — mainly to Egypt and Lebanon (before the outbreak of hostilities there).

The first four institutions mentioned above (a-d) graduate intermediate and secondary school teachers (mudarrisin), whereas the last two (e-f) train elementary school teachers (mu'allimin).

NEWS AND VIEWS

THE SHAH'S REGIME MEETS PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS WITH BULLETS

On 19/20 February 1978, police authorities in Tabriz, acting on instructions from Teheran, fired on a peaceful demonstration commemorating the victims of unrest which took place at Qom 40 days earlier. The crowd was sprayed with bullets, as a result of which at least 100 people were either killed or wounded. Many more demonstrators (official figures admit to 650) were detained and tortured.

Both the demonstration and its aftermath were a clear expression of the popular discontent felt in Iran with respect to the Shah's regime, his one-man dictatorship, his repression and arbitrariness, and his squandering of enormous sums on armaments at a time of soaring inflation and rising costs of living which hit hardest at the poor in rural areas and low income groups in the urban centres.

Our Kurdish people in general and our party in particular have had full experience of the Shah's dishonesty and sinister intentions towards Kurdish rights, aspirations and national liberation movement. We denounce his repression of the Iranian peoples, his collaboration with the Baghdad regime in their attempts to suppress the 26 May 1976 revolution and his interference in Iraqi Kurdish affairs. We also support all progressive forces in Iran which are struggling against his one-man dictatorship and repression.

SAUDI MINISTER FOR DEFENCE AND AVIATION VISITS BAGHDAD

The Saudi Minister for Defence and Aviation, Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz, paid an official visit to Baghdad from 17-19 April 1978, when he met with the Iraqi President al-Bakr, the Vice-President, Saddam Tikriti, and the Defence Minister, Adnan Khairalla Talfah.

In a statement before his return to Riyadh, the Saudi Minister "emphasised that there were no points of disagreement on any topics discussed". His Iraqi counterpart said that "his talks with Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz had achieved positive results. . ."

REVIVAL OF THE GULF SECURITY PACT

The Gulf News Agency in a dispatch from Kuwait, reported on 19 April that "the Kuwaiti newspaper 'al-Siyasah' today reports that the Gulf is moving towards establishing a security belt and Saudi Arabia now feels the need to activate contacts on both sides of the Gulf." The paper added that the Saudi Crown Prince is expected to pay a visit to Teheran after the visit to Baghdad by the Saudi Defence Minister "and will aim at developing a kind of security and defence cooperation among the three big Gulf littoral countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran)." The paper went on to say that "this cooperation will begin with a meeting of the Ministers of Interior and Defence of the three countries to draw up a joint collective working formula for the Gulf region to face foreign dangers to the area."

"Al-Madina", the Saudi Arabian daily, on 16 May published a statement by Prince Nayif, the Saudi Minister of the Interior, in which he described his meeting with the Gulf Ministers of the Interior as "positive". They all wished to develop the security services in the Gulf still further.

(Saudi News Agency, 16 May 1978)



THE BAGHDAD-TEHERAN AXIS CONSOLIDATES ITS ANKARA LINK

Iraqi Vice-President, Saddam Tikriti, has recently announced that his regime's ties with the Shah's government "have become strategic". Meanwhile, the Iraqi-Turkish "border security" pact has been consolidated by Ba'thist concessions over the question of Turkey's debts to Iraq. In return, the Turkish regime has "promised to intensify its surveillance of (the Iraqi-Turkish) borders to prevent infiltration", according to an Arab weekly published in Paris.

The same paper goes on to say that "as Iranian-Iraqi ties have become strategic, so have Turkish-Iraqi relations become strategic also."

These "strategic relations" between the Iraqi Ba'th and Ankara and Teheran are in effect the revival in a new guise of the Sa'ad Abad Treaty and the CENTO Pact signed by the respective governments in the 1940s and 1950s and designed to suppress the progressive forces in the three countries, more particularly the Kurdish national liberation movement. Of course, the Iraqi Ba'th "progressive" pretensions can no longer be kept under a veil as they are being exposed day by day through the actions and policies of the government in Baghdad, their vociferous jargon notwithstanding.

It is worth mentioning here that Mr. Erbakan, Deputy Prime Minister in Demirel's last cabinet, visited Iraq at the end of November 1977 and held meetings with the Iraqi Vice-President, Saddam Tikriti, the Chief of General Staff and the Interior Minister, among others.

Moreover, Mr Dogan Turkoman, a high ranking official at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, arrived in Baghdad on 3 May 1978 at the head of a delegation that included a number of governors of Turkish provinces. The Iraqi News Agency said that the delegation would conduct negotiations with Iraqi officials in Baghdad concerning Iraqi Turkish border problems.

All indications point towards the fact that the delegation's main purpose is the consolidation of the Iraqi-Turkish "border security" treaty of summer 1975 designed to combat Kurdish nationalism.

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN POINTS OUT THE ROLE OF THE SHAH IN THE REGION:

Abh al-Fattah Isma'il of PDRY, in a press conference held on 5 February 1978, pointed out that "Iran was the most dangerous of the big powers to our Arab nation in general, and to our people in the Peninsula and the Arab Gulf in Particular, following US declaration and moves made by the Shah of Iran in the Arab Gulf and Peninsula and in the Middle East region."

He continued, "US imperialism had given the Shah of Iran a very big role as the politician guarding the interests of imperialism in general in the area and US imperialism in particular . . . The Shah of Iran had now reached a level of ferocity when he no longer concealed his intentions of extending his influence over the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf, threatening the security and people of those regions by intervention, and by direct invasion of Oman against the will of our Omani people in Oman as well as against the popular armed revolution under the leadership of the PFLO. To make matters even worse, he had now started talking about the Middle East, Palestine and the role given to Sadat by US imperialism."

FRENCH POLICE AND SECURITY DELEGATION IN BAGHDAD

The Director General of the French Police, heading an official French police delegation which included France's Main Public Security director, arrived in Baghdad on 10 April 1978 for a visit to Iraq lasting several days. The delegation held talks with officials at the Iraqi General Police Department on "cooperation between the police forces of the two countries."

The visit was reported by the Iraqi News Agency on 17 April but nothing has been mentioned about the fields of "cooperation".

REVENGE, TIKRITI CLAN STYLE

The Egyptian daily "al-Ahram" reported on 30 April 1978 that "the Egyptian supreme state security prosecution has charged an Iraqi intelligence agent, Salih Muhsin Khidhir al-Asawi, whose attempt to kill a Syrian in Cairo was foiled by the state security criminal investigation department, with committing a criminal conspiracy to kill in Egypt."

The paper added, "the investigations revealed that the Iraqi, who arrived in Cairo on a forged Kuwaiti passport, was assigned to kill a Syrian in Cairo because of differences between the two wings of the Ba'th Party in the two countries." The target was, according to the paper, Hashim Muhammad Awwad, who had "foiled some Iraqi attempts to assassinate a number of Syrians in Syria."

EXECUTION OF FOREIGN STUDENTS IN IRAQ

1 An official Jordanian spokesman stated on 9 October 1977 that a Jordanian citizen, Ra'id al-Zawayidah, a student at Basra University, was detained in July, sentenced to death, and subsequently executed because he refused to join the Ba'th party. The Iraqi authorities say that he was put to death for "espionage".

2 SANA reported on 9 November 1977 that an Egyptian citizen, Muhammad Amin al-Shinnawi, president of the Egyptian Students' Union, Iraqi Branch, studying at Iraqi universities, was assassinated in Iraq because "he refused to obey (the Iraqi rulers') orders and implement their designs . . . Sources in the General Union of Egyptian Students say that the Iraqi regime "continued to exercise pressure on the Egyptian students in Iraq who refuse to enlist in the Iraqi intelligence service."

IRAQI GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN ATTEMPT TO WHITEWASH THE REGIME'S POLICIES TOWARDS THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN IRAQ

In an attempt to counter the mounting popular resentment among Kurds and Iraqis against the current wave of oppression and the regime's retreat from the implementation of Kurdish national rights (referred to elsewhere in this publication), and in trying to improve its image abroad, the Iraqi government has begun a new round of propaganda moves.

The prominent features of this new campaign are: (1) avoidance of touching upon the real issues at stake (such as the village evacuations, cancellation of 40% of Kurdish language usage in schools in the "autonomous region", lack of economic development in the region, particularly in the industrial sector); (2) the use of data which cannot be verified (eg. figures are mentioned for sums "allotted" but no reference is made to actual spending on projects, data is given at random which is neither systematic nor comprehensive and from which no comparisons or accurate deductions can be made); (3) outright fallacious statements (eg. claims that "not a single unemployed person exists in the autonomous area", or "there is not a single deported Kurd"); (4) categorical denials (eg. "all talk of Kurds being executed is untrue", or "there is no Kurdish problem in Iraq"); (5) contradiction between official publications, statements and decrees and the oral pronouncements of government spokesmen (eg. the Vice-President of Iraq stated (in a speech published in "One Trench or Two Trenches", 1977, pp.34-35) ". . . In addition, . . . certain other requirements must be completed, such as control of the borders, deportation from the border to a depth of 20 kms so that infiltration does not occur, the founding of apparatuses for the collection of information and to follow evil tendencies, the stationing of the army in the area and deploying it in the form of special camps and the opening of roads in the mountains. . . etc", whereas the official spokesmen pretend that the measures have been taken "to help the inhabitants of the border by resettling them in larger villages which can be supplied with modern amenities."

However, the new attempt has not fared any better than previous ones because it is based not on an honest discussion of issues at stake, founded on all available facts, but rather on the achievement of one sole objective, namely propaganda for the Iraqi regime, even if this required suppression of unwelcome facts and problems.

ANOTHER STEP BACKWARDS ON THE ROAD OF RETREAT FROM KURDISH RIGHTS IN IRAQ

The Regime Fights Kurdish Culture

In mid-October 1977 the Iraqi regime issued a new decree by which the use of the Kurdish language as a medium of instruction in the schools of the "autonomous region" was reduced by at least 40%. This decision contravenes the provision stipulated in both the 11 March 1970 agreement between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government, and the government's own "Law of Autonomy" unilaterally proclaimed by Baghdad on 11 March 1974. It is also an outright disregard of the Kurdish people's national rights and aspirations. It is yet another step backwards on the road of retreat from the Kurdish masses' national, democratic and cultural rights followed by the Iraqi Ba'th regime.

This arbitrary measure has caused great anger among the Kurds, especially among students, who marched in protest demonstrations against it. All books, written in the Kurdish language affected by this measure were collected by the authorities and burned in school yards in the presence of students who showed signs of disappointment, anger and sadness; some even wept openly. Such practices remind us of similar acts committed during the Dark Ages in Europe, by the Nazis in Hitler's Germany and by the Fascists of Mussolini's Italy. But we all know the ending in those cases and what has been the judgement of history on the regimes involved and their policies.

CLAN AND TRIBAL CHIEFTAINS JOIN WITH LANDOWNERS AS GUARDIANS AND EXECUTORS OF THE "PROGRESSIVE" BA'THISTS' "AUTONOMY"!

On 26 Sept 1977, "al-Jamhuriya", the Baghdad daily paper, published a RCC decision appointing Muhi Jahangir Harki, the well known tribal chieftain and big landowner, as "Counsellor on Kurdish Affairs" to the Ministry of Coordinating the Affairs of the Autonomous Region. Harki's only merit and qualification for the post is his long service as an armed mercenary of various Iraqi governments, "chauvinist, dictatorial" as well as Ba'thist. The man is semi-illiterate and has not even completed elementary school.

His vacant seat on the Legislative Council (which he has never bothered to attend) was given by the Baghdad government to his younger brother, As'ad Jahangir Harki. Moreover, many of the appointed Council members are clan chieftains, tribal chiefs, Aghas, Beys and large landowners — e.g.:

- 1 Anwar Rashid Betwata, Chieftain of the Khoshnaw clan, Arbil
- 2 Jafar Abdul Karim, Agha of the Doski clan, Dahok
- 3 Hamza Bapir Agha al-Pishdari, Agha of the Pishdar clan, Qala Diza
- 4 Hussain Khidir Ahmad al-Soorchi, Chieftain of the Soorchi clan, Arbil
- 5 Dara Ibrahim Charmiga, one of the chiefs of the Ismail Uzairi tribe, Sulaimaniya
- 6 Sabir Raqib al-Soorchi, a chief in the Soorchi tribe, Arbil
- 7 Awni Mustafa Mulla Jibrael, a large landowner in Aqra
- 8 Kak Hussain Kanabi Bilbas, Agha of the Bilbas tribe, Ranya
- 9 Kawa Shaik Latif al-Hafid, a large landowner and a prominent sayed (religious leader) of the Barzanji sect, Sulaimaniya
- 10 Latif Ahmad Muhammad al-Zibari, a Zibar tribal chief, Zibar and Aqra
- 11 Mustafa Hassan Shaban al-Amadi, a large landowner of Amadiya
- 12 Muhsin Ahmad Rasheed Barwari, a chief of the Barwari tribe, Barwari
- 13 Muhammad Rasheed Lulan, Chieftain of the Lulan clan, Baradost, Arbil
- 14 Muhammad Shaikh Abdul Karim al-Kasnazani, a large landowner and a prominent sayed of the Qadiri sect
- 15 Mustafa Mahmoud al-Pishdari, one of the chiefs in the Pishdar tribe, Qala Diza
- 16 Muhammad Kulhi al-Rekani, Chieftain of the Rekani clan, Amadiya
- 17 Muhiddin Jahangir al-Harki, a chief in the Harki tribe, Aqra
- 18 Nathir Ahmad al-Barzani, one of the chiefs of the Barzan tribe, Arbil

These and the rest of the members of the Legislative Council have been appointed by the Baghdad government in contravention of its own "Law of Autonomy" of March 1974 which stipulated that the members of the Council should be appointed for one term and that then they must be elected.

Moreover, the newly appointed Minister of State for Coordinating Activities in the Autonomous Area is Khalid Tabrah. During and after the 8 February 1963 coup d'état, Tabrah was notorious for torturing political detainees, especially those having progressive leanings. After the July 1968 coup, he was appointed Governor of Kirkuk and was the man entrusted by the Ba'th regime to carry out its policy of forcibly deporting Kurds from the oil rich province, including the dismissal of all Kurdish workers from the oil installations and the sulphur extracting plant in the province.

INFIGHTING CAUSES FREQUENT CHANGES IN THE IRAQI CABINET

One of the prominent features of the Iraqi dictatorship is the frequent turnover among members of the cabinet and within the hierarchy of the ruling party and armed forces. These changes reflect the degree of infighting and the inability of the regime to tolerate people of differing views, even within their own ranks. They are also a measure of the failure to solve the country's basic problems and the struggle which is taking place between various factions within the Ba'th party in an attempt to keep a balance between the two wings which support Vice-President Saddam Tkiriti and President al-Bakr.

At the end of February 1978, three ministers were replaced without any reason being given for the changes. The main element at work seems to be the preservation of the delicate balance between the two strong factions, with each attempting to improve his own position at the expense of the other. This has led to the appointment to sensitive posts of individuals who lack the basic qualifications to fulfil their responsibilities.

During the past 8 months, the following changes have taken place:

- 4 September 1977: A cabinet reshuffle affecting 11 Ministers of State as well as RCC changes.
- 15 October 1977: A cabinet reshuffle affecting 3 Ministers
- 12 November 1977: A cabinet change; appointment of 4 Ministers

18 February 1978: A cabinet reshuffle affecting 3 Ministers

2 April 1978: A new Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research is appointed

Another sign of weakness is the passing of a 12-year imprisonment sentence on the Ba'thist ex-Foreign Minister Abdul Karim al-Shaikhli. There are also reports of the arrest of the Ba'th Party National Command Member Shibli al-'Aisami, as well as a number of ambassadors.

THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON

On 15 March 1978, Israeli forces committed a new act of aggression against Lebanon, violating its sovereignty and bombing and strafing Palestinian refugee camps in the southern areas of the country. This action was aimed at the annihilation of Palestinian resistance, liquidating the cause of the Palestinian people, and the occupation of further territory.

The root cause of violence in the area is not so much guerilla action to the north of Tel Aviv but rather the denial by the Israeli regime of the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state.

In its disregard for the territorial integrity and independence of other countries and for the rights of the Palestinian people, Israeli intransigence and aggressiveness are based on the enormous quantities of weaponry Israel has received and continues to receive from the American Administration.

Our Party denounces this new Israeli aggression and calls for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli occupation troops from southern Lebanon and all occupied Arab territories. Moreover, we support the inalienable and legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

EVENTS TO REMEMBER

THE DAYS OF QALA DIZA AND HALABJA

On 24 April 1974 at 9.15 am, two Iraqi airforce planes launched an air attack on the town of Qala Diza, first with bombs, then with rockets and finally with cannon fire.

They hit the school, the hospital and the surrounding houses as well as a temporary university building, killing at least 135 civilians and injuring many more. One father of 9 lost every member of his family during this attack.

Two days later, on 25 April 1974, the town of Halabja was strafed and bombed, causing the death of 33 Kurds and injuring over 40 others.

Similar actions, callously calculated to produce maximum terror, have been resorted to by the various Iraqi governments in their attempts to isolate the Kurdish national liberation movement from the people as a measure of eventually crushing the movement. However, these acts of terror by successive Iraqi regimes have failed to produce their desired objectives. The Kurdish people embrace their liberation movement because it is the genuine expression of their aspirations and the instrument of their struggle to achieve their legitimate national and democratic rights.

IN MEMORY OF LAILA QASSIM AND HER COMRADES

In May 1974, the present regime in Baghdad committed an act of brutality against our Kurdish people by executing four youths and a girl, Laila Qassim. She was the first girl to be formally executed in Iraq for political reasons.

The five defendants were summarily tried by a military tribunal; they had no access to legal advice or to lawyers. A theatrical "confession" was extracted from the accused on Baghdad's TV — a common practice in all such cases. There was no right of appeal accorded to them. The charge against them was that one of them "possessed explosives". The five young people were:

- (1) Laila Qassim, student of the College of Literature, University of Baghdad.
- (2) Azad Sulaiman, " " "
- (3) Neriman Fuad Mesti " " "
- (4) Hassan Hama Rasheed " " "
- (5) Jawad Hamawandi, a worker.

The memory of our fallen martyrs and of the thousands of other victims of the dictatorial regime in Baghdad will remain fresh in the minds and conscience of our people. Our people will continue their just struggle to win the objectives for which our martyrs have sacrificed their lives.

11 MARCH 1970

Eight years ago, on March 11, the leadership of the September Kurdish revolution and the KDP on the one hand, and the Ba'th government and Party of Iraq on the other, concluded and signed the March 11, 1970 Agreement, which laid down the general principles of Kurdish autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Iraq.

The Kurdish revolution and the KDP signed the agreement in good will, believing that the other party would fulfil its part of the agreement. The government and Ba'th Party signed the agreement because of its military, financial and political weakness and in order to gain a breathing space and time in which to prepare for a new offensive, as subsequent events have proved.

However, the 11 March 1970 agreement remains one of the most prominent achievements of the September revolution despite the fact that the Iraqi government has not fulfilled its part and pledges.

11 MARCH 1974

One of the provisions of the 11 March 1970 agreement was that the Kurdish area must be accorded a mutually agreed form of autonomy within 4 years of its signing. However, when the real intentions of the regime became clear during the intervening four years, especially its military preparations and build up for a new round of fighting, and when it felt strong enough to dictate its terms on the Kurdish revolution, the regime announced unilaterally its "law of autonomy" which did not fulfil all the promises and pledges made in the 1970 agreement. Despite many attempts by the Kurdish leadership to ward off hostilities, the government was stubbornly determined to achieve a military solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq. Thus, the war began once more.

6 MARCH 1975

Mustering all its military might and the newly acquired financial assets following the tremendous rise in oil prices, and hatching as many plots and conspiracies as possible to destroy the September revolution, the Iraqi regime failed to achieve this objective. Despite Iraqi superiority in both man- and fire-power, the Peshmergas brought the Iraqi military machine to a standstill and a situation of military stalemate. To avoid the risk of being overthrown, the regime made a sharp about turn and began negotiations with the regime of the Shah, under the auspices of Kissinger, ex-Secretary of the US State Department. After several meetings, the strongmen of the two regimes, the Shah and Saddam Tikriti, signed an agreement in Algiers on 6 March 1975.

The Ba'th regime relinquished Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt el-Arab waterway and over other Iraqi territories to the Shah, in addition to the other military, political and economic concessions they made to him. Both sides agreed to fight "subversive elements" in their respective countries and to cooperate and coordinate their efforts to maintain "the security of their borders", all measures directed against the Kurdish national liberation movement.

The agreement was a crushing blow to the Kurdish leadership and was the direct external factor leading to the collapse of the Kurdish revolution at the same time as it suffered from various internal weaknesses and problems.

8 FEBRUARY 1963

On this and subsequent days, Iraq witnessed a wave of terror the like of which had never before been experienced in the modern history of the country. The Ba'th Party coup d'état which overthrew the Qassim regime in 1963 committed such appalling violations that the Iraqi people called it "Black February". Within less than a week, the notorious Ba'th militia, "al-Haras al-Qawmi", killed thousands and detained tens of thousands more Iraqi citizens, including democrats, progressives and communists, Arabs, Kurds and other minority groups in Iraq.

What the people have called "Black February" is for the Ba'thist regime "The Bride of Revolutions".

On the 15th anniversary of "Black February", al-Bakr, President of the Iraqi regime, delivered a speech in which he exerted great efforts to reassure his regime's good intentions towards his "good neighbour", the regime of the Shah, and repeatedly to underline his regimes' concern to secure the interests, especially the oil interests, of the imperialist and racist powers and multinational companies. He declared that, "... Iraq has called for strong ties with the countries of the region. . . It has also called for the maintenance of security and stability in the waterways through which the vital interests of all the countries of the region are flowing . . . in accordance with existing laws and pacts.

. . . What we are calling for in this respect is a guarantee for everyone."

DEATH RIDDLE OF AL-BAKR'S SON AND FAMILY

On 26 March 1978, the official Iraqi media broke the news of the death of President al-Bakr's son together with his wife and one of his sisters in a "car accident" north of Baghdad. Two more sisters-in-law were injured.

Some sources have however suggested that the "incident" was in reality an ambush carried out on Route 8 north of the capital in which a convoy of cars carrying members of al-Bakr's family were sprayed with machine gun bullets. In addition to the casualties mentioned above, most of the family's bodyguards lost their lives. Security forces sealed off the city next day but failed to track down the culprits responsible for the ambush.

It should be recalled that al-Bakr's son-in-law, Mudhir al-Mutlag, was also killed not long ago. "His car plunged into the river Tigris because he was drunk at the time", Iraqi officials claimed privately. But others suggest that his car was actually pushed into the river.

BA'THIST HYPOCRISY

In an interview with al-Watan al-Arabi (issue No. 25, 5/11 Aug. 1977) the Iraqi Ba'thist ex-minister of Information and currently member of the National Command of the Ba'th Party, Tariq Aziz, stated with

regard to the Eritrean revolution that, "when Iraq supported the revolution, she had principled justifications, namely that it is a revolution, by an Arab people against a state that does not want to grant this people their natural right of self-determination." He went on to say, "We reject that the Ethiopians massacre the Eritrean people. The people of Eritrea are an Arab people . . . having their entity and national identity which are different from the entity and national identity of the Ethiopian state; and this is a different matter. As for the internal affairs of Ethiopia, we have no concern for them."

This stand is not "principled" as Aziz claims, but it is completely hypocritical because his regime refuses to recognise that the Kurdish people have the same "natural right of self-determination", and does not allow the Kurds to exercise this right. It is often easy to make ostentatious claims but the real test comes when one is required to put one's claims into practice — or not as the case may be. On this issue, the stand of the Iraqi regime is obviously hypocritical.

However, the aid and support provided by the Iraqi regime is not "principled" as claimed; many strings are attached to them, especially the condition to impose Ba'thist ideas and eventually a Ba'th party on the Eritreans.

THE SYRIAN GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOUR UNIONS EXPOSES THE IRAQI REGIME'S DEVIIOUS METHODS

The Executive Office of the Syrian General Federation of Labour Unions has sent a letter to the President of the Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions, in reply to a cable received from the latter dated 23 March 1978, in which it states that, "The fact is that the methods used by the Iraqi regime are now known to the Arab masses in general and to the Iraqi Arab (sic) people in particular. . . this regime has . . . placed itself in one trench with the forces hostile to the Arab struggle. . . " The letter went on to say that this was because "the Iraqi regime is only fulfilling the commitments it assumed under the ill-omened (Algiers) March agreement (with Iran of 1975). . ."

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PALESTINIAN WORKERS' FEDERATION DENOUNCES THE IRAQI REGIME'S PLOTS TO DIVIDE THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

On 5 April, the President of the Palestinian Workers' Federation condemned "the Iraqi rulers' plots to divide the Palestinian movement (which) served only the Zionist enemy." He went on to say that ". . . the Iraqi rulers' policy was against the Palestinian Revolution's interests and was based on outbidding and distortion of facts."

MAY DAY

On May 1 every year, the working class all over the world celebrate their day, the day of triumph over their oppressors, the day marking the turning point of their march towards achieving political, economic and social progress.

May Day represents a special event for the Kurdish working class, who, because of the Iraqi government's reluctance to industrialise the Kurdish region, constitute a relatively small segment of our society numerically. But their thought, steadfastness and determination to carry on the struggle compensate for this. The alliance between workers and peasants and the national petit bourgeoisie constitutes a cornerstone in our party's strategy for the present phase of struggle.

The present Iraqi regime does strive to combat our working people, despite its false slogans. Kurdish workers have been dismissed from the Kirkuk oil and sulphur extracting installations and from other industries.

In addition to national oppression, the Kurdish working class, like the entire working people in Iraq, still suffer from economic, social and political discrimination and pressure. Their living conditions are harsh as inflation is at 25-30% p.a., whereas wages rise by much less. The Iraqi working class are deprived of their trade union and political rights. Political and decision making powers in all fields are concentrated entirely in the hands of the Ba'th party.

We salute the Kurdish and Iraqi working class and the entire working class in the world and wish them further victories.

We take this opportunity to call upon all workers, progressive and democratic forces in the Middle East and the rest of the world to support our Kurdish people's struggle for their national and democratic rights and for economic and social progress.

* * *

EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS

THE KURDS CONTINUE THEIR ONE-THOUSAND-YEAR OLD STRUGGLE

TRANSLATION from Swedish

from EXPRESSEN, Stockholm Sweden,
27 November 1977

Herman Lindqvist of EXPRESSEN is the only Swedish journalist who has been to both sides of the Kurdish freedom struggle. Now, when there has officially been peace for over two years, he is back in Kurdistan with the permission of the Baghdad regime.

by Herman Lindqvist

Rawanduz (Expressen) — The war moved towards its conclusion. The winter was severe and the snow fell early in this last year of war 1974-75. A few months before everything came to an end, I had been here in the mountains with the Kurdish freedom fighters.

We had lain on the heights overlooking Rawanduz, looking down at the town, a cluster of small houses with flat roofs, many built of mud.

Rawanduz, the last Kurdish town nearest the borders with Iran 80 kms away, had been conquered by the Iraqi army, but was still surrounded by the Kurds. The Iraqis had a strong artillery position at Rawanduz which indiscriminately pounded the heights. The Kurds' reply was to sneak down the mountains at night and shoot up the houses with RPGs. Every Iraqi soldier who ventured out of the houses during the daytime was picked off by the Kurdish sharpshooters.

They Do Not Give Up

But it was David's struggle against Goliath, and slowly but confidently, the Iraqi war machine rolled forward towards the Iranian borders. My Kurdish friends swore that they would never give up and that the struggle for a free Kurdistan would continue until the Iraqi occupiers had been driven out.

In March 1975, the Kurds gave up. But the struggle did not come to an end. According to the guide from the Ministry of Information who accompanied me, the only hotel in Rawanduz, at which we stayed, had been built after the war. But I could count a score of bullet holes and shrapnel damage on the walls. The eastern side of the second floor has been hit by a shell. The hall had been repaired with yellow bricks. The stone floor in the dining room had been damaged by shrapnel — traces of Kurdish guerilla attacks, the new war.

Occupied

On the 300 km long ride by car from Kurdistan's borders up to Rawanduz alone, I saw whole regiments with artillery, transport, signal, infantry, supplies and tank troops.

At the oilfields around Kirkuk, seven enormous forts are being built right now, with round towers at the corners. They look like Crusader castles. Each fort has thick walls and window slits which cannot be shot through.

The whole area is full of soldiers who man everything from long range anti-aircraft missiles to guns surrounded by barbed wire. Sometimes jet aircraft flash past in the skies and helicopters hover over the fields.

Submission

It was like travelling through an area where a gigantic army manoeuvre was underway. It has looked like this for more than two years during the reign of "peace" in Kurdistan. It is obvious that the regime in Baghdad does not propose making any mistakes this time. The Kurds will be forced into submission.

Kurdistan is furnished with Iraqi soldiers and wall-papered with portraits of the country's leaders — President Bakr and the strongman Saddam Hussein. Nowhere else in Iraq's personality cult are there so many portraits of the ruling lords as in Kurdistan. The dining hall in Rawanduz had three identical portraits of Saddam Hussein. Every house in Kurdistan, every hut, every wall in every official building, has at least one portrait, often several similar portraits of the leaders.

Prepare to Shoot

At the Rawanduz Basin I saw the guns that had previously shot at us. They still stand there, 12 Soviet made 130 mm long-range guns. They were uncovered and the soldiers standing by them looked prepared to fire immediately should it be necessary.

Rawanduz was full of life, but a quarter of the population seemed to be military and 90% of the traffic in the town and on the roads all over Kurdistan, is military. Wherever I went, I was escorted by a "guide" from the Ministry of Information in Baghdad. As soon as I moved my camera, he said, "Military area". He listened to every conversation I had.

Everything Became Quiet

When darkness fell, everything became quiet. Nobody dares or is allowed to drive on the roads. Guard posts at all bridges, community centres and important strategic targets have been reinforced.

Late into the night I saw lights flickering in the many houses that have no electricity. At 0300 hours during the night I woke up to the sound of a few shots being fired and a dog barked. And then it was silence again.

At 0500 hours the call for prayers was heard. Hundreds of roosters woke up and began to crow. Smoke rose from the flat roofs. The first people, stiff and frozen, walked in the faint light between the houses. The edge of the clouds above the mountains became gold-red in the sun's first light.

School Children in Queue

I asked the hotel porter what the shooting had been about. He shrugged his shoulders and said, "They shot some dog".

We drove from Rawanduz between lines of tanks and jeeps. The bakery opened at 7 o'clock. Small children stood in a queue to get the family's breakfast bread. At 8 o'clock, the children began to set

off for school. Many of them carried tree branches and sticks, a contribution to the fuel stocks of the school.

The Kurds' struggle for freedom has continued for over 2,000 years. It still goes on. In the town of Arbil, the Kurdish capital, I understood why the struggle will continue.

The next article: Therefore The Kurds Fight.

THE PUPPETS RULE IN THE KURDS' LAND

By Herman Lindquist

Arbil (Expressen) - Muhammed Ali Amin is the Kurds' "President". He is the chairman of the Kurds' "Legislative Council" — parliament. He is not elected by any Kurds but is the appointee of the Revolution Command Council in Baghdad.

Ahmed Abdul Kadir is the Kurds' "Prime Minister". His official title is "President of the Kurdish Executive Council", i.e. the government.

The long war between the Kurds and the rulers in Baghdad was, among other things, about the right to rule their own territory, general elections, the right to develop their own culture, to speak their own language, and a demand for a reasonable percentage of Iraq's oil millions to be allocated to the development of Kurdistan, because a great deal of the oil is coming from Kurdish territory.

Today, the regime in Baghdad has divided up part of Kurdistan into three provinces which are called the "autonomous area." The borders of this region bypass the oilfields. The Kurds should thus have obtained their self-rule.

Pure Farce

But the parliament and government are pure farces. Presidents Amin and Kadir are completely unknown outside their offices. Not even the guide from the Ministry of Information in Baghdad could name the "Presidents" we were going to interview. Finally we had to ring their offices direct in order to find out what their names were.

Both gentlemen sit in imposing offices behind enormous empty desks. They have four telephones, a radio and a TV each. Both have well tailored male secretaries and both have about six different portraits of Iraq's strongmen, the President and Vice-President, in their own and their secretaries' rooms.

But here the edge of their desks is the limit of their ability to influence developments in Kurdistan.

No Free Elections

The Legislative Council, which has existed since 1974, has never passed any laws. The government has never executed any measures which have not first been approved in Baghdad. Neither here nor anywhere else in Iraq have there been any free elections.

The parliament's chairman could in no way answer my question as to what was the party composition of the parliament!

None of the parliament's members is elected by the people. All are appointed in Baghdad.

Many of the 80 parliamentary seats are not even filled yet.

But the president maintains that all those present at the Council are known and competent men. He and the Prime Minister are both Kurds with long experience within the state administration. Both of them were born in towns far from the mountains.

In the 1976 Statistical Yearbook of Iraq, one may find out exactly how many goats "younger than one year, female" there are in Kurdistan, (227,073). But nowhere is there a figure on how many Kurds exist.

Deported

President Amin thought there were 1,800,000 Kurds in the "autonomous area", but the Prime Minister thought there were 2 million Kurds in the three towns of Arbil, Al-Sulaimaniya and Dahok alone.

Immediately after the cessation of hostilities in March 1975, great sections of the population of Kurdistan were deported to the arid areas of southern Iraq. Kurdish organisations say that about 200,000 Kurds have been forcibly deported.

Kurdistan's President explained that this figure is greatly exaggerated. This is his explanation:

A few tens of thousands of Kurds, when they returned to their home villages, found that their homes were destroyed or that it was impossible to find employment. The government (in Baghdad) decided to help them to a new life until everything was stabilised. Now, most of them have been allowed to return home, except certain Kurds who remained where they are until further notice.

The fact — and I could verify it — is that all normal civilian life has been suspended in a broad belt in the border area with Iran. The villages have been evacuated.

The long war, which only during the last year of struggle, according to official figures, cost the lives of a least 100 Iraqi soldiers, and, according to the Kurds, at least 150 Kurds, every month, has not given the Kurds the self-rule they strive for and which they were promised.

* * *

My first impression on returning to Iraqi Kurdistan after an absence of several years was that things had changed considerably. On the credit side, communications and social services had improved; but on the debit side, the dissatisfaction of people could clearly be seen on their faces.

All power now rests in Ba'thist hands and it is possible to make a career for oneself only if one is a member of the Party. Nepotism had reached unbelievable levels. To have been born in Tikrit, the home town of President Bakr, of Vice-President Saddam Hussein, Defence Minister, Adnan Kh. Talfah, Sa'dun Ghaidan Minister of Communication, and the rest of the political-military top elite of the regime, is the highest status symbol and many are the advantages for those who can claim Tikrit as their birthplace.

All information is strictly controlled. Telephones are tapped. Mail is censored. It is impossible to own, purchase or hire a typewriter without special permission from the General Security. All written material, manuscripts, foreign newspapers and magazines, etc. are confiscated at Baghdad airport and all books have to pass censorship.

However, Iraqis still protest that their country is free — doubtless because there are still no laws regulating what people should eat or how they must make love.

At night, in practically every street of Baghdad, there are militant Ba'thist 'vigilantes' scrutinising the movements of passers by and stopping them at will. Iraq today is one enormous concentration camp. People disappear, are tortured and killed in the prisoners of Baghdad, Mosul, Sulaimaniya and elsewhere. Almost every week, Iraqi military vans drive out to some fields on the outskirts of Mosul to deposit corpses of prisoners who have been put to death. Of this I had first hand evidence. Doubtless such practices are repeated elsewhere.

Such oppression weighs on the entire Iraqi people, Arabs and Kurds, Communists and Democrats, although naturally, the Kurds are in the front line of repression. The Kurdish people have been subjected to dispersal by the Iraqi Government as a means of upsetting demographic homogeneity. The policy of the Ba'th is only too clear: genocide is the sole solution to the Kurdish problem.

But the Kurds are resisting through every means at their disposal. During the spring feast of Nawroz, some 80-100,000 Kurds congregated along the Zab river. They came from Sulaimaniya and neighbouring villages and towns. Faces were universally sad. Police and soldiers were everywhere and helicopters circled overhead above the crowds. During the afternoon a helicopter crashed, killing the pilot and the soldiers inside. About 3 to 8 people must have died, although no one knew for certain because the incident was never reported in the censored Iraqi press. But all at once the Kurds were smiling. One of them turned to me. "It's a happy day today", he said.

In April 1977, a village in the Galala area was completely destroyed by tanks and aerial bombardment because two or three shepherds had been found carrying bombs. The Iraqi forces had reacted immediately and within a few hours nothing was left of the Kurdish village near which the shepherds had been grazing their flocks.

In other places, Kurdish villages are evacuated without warning. I was told by one eyewitness of some Kurdish children who had gone into the woods to gather chestnuts. On the return home, they found their houses empty: everyone had been taken away by the army. Later one, the children themselves were discovered dead, still clutching the chestnuts in their hands.

I found a profound resistance among the Kurds. They do not wish to become assimilated and lose their national identity. Even in one small village in the southern marshes of Iraq, I met a woman farmer from Arbil dressed in traditional Kurdish costume. She was a Kurd, she told me, and she had been living in that area since her deportation there in 1975. Often Kurds asked me "Are you European?" and they added, "We are very friendly with Europeans."

I found the same deep sense of identity among all Kurds throughout Kurdistan — in Iraq, Persia, Turkey and Syria. I was surprised to see the words AZADIYA KURDISTAN (Freedom to Kurdistan) written on the walls of a house along the road from Bitlis to Diyarbakir in Turkey. If Turkey's Kurds can still retain and cherish their identity over the past 60 years, it is an indication that the sort of repression meted out by Ataturk and the Turks over 6 decades is hardly likely to succeed now under the Ba'th regime of Iraq, despite their present cruel genocide.

"Seagull"*

* The identity of the writer is known to the Editor of Pesh Merga. It is indicative of the repression practised by the Ba'th regime of Baghdad that even a foreign writer feels compelled to seek anonymity.

* * *

APPEALS

Dear Sir,

3 February 1978

We enclose a list of names and relevant particulars of people who have been either executed, imprisoned or detained by the Iraqi authorities. The reasons leading these authorities to mete out such harsh sentences are either joining an opposition political party — namely the KDP — or being relatives of a person who has joined the ranks of the Kurdish partisans. Many of the people involved are either women or girls and children who have committed no offence; or else they are infants who should not be kept in detention under any rule that respects the very laws it has itself made and which values human dignity, rights and lives.

We appeal to you to exert your efforts to help these detainees and to make representations to the Iraqi authorities to put an end to the execution of Iraqi citizens — Kurds, Arabs or members of other national minorities — because of their involvement in politics or on the grounds of being relations of the partisans.

We take this opportunity of thanking you.

Yours sincerely,

	Full Name	Place & Date of birth	Occupation	Place of Domicile	Marital Status & no. of Children	Date of arrest
1	Lt. Abdul Qadir Othman Mizuri	Peda, 1947	Army officer. subsequently railway official	Dahok/Islam quarter	Married - 2	5/6/1977
2	Abid Abdulla Alyas al-Mizuri	Zawita 1953	Veterinary official, Dahok	Dahok Dahok	Married - 1 Married - 1	30/5/77
3	Mahmoud Ghalbish	Ghalbish	Accountant	Dahok	Married - 0	20/5/77
4	Shaban Ghalbish	Ghalbish	Shop keeper	Dahok	Married - 5	20/5/77
5	Mulla Abdul Karim Bati	Bati, 1942	Moslem priest	Dahok, Zawita	Married - 6	4/6/77
6	Khorshid Adil Muhammed Mizuri	Zawita 1955	Veterinary official	Dahok, Zawita	Married - 3	6/6/77
7	Mirza Yousif	Kati Baska 1947	Peasant	Atrosh, Shaikhan	Married - 6	13/11/76
8	Ali Barwari	Silka, 1949	Peasant	Sarsank Amadiya	Married - 5	20/11/76
9	Hussain Hassan Muhammad	Silka, 1945	Peasant	Sarsank, Amadiya	Married - 4	15/10/76
10	Ali Ahmad Hassan	Silka, 1947	Peasant	Sarsank, Amadiya	Married - 1	15/10/76
11	Ayud Yasin Abdulla	Silka, 1946	Peasant	Sarsank, Amadiya	Married - 5	15/10/76
12	Ali Khorshid Ali	Silka, 1945	Peasant	Sarsank, Amadiya	Married - 5	15/10/76
13	Jamil Rasheed Ali	Biyad, 1949	Peasant	Biyad, Amadiya	Single	15/10/76
14	Ibrahim Abdulla Alyas	Zawita, 1946	School attendant	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 9	3/6/77
15	Hussain Muhammad Muharmad-Ali	Dirashish 1951	Grocer	Dahok	Married - 1	11/8/76
16	Tariq Jamil Jasim	Gazu, 1954	Law student	Gazu, Dahok	Snigle	4/6/76
17	Salim Amin Ali	Swaratuka 1950	High school student	Swaratuka, Dahok	Single	5/3/77
18	Nadir Ali Muhammad	Dahok, 1949	Student	Dahok	Single	5/3/77
19	Hussain Ahmad Alyas	Chaman, 1956	High school student (commerce)	Chaman, Dahok	Single	1/6/77

NOTES:

p. = prison

KDP = Kurdistan Democratic Party

'Heavy sentence' = over 7 years

'Light sentence' = 5-7 years

All those detained in the families' prisons in Hilla, Falluja and Diwaniya are forbidden to receive visitors — neither relatives nor friends.

Place of Detention	Charge	Real reason for Detention	Court trying the case: Sentence of Court.
Mosul Prison	Joining KDP	same	executed on 17/9/77
" "	" "	"	executed on 18/9/77
" "	" "	"	executed on 17/9/77
Abu Ghraib Prison	" "	"	Special Court: 30 years
Mosul Prison	" "	"	Revolution Court: 30 years
" "	" "	"	Revolution Court: 20 years
Abu Ghraib Prison	" "	"	Special Court: 20 years
" "	Helped to transport a wounded Peshmerga	same	Special Court: 20 years
" " (heavy sentence ward)	Political reason	Having a shotgun	: 20 years
Abu Ghraib prison	" "	same	: 20 years
" "	" "	"	: 20 years
" "	Cooperation with Peshmerga	political reasons	: 20 years
" "	Having a pistol	" "	: 20 years
" "	Joined KDP	same	Revolution Court: 10 years
" "	Joining KDP	same	Revolution Court: 10 years
" "	" "	"	Revolution Court: 10 years
" "	" "	"	" : 10 years
" "	" "	"	" : 10 years
" "	" "	"	" : 7 years

Full Name	Place & Date of birth	Occupation	Place of Domicile	Marital Status & no. of Children	Date of arrest
20 Thabit Ismail	Rostank, 1956	High School student (industry)	Rostank, Dahok	Single	5/3/77
21 Ma'ruf Abdulla Fattah	Zawita, 1949	Teacher	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 3	10/6/77
22 Hasan Muhammad Salih Mizuri	Zawita, 1947	Forestry worker	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 5	6/6/77
23 Salih Muhammad Salim Rasheed	Zawita, 1950	Forestry worker	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 6	6/6/77
24 Ali Husain Dhahir Rasheed	Zawita, 1954	Agricultural surveyor	Mangish, Zawita, Dahok	Single	6/6/77
25 Siddiq Sa'di Muhammad	Zawita, 1954	Agricultural surveyor	Kani Masi, Zawita, Dahok	Single	6/6/77
26 Ibrahim Taha Muhammad Mizuri	Zawita, 1947	Forestry labourer	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 5	6/6/77
27 Muhammad Abdi al-Muzuri	Zawita	Forestry worker	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 4	6/6/77
28 Isa Ibrahim al-Mizuri	Zawita	Forestry worker	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 3	7/6/77
29 Sa'eed Jirjis Paidawi	Peda	official	Peda, Dahok	Married - 0	6/6/77
30 Faris Tawfiq Tahir	Dahok, 1951	Fireman	Dahok	Married - 1	6/6/77
31 Abdul Aziz Abdulla	Badi, 1952	Staff member of company	Dahok	Married - 3	6/6/77
32 Kamal Kan'an	Dahok, 1952	High school student (commerce)	Dahok	Single	6/6/77
33 Izzat Sa'eed	Dahok, 1953	"	Dahok	Single	6/6/77
34 Jamil Khidir Abdulla	Sharya, 1951	Student	Shari, Simmail, Dahok	Single	6/6/77
35 Bashhar Jamil Jasim	Gzu, 1956	High School student (industry)	Gzu, Dahok	Single	4/6/77
36 Hussain Alyas Silo	Ba'dara, 1955	Student	Ba'dara Shaikham Nineveh (Mosul)	Single	15/9/76
37* Muhammad Hashim Alyas	Ba'dara, 1970	Child	"	Child	15/9/76
38* Sa'eed Hashim Alyas	" 1971	"	"	"	"
39* Mas'oud Hashim Alyas	" 1973	"	"	"	"
40* Fu'ad Hashim Alyas	" 1975	"	"	"	"
(Note: *These 4 children were detained with their mother (see 43))					
41 Tahir Abdulla Muhammad	Spindar, 1924	Peasant	Spindar, Dahok	Married - 4	10/11/76
42 Alyas Silo Ali	Ba'dara, 1917	Peasant	Ba'dara, Shaikhan, Dahok	Married - 7	15/6/76
43 Ayshan Khidir Othman	Ba'dara, 1948	Housewife	"	Married - 4	15/9/76
44 Zulaikha Yusuf Taha	Spindar, 1952	Housewife	Spindar, Dahok	Married - 4	10/11/76
45 Khadija Rasheed Tahir	Spindar, 1970	Child	"	Child	10/11/76
46 Aziza Rasheed Tahir	" 1972	"	"	"	10/11/76
47 Sadiq Rasheed Tahir	" 1976	"	"	"	10/11/76
48 Halima Tahir Muhammad	" 1953	Housewife	"	Married - 1	10/11/76
49 Jalal Hussain Tahir	" 1976	Child	"	Child	10/11/76
50 Abdulla Haji Salih	" 1961	Peasant	"	Married - 0	10/11/76
51 'Aishan Salih Ismail	" 1965	Child	"	Married - 5	10/11/76
52 Gali Haji Salih Abdulla	" 1965	Child	"	Child	10/11/76
53 Farhan Haji Salid Abdulla	" 1972	Child	"	"	10/11/76

Full Name	Place & Date of birth	Occupation	Place of Domicile	Marital Status & no. of Children	Date of arrest
54 Mariam Haji Salid Abdulla	Spindar 1973	Child	Spindar	Child	10/11/76
55 Jamil Haji Salih Abdulla	" 1970	"	"	"	10/11/76
56 Aishan Hussain Muhammad	" 1962	Housewife	"	Married - 0	10/11/76
57 Muhammad Haji Salih Abdulla	" 1972	Child	"	Child	10/11/76
58 Hassan Salih Abdulla	" 1975	"	"	"	10/11/76
59 Maisun Khalaf Alyas	Buzan, 1973	Child	Buzan, Alqosh, Dahok	Child	15/11/76
60 Iwan Khalaf Alyas	" 1975	"	"	"	15/11/76
61 Khidir Abdal	Sharya, 1927	Peasant	Sharya, Simmil, Dahok	Married - 12	30/7/77
62 Mian Abdi	Buzan, 1931	Housewife	Buzan, Alqosh, Dahok	Married - 15	24/12/76
63 Imad Badal Khalaf	" 1974	Child	"	Child	15/11/76
64 Alyas Mirza Alyas	" 1928	School attendant	"	Married - 11	15/11/76
65 Khalaf Darwish	" 1927	Peasant	"	Married - 5	15/11/76
66 Khofi 'Abdai Hasso	Shaikh Khidir 1929	Housewife	"	Married - 5	15/11/76
67 Guli Haji Sulaiman	Bazan, 1953	Housewife	"	Married - 1	15/11/76
68 Sulaiman Khalaf Darwish	" 1957	Student	"	Single	15/11/76
69 Gari Pasi Salo	" 1950	Housewife	"	Married - 2	15/11/76
70 Musa Haider Abdulla	Imunkki, 1927	Peasant	Imunki, Dahok	Married - 12	22/5/77
71 Amin Musa Haider	" 1958	Worker	"	Single	22/5/77
72 Mustafa Sa'eed Darwish	" 1942	Peasant	"	Married - 6	22/5/77
73 Nahari Tanar	" 1942	Housewife	"	Married - 12	22/5/77
74 Totikhan Khorshid Hameed	" 1952	Housewife	"	Married - 4	22/5/77
75 Zhy'an Isa Musa	" 1977	Child	"	Child	22/5/77
76 Khadija Musa Haider	" 1976	Child	"	Child	22/5/77
77 Guli Yusuf	Bajlur, 1942	Housewife	Bajlur, Dahok	Married - 6	22/5/77
78 Agira Haji Kaku	Imukki, 1927	Widow	Imukku, Dahok	Widow	22/5/77
79. Asia Abdul Rahman	" 1951	Housewife	Imunkki, Dahok	Married - 3	22/5/77
80 Ahmad Ali Aba Bakir	Imunkki, 1927	Peasant	Imunkki, Dahok	Married - 1	1/7/77
81 La'li Khan Shaikh Amir	Atuk, 1937	Housewife	"	Married - 1	1/7/77
82 Ahmad Husain Ahmad al-Mizuri	Shkafanduwan 1929	Peasant	Shaikhan, Nineveh (Mosul)	Married - 6 Married - 6	8/1/77 8/1/77
83 Yunis Ahmad Husain	" 1957	Student	"	Single	8/1/77
84 Hasan Haji	Zawita, 1917	Peasant	Zawita, Dhoak	Married - 8	10/5&77
85 Taiib Abdul Rahman	" 1929	Retired NCO	"	Married - 9	10/5/77
86 Khadija Bilar	Srani Zhori 1942	Housewife	"	Married - 4	10/11/76
87 Amina Khalid	" 1939	Housewife	"	Married - 3	15/11/76
88 Halima Abdul Ghaffar	Bakramanm 1907	Widow	Bakraman, Agra, Nineveh (Mosul)	Widow - 4	15/11/76
89 Saliha Ali Shir	Bibak Mal, 1927	Housewife	Srani Zhori, Dinarta	Married - 5	15/11/76
90 Hir Hasan	Srani Zhori, 1957	Housewife	Srani Zhori, Dinarta	Married - 1	15/11/76
91 Abdulla Haji Amin	Zawita, 1920	Grocer	Zawita, Dahok	Married - 5	10/5/77
92 Siddiq Rasheed Dhahir	Spindar, 1974	Child	Spindar, Dahok	Child	31/5/77
93 Najat Muhammad Hasan	Dahok, 1956	Student	Dahok	Single	31/5/77
94 Abdulla Aziz Fattah Guratwani	(No further details available at this time)			Executed in Merga Sur, Erbil	
95 Qirtas Mir Hamd Guratwani	"	"	"	Executed in Merga Sur, Erbil	

Place of Detention	Charge	Real reason for Detention	Court trying the case: Sentence of Court.
Hilla Prison	Daughter of a Peshmerga	same	Not allowed to contact lawyer Sentence not yet passed
" "	Son of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Wife of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Son of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	" "	"	" "
al-Hussain p. Falluja	Daughter of a Peshmerga	"	Sentence not yet passed Not allowed to contact a lawyer
" "	" "	"	" "
Kirkuk Prison	Joining KDP	Same	" "
Special Prison of Falluja	Mother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
al-Hussain p. Falluja	Son of a Peshmerga	"	" "
Ramadi Prison	Father of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	" "	"	" "
al-Hussain p. Falluja	Mother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Wife of a Peshmerga	"	" "
Ramadi Prison	Brother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
al-Hussain p. Falluja	Wife of a Peshmerga	"	" "
al-Hilla Prison	Father of a Peshmerga	"	Sentence not yet passed
" "	Brother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Father of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Mother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Wife of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Daughter of a peshmerga a few months old,	"	" "
" "	" " (with her mother) (infant)	"	" "
" "	Mother of a peshmerga	Same	" "
" "	" "	"	" "
" "	Wife of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Father of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Mother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
Central Prison of Heet	Father of a Peshmerga	"	" "
" "	Brother of a Peshmerga	"	" "
Deported to the south (al-Mahnawi-ya sub. dist. Diwaniya)	Father of a Peshmerga	"	Deported to the south
" "	" "	"	Deported to the south
al-Falluja prison	Wife of a peshmerga	Same	Detained at the al-Falluja prison for families
" "	" "	"	" "
" "	Mother	"	" "
" "	Wife	"	" "
" "	" "	"	" "
deported	Father of a peshmerga	"	deported to the south
Diwaniya prison	Son of a peshmerga	"	Shamiya District, Diwaniya kept in detention
Kirkuk prison	Joining KDP	"	Special court, Kirkuk

3 February 1978

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1977

"Most of the arrests reported to Amnesty International over the past year have been of Kurds. Many of the Kurds who had fled Iraq returned to resume political activities after the March 1975 Iran/Iraq agreement and the declaration of various amnesties. Those who were, or were suspected of being, engaged in such political activities as distributing pamphlets, holding political meetings or forming political organizations have been liable to arrest. By mid-1976 the Kurds were reported to have recommenced guerrilla activities against the Iraqi armed forces. This led to further reports of more arrests of those involved, or suspected of involvement, in acts of sabotage."

"From available information it is difficult for Amnesty International to give an accurate estimate of the number of Kurdish prisoners at present detained in Iraq. Reports received concern certain areas only: in Sulaimaniya 80 Kurds were reported to have been arrested in May 1977 for supporting the Kurdish revolution, and in Dohuk province more than 130 are reported to have been arrested for the same reason since August 1976. In addition large numbers of Kurds are said to be detained in the south of the country (although many of the Kurdish families who were deported earlier as part of the alleged Arabization plan for certain areas of Kurdistan have now been allowed to return to the north). Kurdish sources claim that up to 60,000 men arrested, following the Iraq/Iran agreement of 6 March 1975, on suspicion of being members of the Kurdish Democratic Party, or the Kurdish armed forces are still being held in detention camps in the south; they also claim that since November 1976 families of those suspected of participating in the renewed fighting in Kurdistan are being separated, with wives and children (but not always all the children) mothers, or sisters being taken to prisons in the southern towns of Nasiriya and Diwaniya. Amnesty International has received the names of 35 families separated in this way."

"During the year, Amnesty International received the names of more than 200 other Iraqis reported to be in prison for political reasons. They are members of the Central Command of the Iraqi Communist Party, the left-wing of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and other left-wing political groups. Further information about them is being sought before taking up their cases with the authorities."

Amnesty International continues to receive reports of the systematic use of torture, but is unable, as yet, to substantiate or disprove them. Some of the Shiis arrested in February 1977 were said to have been tortured, as were several of the Kurds arrested in early 1976 and adopted by Amnesty International. In addition, four 14 to 15-year-old Kurdish schoolboys from Zakho province, arrested for possessing political leaflets, were said to have died as a result of torture during July-August 1976. In January 1977 Amnesty International learnt that, the previous April, Reber Mulla Husain, a 19-year-old Kurd who had been head of the Kurdish Students' Union in Zakho, had died because of ill-treatment in prison. His body when returned to his family was said to have shown signs of torture. Amnesty International groups were asked to write to the Iraqi authorities expressing concern at these reports, and requesting that an independent commission of inquiry investigate both this case and police and security interrogation methods in general.

Amnesty International's greatest cause for concern in Iraq is still the consistently high number of reported executions for political offences. In almost all cases, the trials and executions are conducted in secrecy, which raises doubts as to the legality of the detention and trial procedures, also of the charges brought against the accused.

More Kurds have been reported executed than anyone else. Kurdish exiles claim that several hundred were executed having surrendered to the Iraqi authorities after the declaration, then extension, of amnesties, following the March 1975 agreement. After carefully checking these reports with Kurdish sources, Amnesty International compiled a list of executions of Kurds—giving names when possible—which took place during April and May 1975, after the cessation of hostilities. The list included the names of 12 Kurds who had been executed after surrendering to the Iraqi army, and various groups of Kurds in prison at the time of the March 1975 agreement, who were then executed, many after retrial."

"In a letter to President Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr on 28 October 1976, Amnesty International expressed disquiet about these reports, particularly since the Government had, in August, declared a fresh amnesty for Kurds in Iraq and abroad who had not taken advantage of previous amnesties. Amnesty International urged that assurances of safe conduct be given to all those who surrendered under this amnesty. This letter and list were also the subject of a press release."

In early December 1976 Amnesty International was informed that on 23 November four Iraqis, including three Kurds adopted by Amnesty International had been hanged in Abu Ghreib Prison. On 8 December, Amnesty International wrote to President Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr expressing profound concern about these reported executions, and at the lack of basic legal rights accorded to the victims and others in their group: their alleged maltreatment during detention; their trial *in camera* by a revolutionary court; the absence of any appeals machinery. These reports were later taken up by the International Secretariat and by Amnesty International groups with the Iraqi Embassies in their respective countries. All denied that the executions had taken place. On 24 January, however, a Kurdish delegation visiting London on behalf of the Iraqi Government confirmed that the executions had in fact been carried out, and that all four had been found guilty of "acts detrimental to the state."

"Political trials and death sentences are seldom publicized in Iraq, but in February 1977 eight Shii Muslims were officially reported to have been sentenced to death following disturbances on 5 and 6 February in the holy Shii towns of Najaf and Kerbala. An Amnesty International Urgent Action campaign was organized on behalf of those condemned to death. There has, however, been no official confirmation that these executions were carried out."

Baghdad radio and the Iraqi press gave much detailed publicity to the "disturbances", the arrests and ensuing trial. Official sources claimed that Syrian-inspired agitators had caused disturbances during the annual pilgrimage from Najaf to Kerbala; that they had attacked a police station killing one person and wounding several, and that a 16-year-old Syrian boy had been caught attempting to plant a bomb in one of the Shii mosques in Kerbala. On 13 February the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) issued a decree to set up a special investigating body, and on 23 February a second decree ordered the establishment of a special tribunal of three Revolutionary Command Council members to try 110 detainees. The tribunal would not be required to follow normal criminal trial procedures, and procedures about the carrying out of executions. According to the Iraqi paper *Ath Thawra* dated 25 February, the court unanimously decided on 23 February to sentence eight to death, 15 to life imprisonment and to acquit 87.

Unofficial sources, however, do not agree with this account, claiming that the government tried to stop the religious procession leaving Najaf (fearing the anti-government, as well as the religious fervour that tends to erupt during the pilgrimage), and that when they failed, they sent tanks, aircraft and army units to fire on the procession 20 kilometers outside Kerbala, causing heavy casualties. In Kerbala itself over 15,000 were said to have been arrested.

These sources also claim that the special tribunal sat for only three to four hours, that the eight later condemned to death were not present at the trial because they had died during interrogation and that two members of the tribunal refused to sentence people to death who were not present in court. (According to official sources, these two were later dismissed from all party and official posts "for negligence in the performance of their party duties . . ." (Baghdad radio 23 March 1977). In addition, the bodies of the eight have not been returned to their families for burial, as is the normal custom. This would seem to indicate that either they died under torture or that they are still awaiting execution. The 15 sentenced to life imprisonment have been taken up by Amnesty International as investigation cases."

"In a letter to President Al Bakr of 28 October 1976 Amnesty International pointed out that "one of the problems which faces Amnesty International in regard to Iraq is the apparent refusal of your government to allow access to international and/or humanitarian organizations to visit . . . prisons or to attend trials. This policy makes it difficult for us to evaluate the accuracy and validity of allegations and complaints" "

Further to our letter of 3 February 1978, regarding Kurds detained, imprisoned or executed by the Iraqi authorities.

Please note that No. 4 on the list accompanying the above letter, Shaban Ghalbish, a shop keeper of Dahok, imprisoned in the Abu Ghreib prison, has now been executed according to our latest information.

Attached is a new list giving names and details of some of the families of Peshmerga fighters who are now in detention centres or prisons in southern Iraq. This information is as it was known at the end of December 1977. The places of detention named are:—

- a) Siniya Detention Centre, Qadisiya (Diwaniya) Province
- b) The Sports Stadium, Diwaniya town
- c) Abu Ghreib Prison
- d) Diwaniya Prison
- e) Hilla Prison
- f) Simail Prison

Of the 145 persons named who are being held in the 6 places listed above, 24 are 80 years of age or above; 24 are aged between 60-79; 41 are children of 5 and under; and 10 are children aged between 6-10.

In addition, there are 4 further centres where the breakdown of detainees is known but not their names:

- g) Centre for Detainees at Mahnawiya, Qadisiya (Diwaniya) Province, where there are 133 detainees (23 men, 63 women and 48 children).
- h) The Department of Agriculture Detention Camp, Mahnawiya, where there are 123 detainees (3 men, 72 women and 48 children)
- i) Babel (Hilla) Province — a detention centre situated about 10km outside Hilla town, which contains 247 women and 89 children
- j) Babel town detention centre where there are 174 men, all from the provinces of Dahok or Nineveh.

When reading this list, it should be borne in mind that it is not uncommon for Kurds to have two wives; which accounts for some elderly men appearing to have very young families.

In some of the family groups, often the grandparent(s) have been seized with all or some of their grandchildren, leaving other children behind. In some cases, it is likely that wives have joined their Peshmerga husbands in the field, having left their children in the care of grandparents.

The method of seizing the Kurds from their villages varies. The more fortunate are given notice of eviction, in which case they may have an opportunity to sell their livestock and will be able to take some money with them. But others are frequently seized during snatch helicopter raids, when they are air-lifted out of the village and are forced to leave behind all their possessions, including the animals which are their source of livelihood.

It is appropriate when considering the plight of Kurdish children in detention and those who have been torn from their families, to refer to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, drawn up by the International Union for Child Welfare, (a non-governmental organisation in consultative status with ECOSOC):

“Art. 2: The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity . . .”

We would be very grateful for any help you might feel able to give to assist these unfortunate people in their plight, especially the very old and the very young who are most vulnerable.

May we suggest that the most effective action, in our experience, has been:

- (1) To inquire into the conditions of the detainees, the reasons for their detention, etc
- (2) To make representations to the Iraqi authorities for the release of the detainees and their return home
- (3) Publicity to help achieve the detainees' release.

We thank you for your concern.

Yours sincerely

KURDISH NON-COMBATANT CIVILIANS DETAINED BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATIVES OF THE KURDISH PARTISANS — THE PESHMERGAS

Name	Age	Place of Residence	Reason for Detention
1 Haider Ahmad Arab	70	Zakho, Dahok	Father of a Peshmerga
2 Admad Mustafa Ahmad	90	Sarkilar "	" " "
3 Abdulla Ahmad Mustafa	45	" "	" " "
4 Ibrahim Saeed	85	Batuda "	" " "
5 Shaban Muhammad Mustafa	45	Ravbana "	" " "
6 Muhammad Ahmad Abdul Hameed	70	Kheezava "	" " "
7 Ahmad Sulaiman	40	Kanisarik "	" " "

Name	Age	Place of Residence	Reason for Detention
8 Murad Omar Khamo	90	Karni "	" " "
9 Ta'beer Haji Muhammad	90	Marsis "	Mother " "
10 Aghbal Rasheed	50	Bibo, Amadiya	Father of a Peshmerga
11 Ata Beg Aslan)	95	Sakrin, Dahok	" " "
12 Majid Ata Beg Aslan)	26	" "	Brother" "
(father and son)			
13 Muhammad Abdulla Taha	60	Diralok, Amadiya	Father " "
14 Salih Othman Sifdin)	95	Zakho "	" " "
15 Guli Hamid Gindal)	90	" "	Mother" "
16 Hanifa Salih Othman)	8	" "	Daughter "
17 Nadir Salih Othman)	6	" "	Son " "
(one family)			
18 Aisha Omar Haji)	65	" "	Mother "
19 Nisrin Sabri Haji)	5	" "	Daughter "
20 Zainab Sabri Haji)	2	" "	" " "
21 (one family)			
21 Sabri Nimir Aziz)	45	Bahrava "	Father " "
22 Qantar Muhi Kavra)	40	" "	Mother " "
23 Tahir Sabri			
23 Tahir Sabri Nimir)	25	" "	Brother" "
24 Izzidin Sabri Nimir)	8	" "	" " "
25 Basna Sabri Nimir)	6	" "	Sister " "
26 Kahdar Sabri Nimir)	4	" "	" " "
27 Bahar Sabri Nimir)	2	" "	" " "
28 Azad Sabri Nimir)	1	" "	Brother" "
29 Diwan Nimir Aziz)	50	" "	Mother " "
(one family, now moved to Abu Ghreib prison. Left behind at Bahrava with noone to care for them are two other sons, Ramadhan S. Nimir (13) and Sha'ban S. Nimir (12))			
30 Ali Ahmad Abdul Aziz)	75	Ziwa "	Father of " "
31 Sisan Murad Isa)	65	" "	Mother " "
32 Nadira Ahmad Fandi	50	Zakho "	Mother " "
33 Amina Muhi Yaqub	60	" "	" " "
34 Hayat Abdula Maho)	25	Qasrook, Sharanish	Wife " "
35 Dinidar Nimir Sharif)	5	Zakho, Dahok	Daughter "
36 Fatima Ahmad Omar)	33	" "	Wife " "
37 Mughila Ni'mat Ali)	7	" "	Daughter "
38 Dagbila Ni'mat Ali)	5	" "	" " "
39 Walida Ni'mat Ali)	2	" "	" " "
(one family)			
40 Gardan Gurjis Dawud)	50	Birsivi "	Father " "
41 Majid Asho Wardo)	3	" "	Son " "
(a Christian family)			
42 Omar Shino Mubdir)	90	Dasik, Dahok	Father " "
43 Safi SHamsuddin Aiyub)	85	" "	Mother " "
44 Sabiha Hamid Fandi)	30	Talgabar "	Wife " "
45 Bahar Isa Ahmad)	3	" "	Daughter "
46 Fairuz Khalid Haji)	65	Zakho "	Mother " "
47 Khilat Muhammad Mirza	3	" "	Son " "
48 Laila Muhammad Mirza)	2	" "	Daughter "
49 Shivan Muhammad Mirza)	1	" "	(Son) " "
(one family)			
50 Muhammad Rashid Isa)	80	Darkar Ajam Dahok	Father " "
51 Tarkan Ibrahim Khalil)	65	" " "	Mother " "
52 Wahid Muhammad Rasheed)	12	" " "	Brother "
53 Hiyam Muhammad)	7	" " "	Sister " "
54 Ghazal Muhammad Rasheed)	5	" " "	" " "
55 Jawahir Muhammad Rasheed)	3	" " "	" " "
56 Hasan Muhammad Rasheed)	1	" " "	Brother "
(one family) (younger children probably by 2nd wife)			
57 Hiri Mustafa Isa	50	" " "	Mother " "
58 Begi Shahbaz Salih)	4	" " "	Sister " "
59 Jabbar Shahbaz Sahih	2	" " "	" " "
60 Ali Piro Sulaiman	65	" " "	Father " "
61 Sulaiman Yusif Haji)	80	Talgabar "	" " "
62 Guli Omar)	65	" " "	Mother " "
63 Abdulla Husain Ibrahim)	75	Simail "	Father " "
64 Hawad Muhammad Khalid)	55	" "	Mother " "

Name	Age	Place of Residence		Reason for Detention	
65 Sharif Abdulla Husain)	70	"	"	Father "	"
66 Bahar Ahmad Mahmoud)	45	"	"	Mother "	"
67 Latifa Abdulla Othman)	50	Sakrin	"	" "	"
68 Vian Nuri Abdulla)	1	"	"	Daughter	"
69 Biruz Abdul Jalil Hasan)	80	"	"	Mother "	"
70 Hadiya Salih Ahmad)	25	Zakho	"	Wife "	"
71 Ni'mat Adil Qasim)	7	"	"	Son "	"
72 Sabil Adil Qasim)	5	"	"	" "	"
73 Spir Adil Qasim)	3	"	"	Daughter	"
74 Malas Adil Qasim)	2	"	"	" "	"
(one family)					
75 Asia Hasan Muhammad)	30	Qirishi	"	Wife "	"
76 Hishyar Omar Taha)	4	"	"	Son "	"
77 Fauziya Omar Taha)	2	"	"	Daughter	"
78 Fadhila Majeed Muhammad)	30	Barushka	"	Wife "	"
79 Sharmin Taiyar Ni'mat)	2	"	"	Daughter	"
80 Khasti Taiyur Ni'mat)	1	"	"	Son "	"
81 Mariam Muhammad Abdulla)	25	Bamarni	"	Wife "	"
82 Narind Salih Haji)	2	"	"	Daughter	"
83 Nahla Salih Haji)	1	"	"	" "	"
84 (This Peshmerga has been killed in action)					
84 Maran Haji Ali)	50	Bamarni	Dahok	Wife of a Peshmerga	
85 Abdul Sattar Hameed)					
Husain	3	"	"	Son "	"
86 Hinar Hameed Husain)	2	"	"	Daughter	"
87 Chinar Hameed Husain)	1	"	"	" "	"
88 Mustafa Abdul-Razzaq Muhammad	75	Zakho	"	Father "	"
89 Ubaid Mustafa A.R. Muhammad)	22	"	"	Brother	"
90 Fatima Husain Hadi)	55	"	"	Mother "	"
91 Yusuf Khalid Omar	80	Bosal	"	Father of a refugee abroad	abroad
92 La'la Sufi Sadiq)	65	"	"	Mother of a Peshmerga	
93 Daghila Yusuf)	8	"	"	Daughter	"
94 Muhiddin Yahya Abdulla)	85	Batofa,	"	Father "	"
95 Safiya Ni'mat Kamal)	80	"	"	Mother "	"
96 Raihan Abu Bakir Omar)	75	"	"	" "	"
97 Arab Haidar Salim)	70	"	"	Father "	"
98 Fatima Ibrahim Ghazi)	65	"	"	Mother "	"
99 Ahmad Akhdal Omar	80	"	"	Father "	"
100 Omar Isa Ali)	95	"	"	" "	"
101 Nazis Sharif Ali)	80	"	"	Mother "	"
102 Abdul Rahman Fattah)	65	"	"	Father "	"
103 Zahra Taha Habib)	45	"	"	Mother "	"
104 Kawsar Abdul Rahman Fattah	5 months	"	"	Daughter	"
(Note: other grandchildren of this couple have had to be left behind with no one to care for them)					
105 Muhammad Taha Habib)	80	Batofa	"	Father "	"
106 Amina Abdul Qadir Hamza)	75	"	"	Mother "	"
108					
107 Omar Abdulla Muhammad	92	Dulubi	"	Father "	"
108 Jubari Ya'qub Saeed	75	"	"	Mother "	"
109 Basna Yusuf Musa	31	Qasrook village,	Sharanish,	Wife "	"
(with a suckling infant; place of detention not known) She had to abandon 4 older children:					
Tahsin Muhammad Sharif	10	Zakho,	Dahok		
Laila Muhammad Sharif	8				
Ramadhan Muhammad Sharif	7				
Saifuldin Muhammad Sharif	4				
(Their grandmother is also detained (see No. 33 above)					
B. Held in the SPORTS STADIUM, Diwaniya					
110 Halima Muhammad Ali	30	Simail,	Dahok	Wife of a Peshmerga	
111 Shirwan Sabri Ali Haidar	2	"	"	Daughter "	"
1 (arrested August 1976)					
112 Piruz Haji Amin)	40	Sorya	Batofa,	Mother "	"
113 (her daughter)	17	Zakho,	Dahok	Sister "	"
114 Samya Murad (arrested 29/2/76)	76	"	"	Mother "	"

C. Held in CENTRE FOR DETAINEES, MAHNAWIYA, Qadisiya, (Diwaniya)

115	Haji Mulla Amin Hafdhalla	55	Batofa, Zakho, Dahok	Father of a Peshmerga
116	Amina Sa'id Adbulla	50	" " "	Mother " "

(Note: there are 133 detainees at this centre — 23 men
63 women
47 children)

**D. Held at DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE DETENTION CAMP, Mahnawiya, Qadisiya
(a second detention camp in Mahnawiya)**

117	Mulla Hasan al-Amadi	40	Amadiya, Dahok	Father of a Peshmerga
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(Note: there are 123 detainees at this centre: 3 men
72 women
48 children)

E. BABEL (Hilla) Province

There are 2 centres of detention in Babel:

One is situated about 10km outside Hilla Town and contains 247 women and 89 children.

The second is inside the town itself and contains 174 men, all of whom came from the province of Dahok and Nineveh (Mosul)

F. Miscellaneous — in various prisons and detention camps:

Name	Age	Place of Residence	Place of Detention	Date of Detention	Reason for Detention
118 Khadiya Ahmad	55	Kabrook, Sharanish Zakho	Abu Ghraid Prison	March 1977	Her son Saifin is a refugee abroad
119 'Azab (husband of 122)	55	"	"	"	Her son " "
120 Wife of Saifdin (name not yet known)	25	"	"	"	Wife of " "
121 Haidar Saifdin	4	"	"	"	Son of " "
122 Yusuf Tahir	55	"	"	"	His son is a refugee living abroad
123 Ghazal Haji Ahmad	60	"	"	"	Her son " "
124 Adla Haji Amin	40	Sorya, Batofa	Hilla P.	"	Her son is a Peshmerga
125 Zainab Hameed)	20	"	"	"	His brother " "
126 Nathir Hameed)	5	"	"	"	His " "
127 Madina Mulla Muhammad	60	Mulla Arab, Batofa	Hilla or Diwaniya	"	Her husband is a refugee abroad
128 Sufi Ibrahim	85	Batofa, Zakho	" "	"	Her sons are Peshmergas
129 Khajij Sufi	75	Gulnazik Mangish, Dahok	Simail	July 1977	Her son is a Peshmerga
130 Jazya Abdulla	3	"	"	"	Her father " "
131 Nadya Abdulla	5	"	"	"	" " "
132 Hamra' Ahmad	80	"	"	"	Her son " "
133 Firsat Sadiq	8	"	"	"	Her father " "
134 Muhammad Sadiq	8	"	"	"	His " " "
135 Mariam Mustafa	40	Simail	Hilla Prison	May 1977	Her son " "
136 Sito Ahmad	60	Dahok	"	"	His " " "
137 Sabiha Ahmad	14	"	"	"	Her brother " "
138 Abuzid Mustafa	90	Dergazhnik Mangish, Dahok	"	July 1977	His son " "
139 Jawa Mighdad Hasan	30	Ghalbish, Sarsank Dahok	Diwaniya	June 1977	Her husband " "
140 Fawzi Ali Abdulla	3	" "	"	"	His father " "
(Note: 4 other children have been left behind in Ghalbish with noone to care for them:					
Abdulla Ali Abdulla	10				
Salih Ali Abdulla	7				
Salim Ali Abdulla	5				
Salima Ali Abdulla	3				
141 Farman	85	Ghalbish, Sarsank Dahok	Diwaniya	June 1977	Her son " "
(Note: She has had to leave 2 children behind in Ghalbish with noone to care for them:					
Amina Ali Ismail	5				
Fawzia Ali Ismail	3				

Further to the lists of names dated December 1977 and 3 February 1978, we enclose herewith a further list, dated 15 May 1978, containing the names of 40 Iraqi Kurds who have either been imprisoned or executed for being connected with the KDP, or of families detained because they are relatives of peshmergas.

We appeal to you to use your good offices in whatever manner you deem most appropriate to help to secure their release.

* * * * *

NOTE: Since December 1977, the Iraqi government has been repatriating to the Kurdish areas some of the Kurds who had either been deported from Kurdistan or who had returned from Iran and had been settled in camps in the southern areas of Iraq. Most of those who have returned have not been allowed to return to their original places of domicile because these were located in the 20km wide border strip which is scheduled to be depopulated, or in other strategic areas.

The Kurds who remain in the south and west, who number over 100,000, fall into two categories:

- a) The families of peshmergas, who are being detained in prisons and jails, and
- b) The deportees and returnees who are now, in the main, being housed in mud huts in separate communities or in houses within certain sections of cities and towns in certain areas of southern Iraq.

LIST OF KURDS DETAINED/DEPORTED/EXECUTED, 15 May 1978

Name	Place & Date of Birth	Occupation	Residence	Marital Status & no. of	Date of arrest	Prison where held	Reason for arrest	Term of imprisonment
1 Sabri Ya'qub Muhammad	Ardana, 1938	Farmer	Ardana, Sarsank	Married -	Oct. 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
2 Mrs. Halima Muhammad Sa'di	Zawita 1914	Housewife	Zawita Dahok	Married 7	June 1977	Ramadi	3 of her sons PM*	-
3 Hasan Haji Salim	Zawita 1903	Farmer	Zawita Dahok	Married 7	June 1977	Ramadi	his son PM	-
4 Ramadhan Sulaiman Barwari	Amadiya 1944	Farmer	Dilabi Dahok	Married 8	Feb. 1977	unknown	KDP member	unknown
5 Waisi Ali Hassan	Amadiya 1952	Farmer	Dahok	Married 3	Feb. 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	unknown
6 Shamdin Karam	Diznur 1957	Farmer	Bibo	Single	May 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
7 Ismail Sadiq Ismail	Banki 1953	Worker	Banki Sindi	Married 3	Oct. 1977	Diwaniya	KDP member	10 years
8 Muhammad Amin Haji Isa	Gari Sufi	Farmer	Gari Sufi Sindi	Married	Oct. 1977	Diwaniya	KDP	unknown
9 Ahmad Salman Mahmoud	Kani Sarki 1956	Student	Biznu Amadiya	Single	June 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	7 years
10 Husain Muhammad	Dirashi 1956	Student	Aqra	Married	May 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	20 years
11 Salman Muhammad Waisi	Banafi 1950	Worker	Dahok	Married 2	30 June 1977	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	15 years
12 Sadulla Abdul Rahman	Banafi 1910	Farmer	Dahok	Married 3	May 1977	Diwaniya	his brother PM	-
13 Muhammad Sadalla Abdul Rahman	Banafi 1962	Student	Dahok	Single	May 1977	Diwaniya	his uncle PM	-
14 Mrs. Hafsa Mulla Husain Saeed	Banafi 1917	Housewife	Amadiya	Married 3	Nov. 1976	Diwaniya	her son PM	-
15 Izzat Muhammad Salman	Banafi 1957	Student	Dahok	Single	May 1977	Diwaniya	his brother PM	-
16 Mrs. Fatima Ali Husain	Banafi 1917	Housewife	Dahok	Married 3	May 1977	Diwaniya	her son PM	-
17 Mrs. Nahida Muhammad Rajab	Amadiya 1958	Housewife	Amadiya	Married 2	11 June 1977	Diwaniya	her husband PM	-
18 Nasrin Ahmad Mustafa	Amadiya 1974	child	Amadiya	(child)	11 June 1977	Diwaniya	her father PM	-
19 Shuwan Ahmad Mustafa	Amadiya 1976	child	Amadiya	(child)	11 June 1977	Diwaniya	his father PM	-
20 Mulla Hasan Rasheed +	Amadiya 1937	Grocer	Amadiya	Married 5	Nov. 1977	al-Shamiya (Diwaniya province)	his son PM	-
21 Mrs. Adli Omar Dishtani	Amadiya 1947	Housewife	Amadiya	Married 5	Nov. 1977	al-Shamiya	her son PM	-
22 Fatima Mulla Hasan	Amadiya 1969	child	Amadiya	(child)	Nov. 1977	al-Shamiya	her brother PM	-

* PM = Peshmerga

23 Kuwistan Mulla Hasan	Amadiya 1972	child	Amadiya	(child)	Nov. 1977	al-Shamiya	her brother PM	-
24 Shakir Ahmad Muhammad Tahir	Amadiya 1955	Student	Amadiya	Single	18 Aug. 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
25 Salim Rasheed Haji Ahmad	Amadiya 1953	Student	Arbil	Single	18 Aug. 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
26 Husain Muhammad	Dirash 1950	Grocer	Amadiya	Married	18 Aug. 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	7 years
27 Muhammad Saeed Kunji	Amadiya 1937	Grocer	Amadiya	Married 5	10 Sept. 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
28 Ismail Ahmad Shana	Amadiya 1933	Butcher	Amadiya	Married 6	10 Sept. 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
29 Sidqi Ismail Ahmad	Amadiya 1953	Student	Amadiya	Single	10 Sept 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	7 years
30 Khalid Tawfig Hasan	Amadiya 1954	Worker	Amadiya	Singlw	20 Sept 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
31 Abdul Rahman Qadir	Amadiya 1955	Student	Amadiya	Single	18 Aug 1976	Abu Ghraib	KDP member	5 years
32 Qirtas Mir Ahmad Fattah*	Kuratu 1953	Farmer	Kuratu Mirga Sur	Single	2 Mar 1977	Mosul Kurdish	supporting Kurdish revolution	death sentence passed by special Tribunal Kirkuk (sentence carried out.
33 Abdulla Aziz Fattah*	Kuratu 1958	Farmer	Kuratu Mirga Sur	Single	2 Mar 1977	Mosul	supporting Kurdish revolution	"
34 Hamad Mir Hamad	Kurata 1948	Grocer	Kuratu Mirga Sur	Married	2 Mar 1977	Mosul	supportign Kurdish revolution	life sentence Special Tribunal Kirkuk
35 Yasin Haddo Lashkari	(not yet known)	Farmer	Kuratu Mirga Sur	Single	2 Mar 1977	Mosul	supporting Kurdish revolution	"
36 Tahir Zubair)							
37 Muhammad Biro)							
38 Murad Shukri)							
39 Murad)							
39 Hasan Jasim Ziyuki)							
40 Qadir Muhammad Ziyuki)							

These men have been detained by the authorities. Detailed information will be published as soon as it is available.

* Their names were published in our list of 3 Feb 1978, containing 95 names; full details not available at that time.

+ This name was published in our list of Dec. 1977; details not available at that time.

NOTE: With reference to the Dec. 1977 list, Nos. 111, 112, 113 and 114 were said to have been held in the Sports Stadium in Diwaniya; more recent information indicates that they did not accompany their mother but were left behind in Dahok.

PRESS RELEASES

AN APPEAL

Thousands of Kurdish Children Perish in Iraqi Concentration camps - Save the Rest

A short while after the collapse of the Kurdish revolution in March 1975, the Iraqi regime began implementing its long laid plans for segments of Kurdistan by deporting en masse their original Kurdish inhabitants to the arid deserts of the south, and their replacement with Arab tribes. Initially, one million Kurds were to be removed. The Iraqi authorities have so far effected the deportation of 300,000 from their ancient and traditional homeland, Kurdistan.

The regime's objectives for the rich and fertile districts of Sinjar, Sheikhan, the Slivan plains, Aqra and the oil rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin have already been accomplished, where even the historical place names have been changed to Arabic ones. The plan has also been implemented in the border areas, which have been evacuated to a depth of 20 km, as admitted by Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, the strongmen of Iraq, in his pamphlet "One Trench or Two Trenches" published in Arabic in Baghdad 1977, pp.34-35.

This appeal is particularly concerned with the fate of deportees from one district among the many that have been affected — that is the population of the BARZAN sub-district, MERGA SUR district in the ARBIL Governorate, which is the birthplace of General Mustafa Barzani, and whose population

is victim of a particular grudge and deep animosity on the part of the government. Within a few months of the end of the Kurdish revolution in March 1975, the Iraqi authorities began their operations by forcibly evacuating the civilian population of MERGA SUR district, using the following methods in each village:—

A village would be surrounded by a large military unit and sealed off. The Special Forces units (Meghaweer) would then be dropped by helicopter into the village, forcing the villagers hurriedly into the helicopters, without allowing them to bring with them any personal effects or belongings. After transporting them to a district center at MERGA SUR, a brief stopover would follow for interrogation and registration. Men, women, the elderly and the infants would then be crammed into transport trucks and transferred nearly 1,000 km to concentration camps in the barren region of the south — in this case to four camps situated south-east of the town of IFAK, QADISIYA Governorate. The first camp is located 25 km east of IFAK and the other three are 40 km apart in an easterly direction. The region is a desolate desert where temperatures reach 50 in the shade in the summer, with continuous sandstorms from which many have perished, among them Chacho Chalabi, a young man from HAVINTKA village, BARZAN sub-district. The only source of water is a polluted stream emerging from the sewers of IFAK town. The available public services consist of the police and security stations, a dispensary without doctors or medical assistants, and a school building without staff or furniture. The people are extremely poor and are held incommunicado, living in makeshift reed huts, with an allowance of ID 1.5 (about £2.50 sterling) per person per month. Diseases are widespread and hundreds have died so far. The increasing number of graves and the daily erected headstones attest to the inhumane conditions under which these mountain people exist, forcibly driven into desert areas in which even cactuses will not grow. Reliable eyewitnesses report that up to April 1977, the mortality rate was as follows:—

Camp No. 1	450 persons
Camp No. 2	380 persons
Camp No. 3	400 persons
Camp No. 4	nearly 400 persons, the great majority of them being children

These camps contain deportees from the following villages:—

- A. Camp No. 1: from 12 villages — (1) BARZAN, (2) HOSTAN, (3) REESHA, (4) HASINKA, (5) HASNA, (6) RAZIYA, (7) BIBANA, (8) HAVINTKA, (9) HAMDALÁ, (10) BAZI, (11) SEVRA, (12) BALINDA.
- B. Camp No. 2: from 9 villages — (1) HAIZAN, (2) TEELI, (3) BABSEEFA, (4) SHINKEEL, (5) DAVIDKA, (6) BEKAL, (7) AVADOUR, (8) ARDEEL, (9) MASEKA
- C. Camp No. 3: from 13 villages — (1) BLIA ZHUR, (2) BLIA ZHAER, (3) ASTA, (4) REZAN, (5) QALA TUKI, (6) RELA BEER, (7) SHIKARTA, (8) BEDAR, (9) DARDOLKI, (10) SURANKI, (11) HARUNI, (12) and (13) 2 villages not identified.
- D. Camp No. 4: from 9 villages — (1) DERBONKI, (2) ZORAEVAN, (3) YERIVAN, (4) SEFTI, (5) SHIRY, (6) SERGAVER, (7) ISSOMAR, (8) ZIWA, (9) not identified.

* * * * *

As we report these facts, the resurgent Kurdish revolution, led by our Party in Iraqi Kurdistan for the attainment of the basic rights of our Kurdish people, has entered its second year, resolutely and successfully facing the Iraqi military machine, might and onslaught. The Iraqi regime has intensified its racist campaign against the helpless Kurdish civilians, committing the most ruthless and heartless crimes in an effort to reverse the rising tide of our revolution and to avenge its military ineffectiveness in crushing the Kurdish guerillas.

In this age of concern for human rights, the fate of the Kurds remains consistently ignored by the world's leading figures and international organisations, thus tacitly encouraging harsher treatment against them. We therefore appeal to you to take up the case of the children of BARZAN, and to take the necessary steps to enquire about their conditions and the fate of the remainder who are continuing gradually to perish in silence and resignation, unless the Iraqi government releases them and returns them to their original dwellings without delay.

We are sure that any action or gesture by you will ultimately help to reduce the suffering of the Kurds in Iraq.

KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(Provisional Leadership)
Kurdistan - Iraq

February 1978

* * * * *

KDP SEEKS RELEASE OF PESHMERGA FAMILIES IN EXCHANGE FOR CAPTURED ENGINEERS

At 1600 hours, 29 October 1977, the Peshmerga guerilla forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party — Provisional Leadership captured, following a clash with Iraqi Government forces two engineers on the KANI MASI/BIBO road, an important new military road at present under construction in Amadiya District, Dahok Province. They are:—

- 1 Captain Engineer Salah al-Din Muhammad Abdul Hafidh, a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt, from Cairo, (Identity card No. 2558 issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior on 25 July 1974) — a mechanical engineer.
- 2 Engineer Mahir Ahmad Ibrahim, an Iraqi citizen, from Mosul — a civil engineer.

In their letters dated 3 November 1977 to the International Red Cross Society in Geneva, they asked the organisation to intervene on their behalf with the Iraqi authorities in order to secure their release.

In another joint letter dated 3 November to THE TIMES, London, they appealed to the paper to inform various humanitarian and international organisations to intervene on their behalf with the Iraqi Government to secure their release, emphasising that the conditions they were living under are as rigorous and exhausting as those of the Peshmergas, but adding that they have been well and humanely treated by the KDP guerillas.

Their release is conditional upon the freeing from detention camps in Nasriya, Diwaniya and Hilla of the wives, children and close relatives of the Peshmergas.

6 March 1978

THE FATE OF THE TWO CAPTIVE ENGINEERS

On 29 October, 1977 two engineers, S-D. M. Abdul Hafidh, an Egyptian, and M.A. al-Hassawi, an Iraqi, were captured by the Peshmergas. They were engaged by the Iraqi army on the construction of a new military road which is being opened up between Kani Masi and Bibo, Amadiya District.

They have twice written open letters of appeal. The latest was dated 23 December 1977 in which they state that the Iraqi government has ignored them completely and did not care about their fate.

The Peshmergas are treating them as best they can under the rigorous conditions in which all must live.

Now, the Iraqi authorities, more especially the army and air force, are making preparations for their big spring and summer offensives, including the call up to active service of all reservists for the army, police, border guard, security and intelligence services, who were born in 1949, 1950 and 1952. There is also to be coordination of military operations against the Peshmergas with the Iranian authorities.

Therefore, the Peshmergas declare that under the circumstances they cannot guarantee the safety and well being of the two engineers unless their families — their wives, children and parents — are released by the ruthless Iraqi regime from the detention camps in southern and western Iraq.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Geneva, 12th August 1949

Article 4

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

-
- (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civil members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorisation from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model;

THE CAPTURED ENGINEERS WRITE ANOTHER APPEAL

The two engineers captured on 29 October 1977 by the KDP peshmerga partisans wrote another appeal on 23 December 1977, asking for mediation to effect their exchange with detained families of Kurdish guerillas.

Below are copies of their letters with their photographs — seen in company with other captives — together with their identity cards.



1 Mechanical Engineer Salah al-Din Muhammad Abdul Hafidh was born in Cairo, Egypt on 15 October 1944. He is married and has one child.
His address is:
c/o Abdul Hafidh Muhammad Abdul Hafidh
11 Iliya Abu-Madhi Street,
Halmiyat al-Zaitun
Cairo, Egypt

2 Civil Engineer Mahir Ahmad al-Hassawi was born in Mosul (Nineva), Iraq in 1947. He is single.
His address is:
Mahallat Bab al-Masjid
House No. 5/160
Mosul (Nineva), Iraq

Kordistan - Iraq
23.12.1977

an - appeal.

We The Under Signed, have been Captured on 29.10.1977. by The Kurdish partisans, while Constructing a military road between (Kom-masji and BeBe) amadi-yadistrict, after a heavy engagement with the Iraqi troops guarding us. So after the Iraqi government has Ignored us Completely and Rejected the demand of the Kordistan democratic par,

(K. D. P) to effect the release of the Families (women and children) of the Partisans who are placed in Concentration Camps in the South of Iraq and are kept in Commⁿⁱcad^o, in exchange for our release, The Iraqi army has infact raided, The hole out in which we are imprisoned in, twice using armoured helieokopters for strafing causing us injuries as result. in View of the Iraqi government's determination to keep Silent about

our predicament in pursuit of ~~the~~
its general policy of hiding the
truth of out the war in Kurdistan
and the Kurdish revolution from the
public and as we have ascertained its
disregard for our fate.

We appeal to you to intercede with
The Iraqi government to effect our
exchange with the Kurdish families
and to mediate between the Iraqi
authorities and the representatives
of the (K.D.P)

(Provisional Leadership) to do
whatever possible to improve our
Condition which is deteriorating
rapidly due to the lack of medical
facilities and the severe weather
and Conditions to which we are
not accustomed. ~~This letter has~~
This letter has been written at
our suggestion and at our free
will, after two months of capture
and the realization that the
Iraqi government is indifferent

to our fate, and will reach you
Through The representative of the
(K.D.P) to whom all enquiries should
be made. We are sure that our
appeal will evoke your humane
attention to take the necessary steps
to gain us freedom ultimately
(Thanking you in anticipation)

EX. Captain of engineers.

Salah el-dien, Mohamed abed el Hafez



Engineer MAHER AHMED AL HASSAWY



MILITARY COMMUNIQUÉS

COMMUNIQUE NO. 14

16 November 1977

MILITARY OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY KURDISH PESHMERGA PARTISANS AGAINST THE DICTATORIAL REGIME OF IRAQ AND ITS OPPRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE

- * Battles rage throughout Kurdistan-Iraq
- * The racist Ba'th regime destroys 23 more Kurdish villages and lays mines in the fields of peasants and farmers
- * Peshmergas capture an Egyptian military engineer and an Iraqi civil engineer in Kurdistan
- * Troop carrying helicopter shot down by Peshmergas.
- * Peshmerga partisans capture 35 pieces of weaponry and quantities of ammunition and supplies.

* * * * *

1. Peshmergas capture an Egyptian military engineer and an Iraqi civil engineer and destroy military road building equipment.

At 1600 hours on 29 October 1977, a squad of Peshmergas surprised the military force protecting a mechanical unit on the important military road currently under construction between Kani Masi and Bibo in the Amadiya sub-district. After lying in ambush, the Peshmergas opened heavy fire and quickly gained control of the situation, capturing the following:—

- (i) Captain Engineer Salah al-Din Muhammad Abdul Hafidh, a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt, identity card No. 2558, issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior on 25 July 1974.
- (ii) Engineer Mahir Ahmad Ibrahim, assistant engineer at the General Establishment of Roads and Bridges, Hadhirah al-Sadah, Mosul.
- (iii) First Policeman Infantry Tahir Misaiyar Gati, 37 Battalion, 109 Infantry Brigade. Identity card issued 16 November 1976.
- (iv) Private Abdul Karim Said, from the town of Nasriya.
- (v) Yousif Hamdun Muhammad al-Ta'i, mechanic, born Mosul 1953, from Farouq Street, Mosul.

Our forces also captured 3 Kalashnikovs and a quantity of supplies. One bulldozer and two cars (Toyota plate No. 3051, and Jeep station wagon plate No. 58, Popular model) were burned.

A number of additional road construction workers were released by the Peshmergas after checking their identities and informing them of the aims of the Kurdish revolution.

The Peshmerga squad returned safely to base together with their captives and the captured arms and supplies.

It has been decided that these captives will be released in return for the freeing of the families of Peshmergas presently held in the detention camps of Nasriya, Diwaniya and Hilla.

II. Iraqi Armed Forces burn and destroy 23 more Kurdish villages.

1 August 1977, Iraqi armed forces forcibly deported the inhabitants of 23 more Kurdish villages in the Provinces of Arbil and Sulaimaniya. Some villages were razed by military bulldozers. Others inaccessible to the bulldozers were destroyed by fire. The following are the names of the villages:—

Choman District, Arbil Province

- | | | |
|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| 1 Dilza | 6 Shora | 11 Nawbarga |
| 2 Kona Khan | 7 Galazir | 12 Chomsak |
| 3 Warda | 8 Rasha Harmiyan | 13 Skawa |
| 4 Nawanda | 9 Mawtan | 14 Razoika |
| 5 Dola Bun | 10 Ina | 15 Mawnan |

Sangasar sub-district, Ranya District, Sulaimaniya Province

- | | | |
|---------------|----------------|----------------------|
| 16 Sinamuka | 19 Barawa Zuru | 22 Bianai Ziri |
| 17 Bard Kuran | 20 Barawa Ziru | 23 Pasht Ashani Zuri |
| 18 Bard Mamak | 21 Siwais | |

III Mines laid in farmers' and peasants' fields

For some time now it has become the practice of the armed forces of the Tikriti regime to lay anti-personnel mines in many areas of Kurdistan — such as Barzan, Bradust, Rawanduz, Rikan and Doski Zuri in Amadiya District. These mines are planted on the paths leading to fields and pastures and near to water springs. Every field contains hundreds of mine and this inhuman practice has resulted in the death

of a number of innocent civilians. Many peasants and farmers have appealed to the local authorities to have these minefields cleared, but their appeals have been to no avail.

IV. Execution of 3 spies

1. On 15 June 1977, the death sentence was carried out on the spy Salih Amhad Kizri from Dar Husar village, Zakho District, for his collaboration with the intelligence forces of the regime. He used to roam the villages, dressed as a Peshmerga and carrying a Kalashnikov, committing acts of aggression against the inhabitants and extorting money from them in the name of the Peshmergas.
2. On 24 June 1977, spy Abdi Jangir was executed. He came from Banak village, Batufa sub-district, Zakho District, and openly collaborated with the intelligence forces of the regime against the people and the revolution.
3. On 20 October 1977, the death sentence was carried out on Ahmad Khorshid Aziz, from Zakho. A former Peshmerga, he surrendered to the Iraqi authorities on 28 May 1977. He was taken to the Commander of the Regiment of Thi Qar Force, Abdul Karim Ahmad. He was then given 250 Iraqi Dinars (approximately £500), and sent to Baghdad for training under the supervision of the Director of Security, Abdul Sattar Ismail. Recently, he was sent on a special mission to murder Peshmerga commanders and party cadres. He was supplied with a No. 13 pistol & ID 200, with a promise of a further ID 10,000 on the successful completion of his mission. He was arrested by Peshmergas on 8 October 1977. During interrogation he confessed to the above information.

V. Fierce Fighting in the Amadiya Area

1. Iraqi forces suffer 50 casualties

At 0.15 hours, 28 July 1977, a Peshmerga squad launched an attack on three army bunkers in the mountains near Kani village, about 20km from Amadiya town, using RPG and light weapons. These bunkers had been sited to guard the residence of the battalion commander in the village. In the attack, 20 soldiers and border guards lost their lives and about 30 more were injured, four of them dying later on in Amadiya hospital. Among the dead were the following:—

- (1) Captain Faisal, Battalion Commander from Diwaniya
- (2) 1st Policeman, Border Guard, Kazim Isa Muhammad, 71 Regiment, 114 Brigade, Identification Card No. 362, issued on 29 June 1976
- (3) Border Guard Masoud Zighiyir Alwan, 71 Regiment, 114 Brigade, Identity Card No. 137, issued on 29 June 1976
- (4) Policeman Abid Jasim from Diwaniya
- (5) Border Guard Masoud Hashim from Diwaniya
- (6) 1st Policeman, Border Guard, Karim Dikhin from Diwaniya
- (7) Border Guard Naim
- (8) Conscript soldier Wannan Hassan from Nasriya
- (9) Conscript soldier Kazim Muhammad from Diwaniya
- (10) Conscript soldier Hashim Salih from Diwaniya
- (11) Conscript soldier Abbas Kalluh from Diwaniya
- (12) Conscript soldier Falah Hassan from Diwaniya

Conscript soldier Hashim Abbas Ismail Ali, 71 Regiment 114 Brigade, from Ubaid village, Suwaij sub-district, Shatra District, Nasriya Province, was taken prisoner but was later released.

The Peshmerga squad captured 6 Cross type guns, one Kalashnikov Sikhoi type, and some ammunition.

2. On 24 August 1977, 5 soldiers of a government military force were ambushed by Peshmergas near the army bunkers in Sari Mazrah, Raikan, Amadiya District. Three of them lost their lives and 2 were injured.
3. On 26 August 1977, a government military force fell into a Peshmerga ambush near the water spring of Chin village. Government losses were 2 dead and 3 wounded, with additional material losses.
4. At 0600 hours on 29 August 1977, a Peshmerga squad launched an attack on the Regimental HQ located in Galya Diri village in the Rekan area, Amadiya District, using RPG rockets and light arms. This action resulted in the death of 10 government soldiers, the wounding of 9 more and further heavy material damage.
5. At midday 8 September 1977, a squad of Peshmergas attacked the Trazni mountain bunker situated between Chin and Beri villages in the Doski Zuri area. The occupants of the bunker sustained a number of casualties.
6. At 1030 hours, 9 September 1977, Peshmergas ambushed a government force at the water spring of Chin village, killing 4 soldiers.
7. At 1745 hours, 31 October 1977, a Peshmerga squad attacked Battalion HQ near Chaqla village, Barwari Bala area. During the attack which lasted for over half an hour, the bunker was burned and heavy casualties were inflicted on its occupants. The dead body of a soldier was seen nearby.

VI. Fighting Continues in Zakho District

1. At 2300 hours, 20 August 1977, a squad of Peshmerga launched an attack on the Armisht bunker overlooking the Armisht regiment, using RPG rockets and light weapons. The bunker was destroyed.

6 soldiers were killed and the remainder wounded. The squad also hit a military vehicle of the Zeel-type which was standing in front of the regimental HQ, with the RPG rockets, destroying it.

2. On 30 August 1977, a Peshmerga squad planted a mine on the road between Desht Takh and Sharanish sub-district (at 0630 hours). The mine exploded under a troop carrying vehicle of the Eva type, destroying the vehicle and either killing or wounding its occupants. An hour later, a military force from Dasht Takh army camp arrived on the scene and transported the dead and wounded by ambulance to Zakho.

3. At 1830 hours, 31 August 1977, two attacks were launched by Peshmerga squads using the Spindaruk bunker overlooking Sinat village, using RPG rockets and light weapons. This attack lasted an hour and resulted in either killing or wounding the occupants of the bunker.

4. Attack on Sharanish sub-district Police Station

On the eve of 10 September 1977, a squad of Peshmerga launched an attack on the police station of the Sharanish sub-district, which continued for 20 minutes and caused 4 deaths and 6 other casualties among the police force.

VII. Urban Guerilla Attack on Aqra

At 1300 hours on 26 July 1977, a timed device, planted by urban units of Peshmerga, exploded in the Dinarta police station, causing severe injury to a policeman.

VIII. Fighting Spreads Throughout Arbil Province

1. 1900 hours 17 August 1977 — a Peshmerga squad attacked a bunker overlooking Hayat village in the Bradurst area, killing 10 soldiers and inflicting heavy material damage. One Peshmerga was slightly wounded.

2. 1500 hours 7 September 1977 — a government force fell into a Peshmerga ambush between Khayr Yazuk and Dasht (Barazgar) in Merga Sub sub-district. A sergeant was among the three soldiers killed while a further number were wounded. Peshmergas captured 3 Kalashnikovs and 2 Siminovs. After the incident, a large military force arrived to occupy the area, arresting 30 of its inhabitants on charges of cooperation with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its guerillas.

3. 16 September 1977 — A government military force approached Ziti village, Shirwan Mazn sub-district, Merga Sur district. At 1800 hours, a Peshmerga squad intercepted the force near Hopa village, about 5km from Shirwan, and after a fierce battle forced the government forces to retreat towards Shirwan and Chama, leaving behind several casualties.

The next day (17 Sept), a large government force returned to the scene of the battle with a number of mules appropriated from the inhabitants of Hopa in order to evacuate the dead to Shirwan. Later the bodies were taken by helicopter to Merga Sur. On the same day, government troops landed in 4 helicopters at Ziti village and arrested 12 of its inhabitants, some of whom were transferred to Kirkuk and the rest to Merga Sur. Their fate is still unknown.

4. 15 September 1977 — two soldiers coming from nearby bunkers fell into a Peshmerga ambush near Mazni village, Merga Sur sub-district. One was killed and the other wounded.

5. 8 Kalashnikovs captured.

16 September 1977 — a Peshmerga squad lay in ambush on the Saidakan-Rawanduz road. At 1500 hours a military vehicle approached and after a 15 minutes fight, the car was burned and its 10 occupants killed, among them Corporal Abdul Hadi Hussain, No. 34644 from 1328 unit. He came from Baghdad. The Peshmergas captured 8 Kalashnikovs. The task of this government force had been to search the houses of villagers in the area. In so doing, they had assaulted the people, beating and insulting them and stealing their belongings, especially the gold and jewelry of the women (which is their form of saving and financial security).

Choman District sees renewed Battles

6. 14 July 1977 — enemy troops landing on Mt. Halgurd in helicopters were engaged by Peshmergas in a 4 hour battle which resulted in 4 soldiers being killed and 5 more wounded. The enemy were forced to withdraw from the area.

7. 19 July 1977 — a government force was ambushed on the path between army bunkers overlooking Galala. A Lieutenant was among 7 soldiers killed and 2 others were wounded. Peshmergas captured 2 Kalashnikovs.

8. 25 July 1977 — a Peshmerga squad made a surprise attack on a government force engaged on the construction of bunkers behind Zino village. During a 4 hour battle which ensued the enemy sustained 26 casualties.

9. Eve of 13 August 1977 — army bunkers surrounding Galala bridge were attacked with RPG rockets and machine guns by Peshmergas. The bunkers were destroyed and the enemy suffered heavy casualties.

10. Helicopter Shot Down

1500 hours, 29 August 1977 — a Peshmerga squad engaged in a government military force in the

vicinity of Choma and Zanglin villages, near Dilman in Choman district. A battle lasted 4 hours, during which the enemy suffered great losses. Later at night, the same military force attacked Gomi (Gama Suran) and was again intercepted by the Peshmerga squad on the morning of 30 August. The enemy called up artillery and helicopter support. One troop carrying helicopter was shot down. Enemy casualties were heavy. After the government forces had retreated, Peshmergas approached the wreckage of the helicopter and removed two dead bodies before setting fire to it. During this encounter the Peshmerga captured a No. 12 radio set and large quantities of ammunition and supplies.

11. 0200 hours, 7 September 1977 — Peshmergas attacked enemy bunkers overlooking the seat of Galala sub-district with RPGs and machine guns. The bunkers were set on fire. Four soldiers were killed and 3 others wounded.

IX Peshmergas Penetrate Deep into Sulaimaniya Province.

1. Capture of Mayor and Police Officer of Barzanja Sub-District

On 5 July 1977, a Peshmerga squad ambushed an armed vehicle of the police near Bizainian village, Barzanja sub-district. One policeman was killed, 5 more wounded, and the rest of the car's occupants surrendered, among them the Mayor of Barzanja sub-district, Tahir Khanaqini, and the Police Officer, Falah Hassan. The Peshmergas captured 2 Bren guns, 6 Kalashnikovs and 2 pistols. The car was destroyed. All Peshmergas returned safely to base.

2. On the eve of 21 July 1977, Peshmergas laid a mine on the Kapran bridge near Delga village, Qala Diza sub-district. The mine exploded under a military vehicle (Zeel type) at 0800 hours on 21 July, destroying the vehicle and killing 18 soldiers.

3. 21 July 1977 — Peshmergas engaged an enemy force in Isbiwa village, Chuarta District. The enemy retreated after a 4 hour battle and suffering heavy casualties. A Kalashnikov was captured by the Peshmergas.

4. 25 July 1977 — an army force, reinforced by mercenaries (jash), attacked the Shlir area in Penjwin District. The jash mercenaries were the men of Mirza Sabir Ahmad Mina Randan and Sharib Kachal. This force was intercepted and engaged in a 2 hour battle by a squad of Peshmerga, and was forced to retreat. Two mercenaries were wounded.

5. Military Convoy Destroyed near Maluma

1400 hours, 26 July 1977 — Peshmergas ambushed a military convoy consisting of 4 EVA type trucks carrying troops, and a command jeep, near Maluma village between the Kariza and Chalawa military camps in Chuarta District. The convoy was hit with RPGs and machine gun fire, and as a result of the engagement 60 government soldiers and two officers (a major and a 1st Lieutenant) were killed and several more were wounded. All vehicles of the convoy were burned.

6. 0730 hours 29 July 1977 — an anti-personnel mine planted by Peshmergas on the road between Dolamaw and Waqatrak, Chuarta District, exploded, killing 4 soldiers and injuring 5 others.

7. 30 July 1977 — a land mine planted by Peshmergas between Mt. Spi and Mt. Kili in Sulaimaniya Province, exploded killing 2 soldiers and wounding 2 more.

8. 31 July 1977 — a government force launched an attack on the Bawazi area in Sulaimaniya Province, but withdrew after having been intercepted by Peshmergas, suffering a number of casualties. The Peshmergas captured a quantity of ammunition.

9. LATEST NEWS

On the evening of 12 October 1977, in a daring operation, Peshmergas entered into Qala Diza town, Sulaimaniya Province and from 1900 hours to 2400 hours were in control of the town. They distributed KDP leaflets and other publications in the streets and were welcomed by joyful people with offers of help and food. The Peshmerga squad attacked the local Ba'th party office with RPGs and Kalashnikov fire, inflicting heavy material damage to the building, killing 3 outside guards and either killing or wounding those inside the office. As they withdrew at 2400 hours, the Peshmergas were pursued by some 10 Zeel type troop carrying vehicles and 2 armoured cars, but they made good their escape and returned safely to base.

10. On the eve of 12 September 1977, 4 Iranian border guards ("Chirik"), helped by certain collaborators, disguised themselves as Peshmergas and kidnapped two Kurdish patriots, Ahmad Nistani and Karim Nistani, in the Qala Diza area, handing them over to the dreaded and notorious SAVAK secret police. The lives of these two men are now in gravest danger.

X. Earlier Military Operations not reported in former KDP Communiques

(1) Eve of 9 March 1977 — a Peshmerga squad entered Sulaimaniya town and opened fire on a Toyota car belonging to the intelligence service. Two intelligence officers were killed and 3 wounded.

(2) 3 April 1977 — A Peshmerga squad ambushed a military convoy on the Sulaimaniya-Chuarte road. In an hour long battle the enemy suffered losses in personnel and supplies. The Peshmergas returned safely to base.

(3) 17 April 1977 — a government force, supported by armour and aircraft, attacked the Shar Bazir area, Chuarta District and was resisted by Peshmergas. In a dawn to dusk battle the enemy suffered heavy casualties.

(4) Eve of 31 May 1977 — a Peshmerga squad entered the district seat of Tawila and held it for 4 hours.

Two government spies were arrested, tried and executed; they were Hassan Hama Salim and Jamil Agah.
 (5) 15 June 1977 — a Peshmerga squad engaged mercenaries — Ahmad Aziz Kaki's men — in the Shar Bazir area. One mercenary was killed and 3 others wounded.
 (6) Eve of 13 March 1977 — a clash took place between a Peshmerga squad and a government force composed of an army unit and mercenaries of Ahmad Aziz, in Sarkand village, Shar Bazir area. After a 2 hour battle, 2 mercenaries were killed and a third wounded. The enemy forces were routed.
 (7) 20 March 1977 — A Peshmerga squad attacked army bunkers of Shakha Sur on the Chuarta-Mawat road. In the two hour attack, the enemy suffered several casualties.

XI. "Unextended Amnesty"

The revolution Command Council (RCC), the Supreme Committee of Northern Affairs, headed by Saddam Hussain, has issued a new 'amnesty'. It reads:

"We announce a general amnesty for all escapee Kurds, civilian and military, for one unextendable month, from 1-31 October 1977."

It is not the first time that this and former Iraqi governments have issued "amnesties" or "threats". But none has ever seriously contemplated a just solution of the Kurdish question.

COMMUNIQUE NO. 15

13 March 1978

MILITARY OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY KURDISH PESHMERGA PARTISANS AGAINST THE DICTATORIAL REGIME OF IRAQ AND ITS OPPRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE

Period covered: end of September 1977 to early January 1978

Summary: This period has witnessed a relative lull in the fighting because of seasonal factors. Cold weather and heavy snowfalls, 2m. high in some places, have restricted troop movements.

Though resorting to extensive use of armoured helicopters, the construction of large numbers of bunkers and outposts in the mountains, and the opening up of new military roads, the Iraqi army has not been able to achieve any of its objectives. The Peshmergas have not abandoned their guerilla tactics, successfully avoiding encirclement and liquidation by the Iraqi army, despite its superiority in men and equipment. But the Kurdish people in Iraq and the entire Kurdish nation continue to be the Peshmergas' source of strength, steadfastness and dynamism.

Unable to reach the Peshmergas themselves, the ruthless Iraqi regime has turned on the families of the Peshmergas — wives, children and parents — detaining or imprisoning them as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Peshmergas involved. Executions and long-term imprisonment are also part of the same policy. But Peshmergas are resolute in their determination to resist the racist aggression of the Iraqi government.

There are indications of a tripartite conspiracy between the Iraqi dictatorship, the reactionary regime of the Shah and some local mercenaries to encircle and liquidate the Kurdish people's May Revolution. Iranian liaison officers are now stationed in Qala Diza and Ranya. Frequent visits have taken place between Iraqi and Iranian officials for the coordination of their activities against "subversive elements" — as provided for in the Algiers agreement and its secret protocols three years ago — and to safeguard "the security of their borders".

* * * * *

- * Peshmergas intercept a government task force at the Dahok-Zakho-Mosul junction.
- * Execution by the Iraqi regime of Lt. Abdul Qadir Pedawi and a group of KDP comrades.
- * Kurdish children face slow death in arid areas of Southern Iraq.
- * Dictatorial Iraqi regime continues its inhumane policy of detaining families of Peshmergas.
- * Enemy suffers about 250 casualties as a result of aggression against innocent Kurdish villages and their inhabitants.

* * * * *

1.26 Sept. 1977: At 0710 hours a government task force approached the village of Baban, Barzan Sub-district, in order to confiscate the wood and destroy the houses in the now deserted village whose inhabitants have been forcibly deported to southern Iraq. A force was halted by a Peshmerga ambush and in consequence suffered 6 killed and 3 wounded. The Peshmergas captured a Kalashnikov.

2. Night 6/7 October 1977: An armed military vehicle on a special-mission was ambushed by Peshmergas on the road of Basni District, Sulaimaniya Province. The vehicle was destroyed under machine gun fire and all its occupants were killed.

3. 7 Oct. 1977: A military task force guarding a mechanised unit employed on opening a military road in the Akoyan valley area of Rawanduz District was engaged by a Peshmerga squad in an hour long skirmish, resulting in 20 enemy casualties.

4 Oct. 1977: An army task force approaching the village of Narinan, Rawanduz District, from the

village of Kandor was intercepted by a Peshmerga unit mounting an ambush. It came under fire at 1300 hours and fighting continued until 1400. Four armoured helicopters were sent in support of the force but all Peshmergas withdrew safely. Of the 9 enemy casualties 4 were killed and 5 wounded. The enemy's intention had been to march from one village to another in the area as a show of force to threaten the inhabitants with severest measures should they in any manner cooperate with the Peshmergas.

5 Oct. 1977: Two soldiers were killed and 2 injured when a ZEEL military vehicle was ambushed by Peshmergas inside the town of Chuwarta.

6 Oct. 1977: Peshmergas ambushed an enemy task force between Ziyoka and Pidalat villages in Qala Diza District, killing 1 officer and 3 soldiers. Ziyoka village then came under artillery fire during which a number of children were wounded.

7. 27 Oct. 1977: At 0700 the government's hiring mercenaries of Ali Agh Mangoo attempted to encircle Ziyoka village in Qala Diza District but were foiled by a Peshmerga unit present in the area. After an hour long engagement the mercenaries fled, suffering 3 killed and 4 wounded.

8. 30 October. 1977: In order to frustrate enemy attempts to terrorise the inhabitants of Galala, Peshmergas planted 2 anti-personnel mines at the peak of the mountain overlooking Galala. One of the mines exploded the same day, killing two soldiers. A further soldier was killed the following day when the second mine went off.

9. 6 Nov. 1977: At 1600 hours a task force guarding a mechanised unit opening up a military road between the villages of Pibala and Aflahi in Batofa, Zakho, was engaged by a Peshmerga company. A reinforcement force was despatched to relieve the encircled task force. Fighting continued till 1800 hours. The enemy suffered 50 casualties.

10. 11 Nov. 1977: at 1900 hours a Peshmerga squad intercepted two enemy vehicles (an armed Chevrolet pickup, 1976 model. No. 1824, and a Toyota, 1974 model No. 5073) on the road between Balinda and Kiryadari in Amadiya District, bound on a special mission. The enemy suffered 5 killed —

- (1) Police Sgt. Major Haji Shafiq
- (2) Police Corporal Ali
- (3) Technical supervisor Said Ahmad Muhammad (ID card No. 186)
- (4) Map surveyor Oman Salih Amin (ID card No. 76)
- (5) Driver Khalid Taha Khalid (ID card No. 24436)

In addition, three were wounded, including Policeman Salah al-Din Ahmad Younis. A Bren machine gun, 3 Kalashnikovs and a quantity of ammunition and supplies were captured.

11. 14 Nov. 1977: An armoured troop carrier (BTR 60 type) protecting the military road between the villages of Kiri and Avsarki, Barwaribala, Kani Masi District, was ambushed by a Peshmerga squad and destroyed by RPG fire and hand grenades. Pte. Akram Abdul Qadir (Unit No. 520) and Pte. Kadhim Abbas (no. 44312) were killed. Three other soldiers were wounded, among them the driver of the carrier.

At the same time, the Peshmergas exchanged fire with the mountain bunkers overlooking the road, as a result of which the enemy suffered 6 dead. 1st Lt. Nafi, Company Commander of Balkuka was seriously wounded. Army casualties were evacuated from the area by helicopter. The Peshmergas captured a light (paratroop) Kalashnikov and a quantity of ammunition and supplies.

The following day, enemy troops detained 24 inhabitants of Kiri and Avsarki villages and took them to Dahok for interrogation.

12. Night of 22/23 Nov. 1977: A Peshmerga squad entered the centre of Khilifan Sub-district, Rawanduz District and posted KDP leaflets on the walls of a number of buildings. While carrying out this task, a security forces' car approached them, but they threw a hand grenade into the car, destroying the vehicle and killing its occupants.

13. Night of 24/25 Nov. 1977: In order to disrupt the movement of government troops in the area, Peshmergas planted 3 land mines near the Alana army camp, Khilifan Sub-district. One went off, killing one soldier and wounding two more. The second, planted on the road used by the enemy to bring water for the use of the regiment stationed in the camp, exploded, wounding 3 and killing 2. The third, planted near Basri water spring, went off at 1400 hours on 25 Nov., killing a soldier and injuring 3.

14. 1 Dec. 1977: At 1900 hours Peshmergas intercepted a motorised task force on the main road from Amidiya to Shiladazi, situated between Greater Zab and Lesser Zab. The force, which was transported in an EVA military vehicle for the purpose to persecuting the peasants of the area, was engaged in a 10 minutes skirmish which resulted in the destruction of the vehicle and its occupants. Following this, a second enemy force was despatched from the battalion HQ located near the area to the scene of the skirmish and was intercepted in its turn by the same Peshmerga squad. The army suffered 33 dead in the second engagement, among them two officers, a Captain and a 1st Lt. Two sergeants and 3 soldiers were seriously wounded. Two of the wounded died later in the Amadiya hospital, one of them Conscript Private Aziz Ahmad, No. 5123 Unit, from Kirkuk. As a result, the authorities took the following retaliatory measures:—

- a. Threatening the innocent inhabitants of the area and beating and insulting those travelling to Amadiya.
- b. Imposing a curfew on the Amadiya area for 3 consecutive nights.
- c. Increasing the number of army bunkers in the area.
- d. Increasing road check points on the road in question.

15. 4 Dec. 1977: A fight broke out among enemy troops inside one of the bunkers near Amadiya. As a result, a 1st Lt. and 8 soldiers were killed and a number of other soldiers wounded.

16. A severe blow to the enemy.

31 Dec. 1977: At 2100 hours a task force comprised of 3 military vehicles, a command jeep and two EVA trucks, carrying troops of the Maghawir "Special Forces" was despatched to comb the area of Peshmergas, to patrol the road and to terrorize the inhabitants. The force was ambushed by a squad of Peshmergas and the ensuing engagement lasted until 2200 hours. At the sound of shooting 6 additional EVA trucks loaded with soldiers were despatched to the scene of the battle. In the first few minutes of the engagement the Peshmergas destroyed the three vehicles intercepted in the ambush and then engaged the reinforcement force. Of the 46 enemy casualties 35 were killed and 11 wounded, among them Capt. Jamal al-Lihaibi. Also killed during the engagement was an Arab tribal sheikh whom the racist Iraqi authorities had settled in the area after forcibly deporting its Kurdish inhabitants. As a result of the battle, high tension electric power lines were cut.

This Maghawir force has become notorious among the inhabitants of the area for excessive use of violence and violations, including the torturing of women and children.

On the following day, a frantic search of the area was carried out by the authorities, during which armoured helicopters and the hiring mercenaries of Hikmat Najman and Sheikh Salam took part. The road was sealed off and the area encircled by enemy troops.

On 2 Jan. 1978: the withdrawing Peshmergas encountered mercenaries of the two above mentioned hirelings near the village of Alandki. After a 4 hour fight, the mercenaries fled to the village of Babokhki and were pursued by the Peshmergas into the village. Reinforcements were sent to the aid of the mercenaries but the engagement resulted in the killing of 6 mercenaries — among them Ahmad Jirani and Nadhir — and the wounding of Sheikh Salam himself and his brother, Jalil Sheikh Siddi1.

3 Jan, 1978: The enemy once more resumed the search operation during the morning, using armoured helicopters and mercenaries. In the next two days more violent and aggressive actions were taken against the inhabitants of the area, including beating, threats, stealing money and jewellery — which for the women of the region is their form of life's savings against old age and emergencies. The villages involved were Kind Kos, Har Gundi, Linafa, Bakharniva, Gufki, Zurafa, Bishinki and Pir Mala.

17. 7 Jan 1978: In an attempt to dislodge police bunkers overlooking the centre of Batufa Sub-district Zakho, a Peshmerga unit launched a surprise attack on one of these bunkers, using RPGs and light weapons. The attack lasted about half an hour as a result of which the bunker was set on fire and destroyed and heavy casualties were inflicted on its occupants. Following the attack, the enemy began an extensive search, using armoured helicopters. The whole area was pounded by artillery fire on 7 Jan.

18. 10 Jan 1978: An EVA type military vehicle loaded with soldiers bound on a special mission was intercepted by a Peshmerga squad on the Merga Sur-Chama road at 1500 hours. An army officer and two soldiers were killed.

* * * * *

THE DICTATORSHIP EXECUTE MORE KURDISH PATRIOTS BECAUSE OF THEIR BEING MEMBERS OF KDP

On 17 Sept, 1977, the fascist Iraqi authorities executed another group of Kurdish patriots, members of our party, in the Abu Ghraib prison, after mock trials by the Special Military Tribunal in Kurkuk. These men had no access to legal advice or to the aid of lawyers. The only charge against them was that they founded KDP organisations. The martyrs are:

- 1 Retired Lt. (Iraqi Armed forces) Abdul Qadir Othman Pedawi (30). He was retired from the army because he joined the Kurdish revolution in 1974. He left a wife and two children.
- 2 Comrade Shaban Ghalbish, a tailor from Dahok. He left a wife and five children.
- 3 Comrade Abid Abdulla Alyas al-Mizuri, Veterinary official of Dahok, (24). He left a wife and a child.
- 4 Comrade Mahmoud Ghalbish, self-employed tailor. He left a wife.

The men were arrested in May 1977. Before their execution they cried out "long live the KDP" and "Long live the national May Revolution." In honouring their sacrifice and the memory of these martyrs of ours who have joined other martyrs of Kurds and Kurdistan, we pledge ourselves to continue the struggle until our Kurdish people attain the noble aims for which so many have sacrificed their lives.

THE PROCESS CONTINUES OF TURNING KURDISTAN INTO A VAST MINEFIELD

Enemy forces continue to plant land mines on the roads and paths as well as in the environments of villages and pasture lands, in disregard of the safety of the local inhabitants. This is done on the pretext of protecting their bunkers and outposts. On 13 Nov, 1977, a mine exploded under the feet of a youth, Salman Abdul Rahman of Kani Sarki village, Kani Masi Sub-district, Amadiya, close to the village itself. On 1 Dec, enemy forces laid a thick minefield in the environ of Brifka and Garka villages, Kani Masi. One of the mines exploded near Garka, killing a soldier.

NOT EVEN SHEPHERDS ARE SAFE FROM GOVERNMENT TERROR

15 Sept. 1977: at 1000 hours Ramadhan Salih Haji, a shepherd was killed by Iraqi forces as he was tending his sheep near Sargala village, Amadiya, on the pretext that he had cooperated with the Peshmergas. A friend of his was arrested at the same time but his fate is still unknown.

SHAKLAWA SECURITY OFFICER KILLS KURDISH GIRL AFTER VIOLATING HER

In mid-August 1977, the Ba'thist security officer of Shaqlawa arrested a Kurdish girl of Shaqlawa renowned for her beauty and held her captive for three days in the catacombs of the Security Department, during which time he repeatedly raped her. He then killed her and cast away the corpse on the outskirts of Shaqlawa.

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE RACIST REGIME IMPLEMENTS ITS "LAW OF AUTONOMY"

With the advent of the new academic year in the fall of 1977, Baghdad newspapers claimed a "very prominent achievement" in the so-called 'Autonomous Area' in the cancellation of the Kurdish language as a means of instruction, thus fulfilling part of the Ba'th government's "humane mission". By a simple decree of the ruling all Ba'thist Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the Kurdish language was reduced to the status of a foreign language. The right of the Kurdish people to study their own language, pledged by the Iraqi government and a precondition imposed by the League of Nations for the annexation of southern Kurdistan to the state of Iraq in the 1920s, a right also incorporated in the 11 March 1970 agreement between the Ba'th and the Kurdish people which was reiterated in the Law of Autonomy of March 1974, has thus been rescinded as a measure of fighting Kurdish nationalism.

Early in February 1978, all Kurdish books were collected in the courtyards of schools all over Kurdistan and set on fire, causing great sorrow, pain and anger and even weeping among the students. There were demonstrations and strikes by students in a number of schools in various Kurdish towns and cities in protest against this racist measure.

In such acts of destruction the Ba'th are following the long tradition of many tyrants down the centuries, from the Middle Ages to Hitler and Mussolini.

MORE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY

At the beginning of March 1978, the KDP published a list of 145 people detained in various camps in southern Iraq. Of these, 24 people were 80 years of age and over, 24 between 60-79, 41 were infants of 5 and under and 10 were aged between 6-10. They were detained in the following camps and prisons:—

- Siniya, Qadisiya (Diwaniya)
- Sports Stadium, Diwaniya
- Abu Ghreib Prison
- Diwaniya Prison
- Hilla Prison
- Simail Prison

In addition, there are 4 further centres where names are not known but the details of those detained are as follows:

Centre for Detainees, Mahnawiya, Qadisiya (Diwaniya): 23 men, 63 women, 47 children. Total: 133 detainees

Department of Agriculture Detention Camp, Mahnawiya: 3 men, 63 women, 48 children. Total: 123 detainees

Babel (Hilla) Province — a detention centre situated about 10km outside Hilla town: 247 women and 89 children. Total: 336 detainees

Babel town detention centre: 174 men from Dahok and Nineveh provinces.

On 3 Feb. 1978, KDP released details of another list which contained 95 names of Kurds, 6 of whom had been executed, 31 imprisoned for periods of 5-30 years, and the remainder were aged people, women and children, detained in the prisons of Diwaniya, Ramadi, Hilla, al-Hussain in Falluja, Kirkuk, the Special Prison of Falluja, and the Central prison of Heet.

THE TWO CAPTURED ENGINEERS APPEAL TO THE WORLD

The two engineers, Salah al-Din M. Abdul Hafidh, an Egyptian subject and Mahir A. al-Hassawi, an Iraqi, captured by the Peshmergas on 29 Oct. 1977, have made a second appeal for outside help to secure their release. In a statement, they said that "in view of the Iraqi government's determination to keep silent our predicament in pursuit of its general policy of hiding the truth of the war in Kurdistan and the Kurdish revolution from the public, and as we have ascertained its disregard for our fate, we appeal to you to intercede with the Iraqi government to effect our exchange with the Kurdish families and to mediate between the Iraqi authorities and the representatives of the KDP."

As spring approaches and the Iraqi army and air force prepare to launch a large offensive against the Peshmergas, with the help of the Iranian authorities and some local mercenaries, the two engineers will be in grave danger.

The Peshmergas announce that they cannot guarantee the safety of the two engineers and other captives unless the release of the two is secured by meeting the demands of the Peshmergas for freeing their detained families.

KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP)
Provisional Leadership
International Relations Committee

13 March 1978



ANNEX 1

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Republic of Iraq
General Security
Directorate of Security of Dhee Qar Governorate

No. 3106
Date: 7/6/1977

Archive/The Kurds

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Subject: Permit to Travel/ Sulaimaniya — Qala Diza

The following whose names are listed below are allowed to travel outside the Governorate — Please note

Names

- | | | | |
|---|------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Fatima Sheikha |) | |
| 2 | Sabriya Peerout |) | |
| 3 | Nazdar Peerout Mahmoud |) | The family of Muhammad Peerout |
| 4 | Anbar Peerout Mahmoud |) | |
| 5 | Salih Peerout Mahmoud |) | |

Signed. 1st Lt. of Security
for/ Director of Security of Dhee Qar Governorate
/Abdul Karim/

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الأمين العام / السيد /
القائم / ١٩٧٢ / ٦ / ٧

المدير / الاكبر / الى / بن يمينه الامر
سماح بالسفر / ربيعه / غموزة

يتم للتدريج اسمائهم اذ نساء بالسفر الى خاني المحافظة - للمسلم رجاء.

الاغنياء

- ١- فاطمة شيخه
- ٢- صبرة بيسوت
- ٣- نازدة بيروت محمود عاتلة محمد بيروت
- ٤- عنبر بيروت محمود
- ٥- صالح بيروت محمود

اول الامين .

ع/ مدير امن محافظة ذى قنار

عبد الكريم /

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF BA'TH REPRESSION OF KURDS

The Kurdish inhabitants of many areas of Kurdistan-Iraq have been deported. Some have just been picked up by army trucks or by helicopter and deposited elsewhere, leaving behind all their belongings, animals and properties. Others have been more fortunate in obtaining compensation for their property.

Below is a translation of the text of a document acknowledging the receipt of compensation for property confiscated by the authorities. The names of the recipient and of the village concerned are withheld to protect the person involved from reprisals.

Translation

Document of Receipt	Dinars	Fils
Compensation for the house	650	00
Compensation for provisions	100	00
Seven hundred and fifty Dinars only compensation for the house and provisions	750	00

I, the undersigned inhabitant of the village in the sub-district of Nerwa Rikan, have received my share of the sum decided for me in compensation for my property and belongings, confiscated and registered in the name of the Ministry of Finance, in the above mentioned village. The sum is seven hundred and fifty Dinars only. Since there remains nothing for me to demand from the committee for compensating the inhabitants of Amadiya, I have signed acknowledging the receipt

(Signed) recipient

Please pay the sum in our presence

(signed)
Fakhr al-Din
Abd al-Karim
Director of Finance
Amadiya District Member

(Signed)
Directorate of Police
Member

(Signed) (Signed)
Local Chief of the Arab
Ba'th Socialist Party
Socialist Party Member

Hikmet Haj Salim
Mayor of Amadiya
District Member

(Signed)
Isma'il Mahmoud
Head of the Union
of Farmers' Societies
Member

(Signed)
Muhammad Mustafa
Superintendent of
Fixed Property
Register in Amadiya
Member

(Signed)
Amadiya Security
Officer Member

(Signed)
Abdul Wahid
Husan al-Din Mayor
of Barwari Bala
Sub-district Member

(Signed)
Mustafa Nuri Ahmad
Mayor of Nerwa Rikan
Member

Despite official spokesmen's claims that there is no guerilla activity in Kurdistan, the Iraqi authorities have several times dropped or distributed leaflets all over the Kurdish region threatening death to anyone helping or joining the peshmerga forces.

In the name of Allah, the Merciful,
the Compassionate

For the purpose of giving the opportunity to the persons misled, embroiled and repentant of their acts, we demand from them to return to the national fold; the national government will take care of them, compensate them for the weapons and will employ them. Otherwise, their fate will be death and execution resulting from their treason of the Iraqi people, both Arabs and Kurds.

Committee for Pardoning the Returnees.

49

**MILITARY OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY KURDISH PESHMERGA PARTISANS
AGAINST THE DICTATORIAL REGIME OF IRAQ AND ITS OPPRESSIVE ACTS
AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE**

- * Increase in urban operations
- * A Presidential decree to hang 65 Kurds
- * Murder of the girl, Naranj Hassan, and the child, Piruz Haji Shino
- * The enemy concentrates attacks on the Sidakan sub-district

* * * * *

One of the tactical mistakes of the previous phase of our struggle was to confine the battlefield basically to the rural mountainous areas of Kurdistan. This in turn served the purposes of the Iraqi regime militarily, psychologically and from the point of view of propaganda. Now that this tactic is gradually being changed by the KDP guerillas, military operations are also being carried out within the towns and cities in the Kurdish area, as well as elsewhere in Iraq, to the extent that is both possible and feasible.

Within the framework of KDP's present strategy (discussed in point "Four" of the main article in Pesh Merga 10/11 under "Kurdish Nationalism is a Reality. . ."), military operations are restricted to small scale guerilla actions directed against the enemy's weakest spots. This reality is dictated by our limited resources and by our policy objective of total reliance on our own people's resources and potential.

The time span covered by this communiqué is from January-March 1978, though a number of operations taking place earlier than this period are reported here due to the late arrival of information about them caused by our simple (and consequently slow) lines of communication.

* * * * *

1. Military operations

(1) At 1300 hours on 8 Jan 1978, an enemy force approached from the centre at Atrosh sub-district towards the village of Chamani, after landing large numbers of troops in the surrounding villages. The Peshmergas engaged the force in a half-hour encounter, during which enemy forces used all kinds of weapons, including aerial bombing. The enemy suffered a number of casualties while forcing its way into the target village.

(2) An encounter inside Alqosh sub-district centre

At 1845 hours on 10 Jan, a company of KDP guerillas forced its way into Alqosh sub-district centre (in Talkif district, Nineva Province), and pounded the police station, security office and the electricity project with RPG rockets and small arms fire. The enemy suffered a number of casualties in addition to material damage.

The local representatives of the regime and the ruling party fled the place and headed for the city of Mosul. Meanwhile the Peshmergas demonstrated inside Alqosh, hailing the KDP and the May revolution. The guerillas left the place after this operation, which lasted an hour, and returned safely to base.

The next day, 8 troop carrying helicopters, supported by a number of armoured helicopter gunships, landed troops in the mountains of Alqosh and in the villages of Bozan, Karsaf, Khoran and Kabara, up to the mountain ranges overlooking Ba'ishra, in order to comb the area for Peshmergas. This operation lasted 5 days but failed to produce results. As a result, the local inhabitants were threatened with severe punishment if they were found to be withholding from the authorities information regarding the whereabouts of the Peshmergas.

(3) Armoured helicopter gunships bombed and strafed the Horaman area in the sub-districts of Tawila and Baiyara, for three consecutive days from 15-17 Jan. The operations resulted in the wounding of several citizens.

(4) An operation inside Zakho town

At midnight 23624 Jan, a KDP guerilla squad hit the local headquarters of the government mercenaries inside Zakho town, using RPG rockets and small arms fire. A number of casualties and material damage were inflicted on the enemy. The guerilla held a public meeting about the KDP and the May revolution, at the same time denouncing the regime, and then returned safely to base.

Afterwards, the enemy conducted a large scale search operation inside Zakho and its nearby villages but failed to achieve its purpose.

(5) An enemy land and air assault on the Baradost area causes the death of a child, Piruz Haji Shino

On 3 March, the Iraqi army launched a general attack on the Baradost area (Sidakan sub-district) in Rawanduz district. Enemy forces advanced in an armoured formation, including troop carriers, from Diana to Sidakan and the surrounding villages. Meanwhile, 21 helicopters landed large numbers of troops on the mountains and in the vicinity of the villages in several sorties. A large scale operation was then got underway in search of the Peshmergas in which typical methods of harassment were resorted to,

threatening, kicking and insulting the local population.

In one incident, a military unit forced its way into Haji Shino's home, beating all the members of his family and searching the rooms one by one. Amidst the crying and screaming of the beaten family, a soldier threw a seven year old girl, Piruz Haji Shino, from the roof of the house and she died instantly. Piruz has been made another innocent victim of the ruthless regime of Iraq.

(6) The regime's armed forces retaliate by shooting an innocent girl, Naranj Hassan

At 1200 hours on 10 March, a military EVA troop carrier was ambushed by KDP partisans between the villages of Kolka and Karkal, in Sidakan sub-district, Rawanduz district. The two sides exchanged fire for 45 minutes. As a result, the truck was destroyed and 20 casualties were sustained by the enemy, among them 2 officers killed and 2 more wounded, one of them being 1st Lt. Hikmat Sulaiman.

After this encounter, an army unit was despatched to the village of Kolka to retaliate against its inhabitants. The squad entered the village, insulting and threatening the population and accusing them of giving bread to the Peshmergas. They entered a house and asked a 17 year old girl, Naranj Hassan, to go and fetch her father from outside the village. She was frightened and feared that her father might be in danger, for they had already accused him of having given bread to the Peshmergas; she therefore refused to obey. As a result, one of the enemy troops opened fire on her and killed her outright, spattering her blood over her mother and small brothers who were standing by her side.

In addition to this barbaric deed, a number of the villagers were detained, although others managed to flee into the mountains. The villagers were warned that severe punishment would be inflicted on them collectively should they reveal the details of what had happened.

However, the KDP partisans continued their march in order to carry out another operation. They laid an ambush for an enemy force on the Rizan bridge in Barzan sub-district, as a result of which 6 of the enemy were killed and their bodies left on the battlefield.

(7) Troop landings in 21 villages in Sidakan sub-district

On 29 March, the enemy landed large numbers of troops in the villages of Sidakan sub-district, Rawanduz district. They were transported in 12 helicopters, supported by armoured helicopter gunships. The landing operation lasted from 0800 to 1400 hours, the troops being brought in from Diana sub-district, and was under the command of Ismail Tayih al-Ni'aimi, commander of the Northern Area Army Corps.

The men were landed in 21 villages, in addition to other places in the area, with the aim of encircling KDP partisans active in the region. However, the objective failed despite exhaustive searches, which included the inspection of flooring under beds in the belief that partisans might have escaped through underground tunnels. The troops were accompanied by the mercenary, Said As'ad, and some known spies of the authorities. The inhabitants of the area were ill treated and affronted.

(8) On the night of 26/27 March, a partisan unit pounded the HQ of the border guards regiment (now housed in Kurak school) in Sharanish, Zakho district, using RPG rockets and small arms fire. The attack lasted about an hour. The same night, army outposts bombarded suspected partisan positions in the area. The enemy suffered a score of casualties. Armoured helicopter gunships circled over the area the following day in search of the partisans.

(9) On the night 20/21 March, KDP guerillas attacked the Sari Mani army bunker in Barwari Bala during a 45 minutes engagement which resulted in the enemy sustaining 8 casualties, 6 soldiers killed and 2 wounded. The army made its customary search of the area on the next day, insulting and maltreating the local population.

(10) On the night of 10/11 March, a guerilla unit tried to enter Bamarni at Daho, but was intercepted by a unit of the Special Forces (estimated at battalion strength) in the vicinity of the town. During the ensuing encounter, which lasted for about half an hour, the enemy suffered 5 casualties — 2 soldiers killed and 3 wounded.

(11) On 1 March, a Peshmerga squad ambushed a ZIL military vehicle on the Sulaimaniya-Sayed Sadiq road. After a 15 minutes encounter, the 6 occupants of the truck were annihilated. The peshmergas captured 6 kalashnikovs.

II. FURTHER ITEMS OF NEWS

Innocent Civilian Victims of Landmines

1. The laying of minefields has become the corner stone in the Iraqi regime's military strategy to combat the Kurdish partisan forces. However, the authorities disregard the safety of the local civilian inhabitants in its mine laying operations. Often mines are laid in farms and pasture lands. The innocent victims of these mines are steadily increasing in number. For example, mines have been laid in Sri Bakirman and Sri Sada, both areas of pastureland in Aqra district. On 9 November 1977, one of these mines exploded in the Sri Bakirman area, causing severe injuries to Siddiq Muhammad. In mid-Nov, another mine went off under the feet of Rasheed Muhammad Sharad, an inhabitant of Arkush, in Barzan sub-district. He was severely wounded. The mine was some 200 meters from his home.

Extensive minefields have been laid around the village of Sire, Sidakan sub-district, Rawanduz district. Numerous cattle belonging to the neighbouring villagers have been killed by these mines.

2. During the first week of Nov 1977 the authorities arrested 14 inhabitants of Qala Diza on charges of joining the KDP. They have since been tortured by the regime's local representatives. None of their

relatives has been allowed to see them and the whereabouts of many of them is not exactly known. Among the detainees are:—

- (i) Ahmad Abdulla, from the village of Bikalo, Qala Diza
- (ii) Ahmad Kaka Amin, from Qala Diza
- (iii) Ahmad Kaka Hama " " "
- (iv) Ahmad Abdulla " " "

3. Arrests and Torture on charges of giving bread to the Peshmergas

The following citizens have been detained in mid-Jan 1978. They are inhabitants of the village of Dair on the Iraqi-Turkish border, Merga Sur district. They had been deported to the south of Iraq before being returned to the vicinity of Merga Sur to live a life of destitution and misery. On arrest, they were insulted and maltreated and sent under guard to Kirkuk. They are:—

- (i) Khan Amir Sulaiman Qamji
- (ii) Sulaiman Qamji Tamo
- (iii) Ramadhan Hajo
- (iv) Mesiha Avalal

4. ICP members interrogated on charges of backing the Kurdish revolution

On 25 Dec 1977, the local authorities in Shaikhan summoned and interrogated a number of ICP members. They were held for several days on the suspicion that they had backed the Kurdish revolution and had distributed KDP leaflets.

5. Forcible deportation continues

The inhabitants of the following villages have been forcibly deported:—

- a. Razga
- b. Mara Duwa
- c. Sura Gala

These villages are situated in Qala Diza district. The deportation took place at the end of March 1978. The elders and religious leaders of the area appealed to the authorities to postpone the deportation until the warm season, but their appeals fell on deaf ears.

6. Pressure on Kurds in the Shaikhan District to sell their lands

The pressure brought to bear upon the Kurdish inhabitants of the Yazidid areas of Shamkan and Nav Krufri is mounting. The authorities are now paying ID 2 a donum (2.500m²), but the Kurds are resisting this pressure and refuse to sell their lands. But in the meantime pressure from the authorities is increasing and it is said that the regime has decided to cede these place from the "autonomous area", a decision which, the authorities maintain, requires the Kurds to relinquish their properties.

Nevertheless, some of the inhabitants have countered by saying they would give up their Iraqi citizenship if the pressure continues. Moreover, it is noteworthy that even those who have cooperated with and served the government for a long time, such as Latif Zibari, Suber Zibari, Sabir Soorchi and Muhi Harki and others, have not been spared this pressure.

7. Withdrawal of Kurdish books from secondary schools

Implementing the regime's chauvinist policy of restricting the use of the Kurdish language and fighting Kurdish nationalism, the Iraqi Ministry of Education, in a confidential and urgent circular, has instructed that books written in the Kurdish language must be withdrawn from all secondary schools.

8. Confiscation of Shotguns

The Mukhtars of several villages in Iraqi Kurdistan have been told that the authorities have decided to confiscate all shotguns. Anyone found in possession of a shotgun will be imprisoned for 10 years.

9. "Celebration" turns into a Demonstration

On the anniversary of the Black February coup d'état, the authorities organised a celebration in the Province of Dahok. The masses availed themselves of the occasion to turn it into a demonstration against the regime. Police and security forces intervened but failed to quell the demonstrators; violence broke out and some people were wounded.

10 An extendable "pardon" after an unextendable "amnesty"

The Supreme Committee for the Affairs of the North, chaired by Saddam Tikriti, at the Revolution Command Council (RCC) had issued a "pardon", stating that, "We announce a general pardon for all escapee Kurdish citizens, both civilians and military, for an unextendable period of one month as from 1 Oct 1977 to 30 Oct. 1977."

Once again, the rulers of Iraq could not keep their word for long. They issued another "pardon" on 19 Dec. 1977 after the visit of their stooge, Taha Muhiddin Ma'roof, to Teheran. This "pardon" was extended for another three months as from 19 Feb. 1978.

Nevertheless, this "pardon" or "amnesty" will not be the 1st, because of lack of response by Kurdish

Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council

on

Human Rights and the Kurds

February 23, 1978
Bal Harbour, Fla.

A situation currently exists in Iraq, whereby racial discrimination and the willful violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms is visited upon three million Kurdish people. This consistent pattern of racialism by the Government of Iraq against its Kurdish citizenry is beginning to threaten their very existence. While the Iraqi Provisional Constitution recognizes the Kurdish people as a legitimate nationality, a policy of destroying their ethnic geographic, historic, and cultural character through mass executions, detentions, and terror is being underwritten by the Iraqi Government. This policy constitutes a gross violation of the Kurds' right-to-survival.

The United States has already admitted more than 700 Kurdish refugees, who have come to this nation in the hope of starting a new and decent life. For the most part, these refugees are unskilled and do not possess a working knowledge of the English language, and are thus forced to accept the lowest paying jobs in order not to become a public charge. However, as soon as they become employed, they are obliged to repay the cost of their transatlantic passage to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the cost for final settlement to the various U. S. Voluntary Agencies. In numerous cases, this economic hardship is caused by the

Of Kurds and Kissinger, Carter and Conscience

New York Times By William Safire 19 Dec. 1977

WASHINGTON—In last week's press conference, President Carter made a welcome reiteration of his concern for human rights. Let us examine a case in which recent American policy led to the loss of human rights by a people called the Kurds, and see if Mr. Carter is willing to help right a wrong.

Some history: In 1972, the Shah of Iran wanted to irritate and occupy the Soviet-supplied army of his radical neighbor, Iraq. He offered to help the Kurdish people—a non-Arab ethnic group, nearly three million of whom live in Iraq—in their long struggle for autonomy.

The Kurdish leader—Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani—understood the Shah's selfish motive, and suspected the Shah might encourage the Kurds to revolt and then pull the Persian rug if he wanted Iraq's help in world oil politics. So the Kurds asked the Shah for a partner in their support—the United States, which they trusted.

Accordingly, the Shah asked Mr. Nixon in Tehran in 1972 to join him in supporting the Kurdish uprising. Since it was in the American (and Israeli) interest to tie up a radical

Arab army in Iraq, the United States President agreed.

The Kurds sent Mulla's son and another Kurdish leader to Washington, to spell out what supplies would be needed. They met at C.I.A. headquarters with Richard Helms as well as a White House representative, Col. Richard Kennedy, then Henry Kissinger's top N.S.C. deputy.

People who sat on both sides of that table agree that the Kurdish request was "sympathetically received," and within two months the C.I.A. station chief in Iran delivered to Mulla the United States commitment to help their fight for local self-government. Only supplies were promised, never any troops, and the cost—expected to be about \$5 million worth of captured Soviet equipment—channeled through Iran.

The Kurds fought well for their homeland. During the October war in the Mideast in 1973, with the Iraqi

army looking two ways, their big opportunity came for an all-out attack. But the Israelis had turned the tide, and Mr. Kissinger did not want to further weaken the Arab cause. Word went to the Kurds from the United States and the Shah: Do not attack.

The Kurds obeyed, trusting the Americans. They paid dearly for that misplaced trust. In the spring of 1975, the Shah made a deal with Iraq, and sold out the Kurds, cutting off all supplies and telling them to wave up. When the Kurds turned to the Americans, Mulla Mustafa (and the C.I.A. station chiefs) were amazed to find Mr. Kissinger washing his hands of the whole affair.

An ex-senior official maintains that we had been told by the Shah's men that a continued Kurdish rebellion would require two Iranian divisions, at a cost to the United States of \$400

million; such a post-Vietnam covert investment was impossible. Maybe that's what Henry was told by Iran, and Mr. Kissinger did not want to, as the last thing the Kurds expected or wanted was Iranian troops taking over their fight.

Whoever was to blame, an American guarantee was dishonored. An ethnic group that wanted only to speak its language and pursue its cultural traditions, as an autonomous region under the Iraqi flag, has since been systematically uprooted and dispersed.

The totalitarian state of Iraq has driven hundreds of thousands of Kurds out of their homes. Thirty thousand Kurds have been killed or wounded. Thousands more fled into Iran as refugees.

now fighting once again in the hills—who have been jailed by Iraq, without medical care, in defiance of anybody's idea of human rights.

Mulla Mustafa, now 75 and ill, is in America trying to call Mr. Carter's attention to the plight of his people.

ESSAY

to get world opinion to shame Iraq into halting its political executions and to induce the United States President into mentioning his people's name to the Shah. But Mr. Carter is too busy making statements about human rights, and supporting entities for Palestinians, to see the old man.

Instead, the Kurdish leader was coldly received last summer by the former Kissinger aide who was in charge of first supplying the Kurds

with supplies, and then cutting them off: none other than A. Leroy Atherton, now in Cairo as Mr. Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for the Mideast.

Making certain the Kurdish pleas are not heard by President Carter is the man who took over covert connections with the Kurds from Colonel Kennedy in 1973, and who then personally handled the supply and cutoff decisions for Mr. Kissinger: Harold H. Saunders, whose reincarnation in the Carter Administration is as Director of Intelligence for the Department of State.

As he focuses on the Mideast, President Carter would do well to consider the only human beings in that area currently being harassed, and their leaders executed, for daring to demand the kind of internal autonomy now being offered to Palestinian Arabs, and rejected by Iraq's rejectionists.

The Kurdish sellout was a stain on the Nixon-Ford years; by turning away, by refusing to rectify a wrong, Mr. Carter tacitly makes that disgrace his own.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, March 11, 1978

E39

Jack Anderson

How the Abandoned Kurds Lost Out

In an ordinary brick house in the Washington suburbs, the proud and dauntless leader of a fierce mountain people spends his days visiting with friends and laboring to learn the English language. Every few weeks, he visits the Mayo Clinic for treatment for the cancer that is ravaging his lungs.

He is Gen. Mustafa Barzani, the grizzled, 75-year-old commander-in-exile of the Kurds, who used to roam the rugged mountains where Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union come together. Now, most of his people have been deported in small groups to the deserts of Iraq and dispersed throughout remote regions of Iran.

The unfortunate tribesmen became pawns on Henry Kissinger's chessboard in 1972. They were manipulated and then abandoned. Today, the powers-that-be in Washington act as if they would like the Kurds to fade away.

The Kurds lost out because of Washington's strange love affair with the Shah of Iran. In the early 1970s, he was embroiled in border and navigation disputes with Iraq, and he felt threatened by Iraq's close relationships with the Soviet Union. He thought it strategically wise, therefore, to stir up the ancient, simmering struggle between the Kurds and the Iraqis.

In May, 1972, the Shah pressed Kissinger and his boss, Richard Nixon, to arm the Kurds against the Iraqis. Despite CIA resistance, the White House pair agreed to the Shah's scheme. Following orders, the CIA smuggled \$16 million worth of untraceable Chinese and Soviet weapons through Iran to

the Kurds. They fought the Iraqis to a standstill.

But in March, 1975, the Shah abruptly announced he had patched up his differences with Iraq. Overnight, American support for the Kurds dried up, and, without weapons, the mountain men were overpowered. Thousands were killed or wounded; thousands more fled into Iran as refugees.

Gen. Barzani flew to the United States to plead with Nixon and Kissinger for humanitarian help for his beleaguered people. The American leaders, who had abandoned him on the battlefield, refused to acknowledge any obligation. They ignored his appeals.

Our sources say they refused assistance in deference again to the Shah, who distrusts the Kurds and prefers to keep them subjugated. He has tried to conceal, meanwhile, the ruthless manner in which he exploited them.

Eventually, a token 700 Kurdish refugees were admitted to the United States. Kurdish leaders were instructed to keep quiet about even this minor gesture. Like the Shah, the United States doesn't want to advertise its crass intrigues in the Iraqi highlands.

The Kurds who arrived in the United States were granted no special privileges. They were sponsored by international refugee organizations, which gave them personal loans to pay their air fares and expenses. Some were thrown into resettlement camps in San Diego. Later, they were actually asked to pay for their "care and main-

tenance" at the camps.

Although the Kurdish refugees, for the most part, are educated and skilled, many had difficulty with the English language and had to take low-paying jobs. Dozens of them remain unemployed. Nevertheless, they are receiving due letters from their sponsoring organizations.

One letter from the Tolstoy Foundation, for example, warns a refugee that non-payment of his loan "may cause you difficulties in your permanent residence in this country."

The refugees from other U.S. foreign policy flops, on the other hand, are treated royally. Over \$1.3 billion has been lavished on Cuban refugees since 1961. And some \$455 million, according to congressional sources, has been spent to help Indochinese refugees resettle in this country.

For the Kurds, the State Department reached into its petty cash and scraped up a paltry \$150,000, which was used to help finance the United Nations Kurdish refugee program. Congressional leaders, meanwhile, have ignored the Kurds' plea for funds to help them resettle.

As part of his daily routine, Gen. Barzani musters his energy to dictate a few letters asking for help. Twice he has written to President Carter. Once, he received a short response from the National Security Council advising him to talk to the State Department. On another occasion, he received a two-sentence note from a presidential aide who assured the general that his "interest" in the Kurdish problem, "is appreciated."

The Daily Telegraph,

Friday, March 31, 1978

IRAQI ARMY PLANS KURD OFFENSIVE

By DAVID ADAMSON
Diplomatic Staff

KURDISH rebels in the mountains of Iraq claim that the army has been forced to call up reservists in preparation for a spring offensive against them.

Despite heavy snowfalls, the lightly armed Kurdish peshmerga (or partisans) have managed to launch repeated ambushes and raids against the Iraqis throughout the winter. Iraqi casualties appear to run into scores.

Measures against the Kurds include the clearing of all inhabitants from a 12-mile wide no-man's land along the borders with Turkey, Persia and Syria, where there are Kurdish communities.

Since the 1975 Algiers Accord between Persia and Iraq, which ended Kurdish control of a large part of north-east Iraq, the army has entrenched itself in the ter-



ritory. Strategic Iraqi fortifications have been built in the passes and the mountains, where they are supplied by armoured helicopters.

Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader, is now in Washington, where he is seriously ill with lung cancer, and several senior members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party are in exile in London.

The new revolt is admitted to be on a small scale and the peshmerga do not control any villages. Its purpose is to keep the spirit of Kurdish nationalism alive until events in Iraq or internationally turn in its favour.

Prisoners of conscience



Iraq: Mrs Hafsa Mulla Hassan

By Clifford Longley

The end of the war in Iraq against Kurdish insurgents negotiated through the good offices of Iran, was based on the granting of a considerable measure of cultural and political autonomy to the Kurds. The Iraqi authorities, in implementing these arrangements, offended Kurdish aspirations, which resulted in a resumption of hostilities.

Guerrilla groups are again fighting Iraqi troops, which have responded with fierce measures designed to subdue Kurdish discontent by intimidation. Mrs Hafsa Mulla Hassan, a grandmother from Amadiyah, close to the Turkish border, is a typical victim of the apparently common Iraqi practice of detaining the relatives of Kurds suspected of taking part in the armed struggle. She has been detained since the summer of 1976, together with her daughter-in-law and grandchild.

Her son was sought for questioning, allegedly for having made propaganda for the peshmerga (Kurdish forces.) He escaped, and has remained in hiding since. The Iraqi secret police questioned the family, then arrested them. His mother, wife, child and younger brother were taken by lorry to Diwaniya prison and subsequently transferred to Hilla prison.

Mrs Hassan is said to be one of many hundreds, including children, held without trial because their kin are wanted by the secret police. The total may run to many thousands: dissident Kurdish sources speak of some 300,000 deportations from the Kurdish districts of Iraq to the Arab ones as part of the policy of subduing the Kurds. The arrest of family members in such circumstances contravenes Iraq's constitution.

Ottawa Citizen, Ontario, Canada

Kurdish rebels executed

TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) — Several Kurdish secessionist rebels detained in Iraqi jails near the north-western town of Mosul were executed Wednesday after prison officials said they incited trouble, highly placed diplomatic sources said in Tehran Thursday.

There are an estimated 2,000 Kurds detained in Iraqi jails on various charges of separatist activities.

The sources, quoting reports that reached Tehran through diplomatic channels, said the Kurdish detainees were shot by the jail guards because they became "too active."

Years of Kurdish rebellion in Iraq ended after Iran terminated military aid to the rebels following a reconciliation with Iraq in the summer of 1975.

THE GUARDIAN
DECEMBER 22 1977

Capitulation

Sir,—The Iraqi Embassy's press counsellor has made an extraordinary reply (Letters, December 13) to David Hirst's article.

The press counsellor says that Iraq, not out of intransigence but on the basis of a careful reading of history, rejects the capitulationist settlements, yet the same regime, in 1975, in its attempt to end the Kurdish revolution, did not hesitate to hand over a large section of Iraqi territory to the Shah of Iran, an act of capitulation no previous Iraqi government dared commit.—Yours faithfully,

H. Nariman
Aston University,
Birmingham.

Samstag, 11. Feber 1978

Nummer 35 // P.b.b.

Gründungsjahr 1703

POLITIK + REPORTAGE

3

الفرصة الكردية الطلبية الاكراد-١٩٧٠

يدينون خطوة السادات

اذاعت الهيئة الادارية العامة لجمعية الطلبة الاكراد في اوربيا امس نص تقريرها السنوي المقدم الى الاجتماع الموسع المنعقد مؤخرا في برلين وقد جاء فيه ان زيارة الرئيس المصري الى اسرائيل والخطوات التي تتخذها تشكل حلقة خطيرة في سلسلة التحديات الامبريالية والصهيونية بالتحالف مع الرجعية العربية في التفرير لحقوق الشعب الفلسطيني في تقرير مصيره واقامة دولته المستقلة على ارض وطنه. ولحقوق البلدان العربية في السيادة الوطنية واسترجاع اراضيها التي تحتلها اسرائيل ومنافضة حركة التحرير الوطني العربية في نضالها دفاعا عن حقوقها ومكتسباتها وطموحها الى التطور والتقدم الاجتماعي.

KURDEN APPELLIEREN AN SI

Die provisorische Führung der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partei richtete an die Sozialistische Internationale ein Memorandum, in dem auf die schwierige Situation der Kurden hingewiesen wird. Darin heißt es u. a., das Ergebnis der Teilung Kurdistans nach dem Ende des ersten

Weltkrieges habe dem kurdischen Volk ein bitteres Los beschert. Insbesondere wird Irak beschuldigt, die Menschenrechte bei der Behandlung von Kurden zu verletzen. Irak habe sich vor dem Völkerbund verpflichtet, die nationalen Rechte der Kurden zu respektieren. Diese Zusage habe das ehemalige Feudalregime nicht eingehalten, aber auch nach dem Sturz der Monarchie im Jahre 1958 seien trotz mehrfacher Versicherungen die Rechte der Kurden nicht

beachtet worden. So sei es zum Aufstand gekommen, der vom 11. September 1961 bis zum Abkommen von Algier am 8. März 1973 dauerte.

Die Vorwürfe der Kurden werden durch Erhebungen von Amnesty International gestützt. Demnach sollen Hunderte Kurden während der letzten Jahre zum Teil ohne Gerichtsverfahren hingerichtet worden sein. Das Memorandum spricht ferner davon, daß Zehntausende Kurden in der irakischen Wüste in Lagern gefangen gehalten werden. Aus diesem Grund habe auch Amnesty International im Dezember 1977 einen Appell an den irakischen Staatspräsidenten gerichtet. Wie aus einer Verlautbarung der Internationalen Liga für Menschenrechte vom 14. Jänner 1977 hervorgeht, seien seit 1973 rund 300.000 Kurden nach Südirak deportiert worden.

telegramme...

© Amnesty beschuldigt Irak

WIEN (apal). Der Irak liege nach der Anzahl der ermordeten Regimegegner an der Spitze der in dieser Hinsicht bekannten Diktaturen, wie Chile und Südafrika, obwohl die irakische Verfassung die Würde des Menschen und den Schutz vor willkürlicher Verhaftung, psychischer und physischer Folter formal garantiere. Darauf weist die österreichische Sektion von Amnesty International in einem Offenen Brief an Staatspräsident Al-Bakr hin, in dem appelliert wird, sich für die Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte einzusetzen.

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΩΤΙΚΗ

Λαοκρατία ΠΙΕΣΗ

Ανομονομία

Ζητούν συμπαράσταση οι Κούρδοι φοιτητές

ΟΕΣΕΛΑΘΟΝΙΚΗ, 1.
Με έγγραφό τους οι Κούρδοι φοιτητές στην Ελλάδα, ζητούν συμπαράσταση στην προσπάθειά τους να αποκτήσουν την εθνική τους ανεξαρτησία. Η κατάσταση που επικρατεί στην Τουρκία, τους οδηγεί τους με διαρκή προσπάθεια για τη μετακίνηση της φωνής της Κούρδικης Ένανσης, σε όλους τους προσώπων που έχουν τον κόπο και τη δημιουργία σταθερών και ευχάριστη σχέσεων με τους δημοκρατικούς και ελευθεριακούς στην Ελλάδα.

Wiener Zeitung

Seite 1

Dienstag, 14. Feber 1978

Nummer 37 // P.b.b.

Gründungsjahr 1703

St.-Generalsekretär Berndt Carlsson sagte auf eine Frage zum Kurdenproblem, dieses sei wiederholt vom Büro der SI diskutiert worden und man habe auch humanitäre Aktivitäten entwickelt. Es gebe jedoch unterschiedliche Auffassungen innerhalb der Mitgliedsparteien, und es sei bisher noch nicht ausgedrückt worden, daß die kurdische Bewegung als nationale Freiheitsbewegung anerkannt sei.

Dienstag, 14. Februar 1978 • Nr. 45 • S 3,50

Arbeiter-Zeitung

SEGRÜNDET 1929

Seite 3

Die „Kurdische Demokratische Partei“ hat die Wiener Nahostkonferenz benutzt, um in einem Appell die SI darauf hinzuweisen, daß der Friede in Nahost unteilbar sei und nur dann erreicht werden könne, wenn alle Kernfragen dieses Gebietes gelöst werden würden. Es sei also ohne Lösung der Kurdenfrage kein dauerhafter Friede in dieser Region möglich, da das Prinzip der Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit für alle, auch für die Kurden, gelten müsse.

Die Presse

ERHABENDE ZEITUNG FÜR DIE GANZE BEVÖLKERUNG

8/9 April 1978

POLITIK IN KÜRZE

Seite 2.

IRAKS KURDEN. In einem offenen Brief an Staatspräsident Bakr weist die österreichische Sektion von Amnesty International darauf hin, daß die Menschenrechte im Irak laufend schwerstens verletzt würden. Allein zwischen Sommer 1976 und Sommer 1977 seien 400 Kurden hingerichtet worden.

AZ

SAMSTAG, 8. APRIL 1978

WELTPOLITIK

Extract from
Middle East Economic Digest, London

10 MAR 1978

Iran and Iraq are to keep to the 1975 Algiers agreement which ended Iranian support for Kurdish insurgents. This was agreed at a meeting of the Iranian-Iraqi commission attended by Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Ali Khalatbari.

Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Kurdish factor

The Iraqi propaganda machine has begun to focus its attention on what is happening with Kurdish rebels in the north of the country: reports have come from Baghdad that several army units have been sent to Kurdish areas. At the same time Iraq, when it was still supplying oil to Turkey, warned the Turks to control the Kurds within their borders. Turkey has replaced Iran as the country suspected by Iraqis of supporting the Kurdish cause.



understands the relationship between Ankara, Baghdad and Teheran must realise that what he was avoiding saying was "we are arming against Russia." Relations between Iran and Iraq are in fact on the way to a basis of firm mutual trust. When the Shah met the representative of the president of Iraq more than two months ago, he made it clear that he welcomed a strong, independent Iraq as a neighbour.

Few would dispute that Iraq, for its part, regards links with Iran as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Since the settling of the border disputes between the two countries, Iran has made substantial efforts to help the Iraqi government. When disorder flared up in the Shiite holy places of Karbala and

6 OVERSEAS NEWS

THE GUARDIAN Monday January 30 1978

Boycott is setback for anti-Sadat alliance

From David Hirst in Beirut

Syria and the anti-Sadat Tripoli Alliance have suffered a serious setback with Iraq's apparent decision to boycott this week's Algiers summit of steadfastness and confrontation after all.

According to a statement issued in Baghdad, "the Iraqi Government is not concerned with this invitation (to the summit) because it previously withdrew from the Tripoli conference for reasons which it explained to the Arab masses and all the parties concerned... Iraq cannot attend any conference if it is not confident beforehand that serious commitments have been undertaken to ensure results giving real meaning to steadfastness and confrontation."

(UPI reports from Algiers: Iraq has proposed an Arab sum-

mit in Baghdad and moderate Saudi Arabia has accepted an invitation to it, the Government-owned Algerian Press Service reported yesterday. No date was given for the proposed summit.)

The Iraqi snub comes after intense diplomatic efforts, led by Algeria, which appeared to be making headway—and were producing forecasts, from Damascus and Algiers, that General Saddam Hussein Takriti, the head of the Iraqi Military Council, would be going to the summit.

Ever since Mr Sadat went to Jerusalem nothing but vacillation and contradiction has come out of Baghdad. The latest shift must be seen against a background of tactical differences within the leadership—between President Bakr and the army establishment on the one hand and Saddam Hussein and the party leadership on the other—

and of a more serious generational tension between the lower reaches of army and party, which tend to favour co-operation with the Tripoli Alliance, and the upper reaches, which do not.

The fundamental contradiction is between a "rejectionism" that upstages Colonel Gadhafi and signs that in reality this is merely a convenient cover for steering clear of the anti-Sadat front — if not the fruit of a secret agreement, through Iran, designed to assist his peace-seeking. The Tripoli alliance has long suspected such motives but, anxious to win over Iraq, has refrained from saying so.

However, Algeria's impatience is beginning to wear thin. It has now chosen to publicise its belief that Iraq is conspiring with Saudi Arabia in an attempt to rehabilitate President Sadat in the Arab world —

an attempt which Syria and the Tripoli Alliance strongly oppose. A week ago the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut denied a report that Iraq was proposing the holding of a full-scale Arab summit.

Now confirmation of this report has come from the official Algerian News Agency. Iraq, it said, has been in touch with Saudi Arabia, whose Foreign Minister had agreed to the proposal — provided that a full-scale summit meant that Mr Sadat would be invited.

The Tripoli Alliance rejects any restoration of Arab solidarity on a basis that exonerates Mr Sadat. For, they say, he has deviated inexorably from the principles — enshrined in the Rabat summit resolutions — which have previously governed that solidarity.

This Algerian revelation comes as no surprise in the light of the proposals which

Iraq had earlier put before the Tripoli Alliance for a "front of steadfastness and liberation." The language of Iraqi "rejectionism" is often studiously ambivalent, and nowhere — in what was to be the Front's public charter and the secret interpretation of it — did the proposals include a specific condemnation of Mr Sadat.

Even if this mediation makes headway, Saddam Hussein Takriti's absence from the summit will impair the chances of putting more teeth into the Tripoli Alliance, for so much store had been set by bringing Iraq in. Mr Sadat will be encouraged to go that much further down his own separate road than he might otherwise have been, and others like King Hussein will feel that they can move that much closer to him.

Saddam Hussein Takriti going to the summit?

OVERSEAS NEWS

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday December 6 1977

5

Iraq walk-out mars Tripoli conference

From David Hirst in Tripoli

The Tripoli summit ended yesterday with the formation of a "Pan-Arab front for steadfastness and confrontation" whose main aim is to combat President Sadat's go-it-alone diplomacy—and the separate peace to which, the front believes, it is leading.

The Iraqi delegation stalked out of the conference at two o'clock yesterday morning. It was a bad blow for the other participants—Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO—but, since it was not unexpected, they are far from considering their summit a failure.

"We consider it a sixty per cent success," said a Syrian official. It is Syria's "steadfastness" in the face of grave adversity, that the conference was mainly concerned to promote. In their "Tripoli Declaration," the five allies proclaim that Syria has "become the main confrontation state and the main base of resistance confronting the enemy." They call on the Arab nation to furnish it with economic, financial, political and military assistance.

They announce that Syria and

the PLO have formed a "united front" and that, with Libya, Algeria and South Yemen's decision to join it, it is enlarged into a "Pan-Arab front" which considers that "aggression against any of its members is an aggression against all of its members."

The "Tripoli Declaration" does not—in spite of the "rejectionist" pretensions of the Libyan hosts—formally close the door on a peaceful settlement. It says that the first consequence of Sadat's "great service" to the enemy is that "it eliminates the possibility of a just and honourable peace."

However, President Assad now finds himself in a more militant posture, and the PLO, in its own, separate Tripoli proclamation, struck the kind of militant note that has not been heard for a long time.

George Habash and his Left-wing Popular Front, representing the most "rejectionist" of Palestinians, has been formally reconciled with Yasser Arafat, and Nayif Hawatmeh—leader of the Democratic Front, which often used to act as a trail blazer for Arafat's "moderation"—said that the Palestinians really had no choice. They had gone to the limit of

the diplomatically possible, he said, only to be rewarded by greater intransigence from the other side. Begin, the American said, and now Sadat, had driven them back into a counter-intransigence of their own.

The Tripoli Declaration, while it calls for the furling of Sadat's diplomacy, is careful to stress the sacrifices which the Egyptian people have made for the common cause. But Egypt, it says, cannot do without the Arabs any more than the Arabs can do without Egypt. By way of sanctions it calls for the "freezing of political and diplomatic relations with the Egyptian government" and the application of the "Israeli boycott" regulations to Egyptian individuals, companies, and institutions dealing with the enemy. It also calls for the boycott of Arab League meetings held in Cairo, and for consultations with other Arab States concerning the relocation of Arab League headquarters.

Although the alliance signifies greater militancy, it is strictly in the national, non-ideological sense. Its members consider themselves "progressives" or "socialists," but

nowhere is this stressed in their charter.

The "Pan-Arab Front" is only a nucleus that other states can join. Theoretically these could even include Saudi Arabia, and while they warn all those (King Hussein?) who might attempt to follow Sadat's example, they "record with satisfaction the initial stances" of Arab states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia?) which "condemned the visit."

There is little doubt, however, which Arab regime, after Sadat's, stands lowest in the alliance's esteem: it is Iraq which, inside, would have made the alliance a formidable force in inter-Arab politics, but which, outside, endangers it from the outset—especially the Syrian cornerstone of the whole fragile edifice.

Recalcitrance taken to extraordinary lengths has tended to confirm the darkest Arab suspicions about a secret deal between Iraq, outwardly the most "rejectionist" of Arab states, and Egypt, the most conciliatory. Both before and during the conference Iraq behaved as if it was determined to sabotage it at great cost to its reputation among the Palestinians and all the so-called "progressive

and patriotic forces" to which it claims to belong.

It did this by striking attitudes of outright intransigence which even Gadhafi found unreasonable. It urged Syria to make an unconditional repudiation of UN Resolution 242 in return for which it would throw its full weight into a fully-fledged "eastern front" dedicated to an all-out military solution.

There is nothing new in this position. "They have always told us," one Palestinian leader said, "that as soon as Syria proves itself serious they will send five full divisions to the Israeli front and that their 'popular army' will take care of Iraqi territory."

At the same time the Iraq plenipotentiary, Tah Jazrawi, was refusing to adopt any sanctions against Egypt until Iraq's programme was accepted, and although Jazrawi had been officially vested with the powers of head of state, he was continuously breaking off negotiations for consultations with Baghdad.

President Bolmedienne and Gadhafi, taking Syria's part, rejected Iraqi arguments as gra-

tuitous outbidding. There was no need for a formal Syrian rejection of 242. "It is dead anyway," Gadhafi told me.

Even George Habash, the embodiment of Palestinian intransigence, found himself supporting President Assad, whom he hitherto considered little better than Sadat, against his Iraqi sponsors. George was visibly shaken at the spectacle of the Iraqis ending up as the champions of Anwar Sadat, a rival guerrilla leader said. "He defended them to the end, but he finally gave in."

The roots of the Iraqi position lie in narrow factional rivalry—their refusal to do anything to save President Assad—and in their reluctance to take on far-reaching Pan-Arab commitments which could undermine them at home.

But even Iraqi sympathisers are beginning to suspect that they may have entered into a secret deal with Egypt not to oppose its peace-seeking diplomacy. According to some quarters this was the price of the Iraq-Iran agreement which ended the Kurdish rebellion in March 1975 and probably saved the Baathist regime from collapse.



Käskyt tulevat Bagdadista

If you have found this booklet to be of value in contributing to a greater understanding of the cause of the Kurdish people, your financial contribution towards the cost of its publication and distribution would be greatly appreciated.

Cheques may be made payable to:

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