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Kurdish Nationalism

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PART ONE: (March 1978)

Every revolution has its own features and characteristics that stem from its soil, people, intrinsic forces, the forces of counter-revolution and its surrounding international circumstances. The Kurdish revolution, as a living process interacting with numerous internal and external factors and being influenced by them all both directly and indirectly, is no exception to this rule. The purpose of this article is to discuss and analyse these factors, their outcome and what should be done in order to weaken the influence on the continuation, development, path and ultimate results of the revolution.

First: The revolution takes place on the soil of Kurdistan. Kurdistan has a mountainous terrain, which is very suitable for guerilla warfare. The revolution covers the entire Kurdish country, almost from north to south, in an 800 km long arc. This mountainous area is covered with many forests which constitute a fairly good cover against air raids. The mountain ranges are separated by green fertile valleys and plains that produce most of the foodstuffs needed.

The economy of Kurdistan is an agrarian one, based to a great extent on small holdings which maintain their cultivators at subsistence level and the poorer groups at even lower levels. About half the Kurdish people live in cities and towns both within Kurdistan and outside it. However, urban centres in Kurdistan are dependent and economically weak. Most of their inhabitants are petit bourgeois groups, and both permanent and seasonal workers. Most incomes of these groups and classes derive from government expenditure. The privileged group is composed of bureaucratic Ba'thists and those who serve the ruling Ba'th party apparatus.

Kurdistan's oil has become a curse on our people since its discovery at the beginning of this century. The Kirkuk oilfield was among the first to be exploited in this part of the world. The colonialists and the ruling racist bureaucracy in its turn have enjoyed the benefits accruing from oil revenues, but our Kurdish people's share has come in the form of bullets and guns that kill them and destroy their villages. These revenues should instead have been used for the benefit and prosperity of the Iraqi people in general. Our masses have for a long time been aware of these facts.

It should not be forgotten that the dynamism of the Kurdish revolution lies in the Kurdish liberation movement being the expression of the aspirations of an ancient people, a people who are aware and conscious. The phenomenon of Kurdish nationalism has grown and developed as a reality, supported by scientific

observations, over a long period. It has been strengthened by and has flourished since the September revolution, over many years and varying phases. It struggles to realise these legitimate aspirations, but is confronted by conspiracies, war, international pacts, forcible deportation and compulsory resettlement of its masses in the worst forms of racism. We can say without exaggeration that our entire people are now in a mood of anger and resentment and despise the Iraqi regime with its racialist and dictatorial measures. Our people yearn for the day when they will overthrow the present regime, its injustices and tyranny the like of which Iraq has never experienced during its history. Our people embrace their vanguards who have hoisted the banner of national democratic revolution, in the same way in which a mother embraces her child.

The two factors of terrain and people are greatly to our advantage in the effect on the war situation.

Second: The Iraqi regime is a dictatorship representing the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie ruling the country from north to south through the Ba'th party apparatus. Its entire policy stems from one fundamental aim to which everything else is secondary, namely to remain in power. The regime has concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union in 1972 for this very purpose. It agreed, or rather begged for the conclusion of the treacherous Algiers Agreement of 1975 with the regime of the Shah, and with the blessing of the American Administration, realising that this was the only way to prolong its life.

Repression has always been and still is the most effective weapon in the hands of the regime; this weapon is directed against Arabs and Kurds alike and includes everyone opposing or disagreeing with its official policy. Therefore, repression has struck at all democrats, at KDP members and sympathisers, communists, nationalists, Ba'thists and even members of the ruling party apparatus itself.

The second weapon in the hands of the regime is the enormous source of money from oil revenues, which are used for tempting people and solving problems that repression alone cannot solve. These revenues are employed to absorb part of the popular resentment and to cover up the economic and administrative failures of the state agencies. They are also spent on enlarging the apparatuses of repression, to foment plots and to meet the costs of demagogic propaganda in Iraq and abroad. Because of the vast increase in these revenues, the Iraqi armed forces have doubled in number as compared with the period which preceded the increase in oil prices. These forces are supplied with the most advanced

arms, especially anti guerilla weapons. It should be emphasised in this context that the main task of these forces has for years been to fight our revolution by concentrating troops in Kurdistan and building bunkers and outposts on top of every mountain peak and at every road junction; many of these bunkers and outposts can only be supplied by helicopter. The number of troops deployed to fight our partisans now exceeds 6 army divisions, apart from units of the air force.

The regime uses oil sales and that part of the oil revenues allocated for imports as a means of pressure in the international field, a pressure directed against our revolution and even to harass Kurdish refugees abroad.

The leaders of the regime practise a considerable degree of evasion and deception and are experienced in the arts of cunning. But we believe they have been exposed and that their methods have become known both in Iraq and abroad. It can be said that the regime is, by and large, strong in Iraq. But we can also state that its strength has been declining and diminishing since 1976. The Kurdish revolution has been resumed under national, progressive thought and modern methods. It is wishful thinking (as well as the belief of some other people) that Kurdish resistance "has ended once and for all" notwithstanding, the regime has paid a dear price at the cost of Iraq's sovereignty for the suppression of the revolution. This experience has only shown that those who compromise with the foreigner in order to liquidate a popular movement in their own country are the ultimate losers.

The May revolution has been the factor stimulating all national forces in Iraq to resume and increase their struggle. The violence of the popular uprising in Karbala and Najaf at the beginning of 1977 was clear evidence of the isolation of the racist and sectarian regime and a true expression of the widespread resentment growing among the masses that challenged its repression and resisted its tanks, aircraft and armoured helicopters. On the other hand, conspiracies within the regime itself are continuing; as soon as one is foiled another is hatched.

As for the oil revenues, the revolution saps a major part of them, either in forcing the regime to purchase arms or by keeping six army divisions pinned down in Kurdistan. Besides the nature of the regime, its vast and constantly increasing non-productive spending consumes another major part of the oil revenues. Moreover, world inflation has reduced the real value of oil revenues. The level of living (in real terms) for the popular masses is now sharply declining as a result of the rate of inflation, now running at 25-30% in Iraq, by comparison with the far smaller increase in

wages and salaries.

The strength of the regime is failing, though it is still strong. The continuation of the revolution and the development of all its activities will guarantee the consumption of the main part of the financial, military, administrative and psychological resources of the regime.

It is a great mistake to fear or dread the enemy; but it is equally wrong to underestimate or disregard him.

Third: The Kurdistan Democratic Party – Provisional Leadership – is the biggest national institution of struggle in the modern history of the Kurds. The Party is the real leader of the revolution. Despite numerous and some enormously grave mistakes committed during its long march of struggle up to 1975, this march has witnessed great sacrifices, heroism, experiences and lessons.

The important thing in this respect is that while keeping its positive national heritage, non-compromise of the rights of the people and its broad popular line, the Party has simultaneously adopted a new path which is reflected in its programme; a clear, progressive and socialist path that has no vagueness.

The Party has achieved qualitative leaps in its revolutionary activities in the process of re-organisation and, in the field of information and international publicity which has so upset the regime that it resorts to all possible means in order to silence it.

Meanwhile, we must admit that our Party has not yet rid itself of all the sediments of the past with their burdens and ideas and the interests behind them. But we sincerely believe that the new outlook of our Party and its march during the past two years, have been sound and in accordance with the new outlook. The effective elements within the Party and around it function in this direction. It is political naivete to imagine that the inner and outside reactionary forces would drop their weapons as soon as we carried progressive slogans and adopted national programmes, especially since the issue is no longer theoretical but concerns and is linked to a popular revolution that affects many interests. Therefore, the highest degree of vigilance and caution must be exercised, the most important thing in this respect being the broadest possible participation of the Party rank and file in the drawing and implementation of its policies, the education and mobilisation of the masses of the Party, the revolution and the people.

As its progressive path and socialist programme become clearer, its organisation firmer and more conscious, its leading vanguard role in the revolution more crystallised, the Party could play a broader and deeper, more positive role in the war presently raging between the Kurdish partisans and the regime of Baghdad.

It is appropriate to emphasise here that we have not advocated

and still do not advocate a one-party situation in Kurdistan. On the contrary, we see the establishment of a Kurdistan front of struggle as an objective necessity, which it is folly and dangerous to ignore, for it will certainly come into being sooner or later. The front is not a substitute for our Party or any other force; but its establishment will add strength in the field of battle in favour of the revolution and to the disadvantage of the insolent enemy.

Fourth: The army of the revolution (the partisans) is small in number in comparison with enemy troops, its weapons are few and simple, living conditions are difficult but tolerable, its supplies of arms and ammunition few though increasing—securing them is difficult and achieved through fierce encounters with the troops of the regime. But the patriotic partisans are strong in their national beliefs and progressive thought which the Party constantly spreads among them; they are firm in their organisation, conscious organisation giving them added strength; and they are determined to win victory, however dear the sacrifices required of them may be. They have tasted, during recent history, both the pride of triumph and the bitterness of setback. They are the inheritors of long traditions of struggle and notable military battles. They have within their ranks cadres experienced in all kinds of fighting. And they can continue the fight, modernising and developing it. Their numbers and equipment will increase, their training develop and their political, Party and military education will improve and deepen. They can multiply the losses inflicted on the forces of the enemy and sap more of his energies and neutralise his capabilities. As an indicator to this fact, we can mention that for every 20 casualties among enemy troops, the partisans suffer one casualty.

However, their small number in comparison with enemy troops and their few and simple arms in comparison with the huge arsenals of the enemy, make the achievement of a decisive victory on the battlefield impossible under existing conditions.

Fifth: The oppressors of the Kurdish nation in the neighbouring countries, who are supported by colonialism, aid the Baghdad regime in preventing the Kurdish people from achieving decisive victory in Iraq, even if they try to exploit the Kurdish revolution for tactical reasons to gain territorial, political or economic advantages at the expense of Iraq and its people. The Iraqi regime meanwhile is prepared to offer every concession demanded in return for these countries' assistance against the Kurdish revolution. The presence of Iranian liaison officers in the two Iraqi Kurdish towns of Ranya and Quala Diza is new evidence to this fact. This does not mean that Iran will not, on the other hand, try to escalate disagreements among the Kurds themselves. Iran is

expert in the cunning of grazing with the lambs and feasting with the wolves. Everyone working in the national field, and especially those who have a relationship with the armed men, must not forget recent as well as remote history; they must know that wolves do not eat the flesh of wolves, but all wolves eat the meat of the lamb. Therefore, they must avoid opening any gaps in the revolution from which its strategic enemies may benefit. The role of the oppressors of the Kurdish nation and their co-operation amongst themselves against it has been and still is a great negative factor against the revolution.

Sixth: However, the previous factor is counterbalanced by the national dimension of the revolution. This is a factor which was greatly neglected in the past, but which assumes greater significance with the increase and spread of consciousness and education among the Kurds. The role of the national dimension must be deepened and widened so that the masses of the Kurdish nation and their political parties become props for the revolution, its invisible soldiers, its armoured shield against all those who try to commit acts of aggression against it.

The national dimension can prevent the encirclement of the revolution, which the enemies of our people try to bring about, from being successful and complete; this dimension is an inexhaustible source of genuine aid to the revolution.

With the creative forces of the Kurdish nation, we will withstand all the efforts of our nation's enemies to close the pincers around the revolution.

This process cannot be attained overnight. But it must be given the attention it deserves, strengthened and consolidated constantly like the process of continuous construction. It is worth mentioning here that the progressive path of our Party, which is not viewed with satisfaction by the reactionary and imperialist enemies of our nation, will cement the national relations of the revolution with the struggling Kurdish parties and masses.

Seventh: The Middle East region has for a long time remained the primary scene of international struggle and competition, firstly because of its enormous oil resources; secondly, the Arab Israeli conflict; and thirdly, its strategic position. It can be concluded, therefore, that every political-military power has its own military-political equation for the region. We, as a liberation movement, stand firmly by the side of the peoples of the region, their struggle and their national liberation movements and against reaction and Imperialism. We back the Palestinian people and the Arab nation for the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and support the Palestinian people's right of self-determination in their

land and the establishment of their independent state.

This progressive, internationalist face of our Party and revolution, in addition to our organised activities among the international public opinion quarters which greatly annoy the dictatorial regime in Baghdad, is bound to win over to our just revolution the masses of the Arab nation and their struggling progressive forces, world public opinion and all progressive and socialist forces.

We must not forget that the enemies of our people constitute an international dimension for the Iraqi government; moreover, our progressive path is bound to make these enemies instruct their agents and mercenaries to intensify their fight against us.

What can be concluded from all these factors which play their roles in the war presently being fought between the revolution and the regime of Baghdad?

More importantly, what is the total net outcome of all these factors?

On the one hand, from the following factors: (1) the readiness and ability of the Kurdish people to sacrifice and struggle; (2) the Kurdistan Democratic Party with its new path and as a leader of the revolution; (3) the national partisan movement; (4) the Kurdish nation and its support of the revolution, and (5) the correct move in the region within the framework of its volatile situation and the winning over of world public opinion through our organised activities, we conclude that the revolution has all the pre-requisites of steadfastness, continuity and success. If well mobilised and invested, these factors will strengthen the revolution both numerically and morally. Any strength the revolution gains simultaneously weakens the enemy and leads to the further exhaustion of his energies and sapping of his resources. However, any serious mistakes the revolution's leadership may commit can greatly weaken the revolution itself.

On the other hand, the following factors: (1) the strength of the Iraqi regime; (2) the relatively small size at present of the partisan forces; (3) the fact that the revolution is surrounded by the imperialist supported oppressors of the Kurdish nation, and (4) the use of oil by the regime as a weapon against the revolution and the support it gets from the conservative regimes of the region, all render difficult the achievement of a quick and total victory over the Iraqi government.

It follows from all this that ours is a protracted and long term armed struggle. This fact is the net outcome of both the above mentioned positive and negative factors.

Those who fail to understand the protracted nature of the Kurdish revolution will commit grave mistakes, whether as a result

of "leftist" or "rightist" opportunism, one of its features being fleeing from the field of struggle, or the desire to throw oneself into the laps of the enemy for short term personal gains.

The other aspect of this armed struggle is that it is a war of attrition, the burdens of which the enemy cannot shoulder and sustain without interruption for a long time. The enemy will resort to evasion and cunning and all forms of compromise, except a genuine solution to the Kurdish issue; he is, as a matter of fact, unable, from both the vested interest and ideological viewpoints, to realise such a solution.

The final conclusion from the above analysis that Kurdish nationalism (in its modern, progressive sense), which has formed as an historical process, whose existence and development is supported by scientific observations, and which is the expression of the aspirations of the Kurdish nation in many forms (especially the armed revolution), cannot be liquidated. It will ultimately certainly be victorious.

PART TWO: (September 1978)

It was pointed out in Part One of this article that we think that our revolution will be protracted and we have a strong belief, based on the scientific study of the situation and the correct understanding of the movement of history, that Kurdish nationalism is a reality that cannot be ignored, and that our armed struggle will be protracted. We consider these two interlocking facts an objective reality. However, if we stopped short at making this statement only, we would not be revolutionaries and scientific socialists. Moreover, our understanding of this objective reality would be static and sterile. At best, we could be offering a scientific study of the factors affecting the revolutionary process going on in Kurdistan. But, scientific socialism and genuine revolutionary orientation require the linking of the analysis of objective reality in its actual course, and the direction of its development, with the methods of influencing this reality. Thus emerges the importance of understanding objective reality in a dynamic way, as well as the subjective factors that influence this reality and take part in changing or modifying it.

There are, on the one hand, the revolutionary forces that strive to accelerate the revolutionary process and enable it to hold down and restrain the racist, dictatorial regime of Iraq, paralyse its movement and deal it heavy, stunning blows—or, at least, drain its resources and potential, abort the organised implementation of its racist schemes and expose its fascist methods before the public, clearing the smoke-screens it emits from its demagogic propaganda apparatus that aim at blurring, or applying cosmetics to, its methods.

On the other hand, there is the suspect dictatorial regime of Iraq that uses its enormous financial assets, terrorism and co-operation with the reactionary and imperialist enemies of the Kurdish liberation movement, to destroy the dynamic subjective factors in the Kurdish revolution—especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the guerillas the Party is leading and the various elements of the Kurdish liberation movement. The regime also tries to win over or neutralise the other positive factors that influence the revolutionary process.

The struggle being waged is between the forces of revolution, being led by our Party, and the forces of counter-revolution, led by the fascist ruling party. We must understand, and always remember, that this struggle does not occur in isolation from its surroundings, environment and conditions—it takes place within the framework of the struggle between the forces of revolution

and the forces of counter-revolution in the Middle East area in particular, and in the whole world in general. Many other forces have their own stands towards this struggle, whether they are now silent, positive or hostile. The course of the struggle itself influences and reinforces the stand of these forces. As the struggle intensifies and spreads out, more and more revolutionary forces, which support the revolution, will express, in a more open manner, their stance; the same will happen with the forces that are hostile to our revolution. In short, the revolution does not take place in a vacuum. Understanding this fact is very crucial for avoiding isolationist tendencies that some "revolutionaries" might adopt as a result of the complex circumstances surrounding the revolution; falling into the trap of isolationism is exactly what the Iraqi regime wants us to do. Isolationism is often the product of pragmatic thinking that refuses to see the natural place of the Kurdish revolution as part of the world national liberation movement. So long as this way of thinking does not get the required tangible aid from the forces of world revolution, it is bound to slip into isolationism, especially if no strong barriers are put up to hinder its zealous rush towards the forces of counter-revolution and consequently its falling into their trap.

Isolationism takes on several forms; among them, for example, one that appears in the shape of this question: 'why do we support such and such movement while it does not support us?'. Our reply is that we should support all liberation movements and the good forces of change in the world and, simultaneously, ask them to support us; then support shall be forthcoming sooner or later. If we look at our Party's Iraqi, Arab and international relations today and compare them with those of the period immediately after the collapse of March 1975, we find a vast, or rather a stunning difference, especially in some fields. We should recall that it was we, and not the others, who took the initiative in establishing these relations. Meanwhile, the racist, dictatorial Iraqi regime, using fascist methods in fighting all the patriotic forces in general, and the Kurdish revolution in particular, is, in actual reality, getting closer and closer to the imperialist, reactionary and Zionist camp in the economic field and in its Arab and international ties; at the same time, the regime tries to cover up this reality with its typical machiavellian methods and demagogic propaganda. What deserves a pause here, is the subject of Zionism. It is now known that the Iraqi regime has been, and still is, the main hindrance before the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, second only to the openly reactionary forces. This regime has taken upon itself the task of wrecking and slaughtering the Palestinian resistance; it

is pursuing this course somehow in co-ordination with Israel—as PLO publications and PLO leaders' statements have pointed out. We add here that the Iraqi regime has demanded from Israel a price in return for these services it has rendered, which demand was channelled through the reactionary Iranian regime. As part of this price, the Iraqi regime demanded that Israel use its enormous publicity capabilities in the USA against the Kurdish revolution and in favour of the suspect regime of Iraq. We are not at all surprised at this development, as the racist and dictatorial characteristics and fascist methods of the Iraqi regime are bound to get it into the same line with imperialism and reaction and, consequently, Zionism.

How, then, can changes in the balance of forces be brought about in favour of the Kurdish revolution?

In order to answer this question, which is the subject matter of this article, we should re-state the favourable and unfavourable factors affecting the revolutionary process in Kurdistan, which were stated in Part One of this article. The favourable factors are:

1. The readiness and ability of the Kurdish people for waging the struggle and offering sacrifices;
2. The role of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, with its new programme, as the leader of the revolution (the role of the other Kurdish national forces must be given its due importance and they must be united against the enemy);
3. The guerrilla movement;
4. The Kurdish nation and its backing of the revolution;
5. The adoption of the correct course of action in the region within the framework of its volatile conditions, and the winning over of world public opinion through our organised activities.

The unfavourable factors are:

1. The strength of the Iraqi regime;
2. The relatively small size of the guerrilla forces at present;
3. The fact that the revolution is being surrounded by the oppressors of the Kurdish nation, oppressors who are supported by imperialism,
4. The use of oil and its revenues as a weapon by the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish revolution and the aid the regime receives from the Arab reactionary governments.

The most crucial factors affecting the current situation will be discussed below in more detail.

1. The Kurdistan Democratic Party

If some people have had doubts about the leading role our Party plays in the Kurdish revolution, we think that the events of last

June, resulting in the triumph of the Kurdish liberation movement under the leadership of our Party over mercenaries, charlatans and embezzlers at the expense of the Kurdish movement, have dispelled those doubts, especially for those who can perceive the prevailing objective facts. As the situation is now, our Party has the biggest influence in the revolutionary process and its development. Any progress achieved, or setbacks suffered, by the Party, will be directly reflected in this process. Therefore, we ought to start from the Party, i.e. from the apex, if we wish to develop the revolutionary process.

One point of utmost importance in this respect, is to enhance ideological cohesion on the basis of the new programme of the Party, which has so far been printed in four languages (tens of thousands of copies of the Turkish translation alone have been sold); the expansion and deepening of its progressive line, the speeding up of our action, overcoming rural sluggishness and traditionalist tendencies, and strengthening party organisations—particularly in the urban centres—on the basis of new patterns and organisational methods capable of withstanding the fascist practices of the regime. We are indeed in a position to carry out more developed organisational tasks in the towns, since we already have under our control liberated bases in the rural areas, which can be used as sanctuaries by Party elements that are discovered by the enemy. Our Party cadres, members and supporters must take an interest in self-education, especially the study of the history and heritage of our Kurdish people, paying particular attention to the points of weakness and strength in this history; moreover, progressive ideology must be spread far and wide, making it an integral part of contemporary Kurdish nationalism. We cannot at present overcome our enemy militarily and economically; but we can overcome him by our systematic, scientific thinking, revolutionary ideology and advanced working methods, to which the Party—leadership and rank-and-file—must give due attention in its activities. A critical matter in this context is the fact that guerrilla warfare requires a great deal of de-centralisation, especially in the implementation phase. Besides, there are other barriers that really restrict the required degree of centralisation in the revolutionary process, such as the difficulties of establishing regular and frequent contact between urban centres and the bases of the revolution in the countryside, between and among these bases located in the various areas of Kurdistan, and between the homeland and abroad. These barriers and difficulties must stimulate us to strengthen centralisation, improve contacts and multiply our organisational work, rather than using them as pretexts for the establishment and

growth of the "spirit of domains", for arbitrary behaviour, for acting lazily or slowly, and for not holding meetings at regular and sufficiently frequent intervals. Any leading figure who restricts his frame of mind and his horizon to his immediate sphere of work only, without forming an overall view of the entire activities of the Party, does lack leadership qualities; he must rid himself of this narrow vision and broaden his horizon to include Party activities furthest away from his centre of work.

Party cadres of all levels are the pillars upon which the Party structure and body are built and upon which the implementation of Party policies and instructions are, in the final analysis, dependent. These cadres are the connecting links between the Party and the masses. If we want a Party that is able to perform a vanguard role, we must not waste an opportunity, however small, to educate, train and nurture these cadres, linking theoretical education with practice. Education must be regarded as a continuous process for everyone—from the apex to the base of the Party pyramid—with particular attention paid to newcomers. Everybody newly joining the Party or the guerrilla forces in the areas controlled by the revolution, must undergo an educational and training course before being given any task of importance. Everything they do during the initial period—of not less than six months—must be regarded as forming part of this training process. This, in turn, requires diversification of education according to the number of cadres and training facilities available. We must remember in this context that every social, or biological structure depends, in the tasks it performs and in the efficiency of this performance, on the material it is built of; as for outside appearances, they are not of much consequence. The same applies to the structure of the Party, the performance of which is dependent on the cadres forming the building blocks of this socio-political institution. Only a party having all the revolutionary and avant-garde characteristics can correctly perform the task of leading the revolution. Being content with a traditional organisation, a pragmatic way of thinking, a slow pace of action, a subjective tendency (expressing itself in such forms as the "ego", the "domain" and so forth), a satisfaction with that which is—without looking for more developed modes, and action on the basis of action-reaction—will deprive the Party of its avant-garde role. Such features will also have direct detrimental effects on the revolution. And, consequently, adversely influence the balance of forces between the revolution and its enemies. Thus, without rectifying these shortcomings, one will appear to be unconsciously rendering a service to the enemy.

Moreover, it is the Party organisations in the urban centres that bear the responsibility of mobilising the masses and boosting their morale, exposing the fascist régime's methods and encouraging opposition, however simple a form it may take, from opposition to an unjust measure, to the most rigorous revolutionary action.

The possibilities for developing the Party on an avant-garde basis, and as the leader of the revolutionary process for confronting the racist and dictatorial enemy in the arena of the struggle, are present, numerous and varied; but this developing, like any other creative work, requires effort, offering and sacrifice; it is also a matter of the utmost importance. This is the most important positive factor in changing the balance of power in favour of the revolution and for intensifying, diversifying and developing the attack on the enemy to the degree of making him stunned, bleed and unable to raise his head from the attacks directed against him one after another. The question of developing the Party, a matter that directly affects the development of the revolutionary process, means the changing of the objective reality, within its specific continuity, by a subjective factor. We do exercise control over this factor more than most other factors. For example, we cannot change the geography of Kurdistan or influence or speed up the establishment of national co-operation—i.e. we are not the only party influencing this co-operation—however positive our attitude may be. Thus, so long as the situation remains as it is, any delay or shortcoming in the development of the Party, its ideology, organisation and activities (within its objective circumstances), is ours, and we alone must shoulder the responsibility directly.

Naturally, the Iraqi fascist régime's hands are not tied up vis-à-vis our Party's different activities, including military operations and the organising of the masses. The régime resorts in addition to imprisonment, torture and assassination, to population deportation and displacement in the mountainous areas, (now in a belt at least 20 kilometres wide along the borders). The latter measure has its racist, malicious and detested motives but keeping the masses away from revolutionary action in these areas is one of its objectives as well. It is now well known that the decision to evacuate the border areas, which was made public by the Iraqi fascist régime after the signing of the treacherous 6th March 1975 agreement (between the Iraqi and the Shah régimes), was a preventative measure against any possible outbreak of the revolution, even in the distant future; and the implementation of this decision becomes speedier with the progress of the revolution. The racist régime tries, in its turn, to alter the power equation—within the

process of struggle between itself and the revolution—to its favour by various means, including the removal of the population from the theatre of direct war and military activities of the revolution.

How can the negative effects of mass population transfer be counteracted?

They can be overcome by strengthening Party organisation in depth, intensifying revolutionary military activities in the urban centres of Iraq and consolidating the links and arteries between the revolutionary bases in the rural areas with the Party organisations in various places, in order to prove to the Iraqi racist regime that its schemes—derived from the manuals of British and U.S. imperialism—will be futile, in the same way that its schemes have so far been to no avail, despite its enormous capabilities and resources.

2. The National Guerrilla Forces:

The revolution is a process of armed political struggle; the guerrilla fighter (the Peshmerga) is a Party member or candidate engaged in the process of struggle, in the name of the Party, with arms in his hands. This, i.e. armed struggle, is the 'option' imposed by the Party. The guerrillas are now the most important instrument of the Party; they are the direct instrument of struggle against the regime and for (re)gaining our people's national and democratic rights. Therefore, developing them and improving their fighting capabilities directly affect the development of the revolutionary process and influence the shifting balance of power within the equation of struggle between the revolution and its enemies. This development and improvement of the guerrilla forces are subjective acts influencing objective reality, within its specific continuity, in favour of the revolution. It is true that the size of the guerrilla forces is now small compared with the enemy's armed forces; however, the number of the guerrillas has increased during recent months and will continue to increase tangibly and to a degree noticeable to both foe and friend. The increase in the size of the guerrilla forces will bridge gaps, multiply and diversify revolutionary operations, and thus lead to the improvement of their fighting capabilities; nevertheless, this increase will not be permitted to reach a level that may become a burden on our Party or become an obstacle in the way of its firm course according to the programme it has adopted.

The development of the guerrilla forces' capabilities is not confined to increasing their numbers; there is the need for developing their weapons. What for us is "development of weapons" is considered something quite simple by others. But this development

can greatly increase the capabilities of the guerrillas, frustrate many of the enemy's tactics and reduce the effectiveness of his weapons, especially those which he has been employing since the start of the glorious 26th May 1976 revolution. Both the number of men and the weapons they use are basic elements of every army; but for the guerrilla fighters, their national and progressive ideology is the most important weapon in their hands. Therefore, this ideology must be strengthened and deepened incessantly and must be completely purged of tribalism and its backward and worn out values, which no one, whether friend or foe, is able to defend any longer. With a national and progressive ideology and by meeting the simple needs of the guerrilla fighters, we can engage in a protracted armed struggle.

Thus, political organisation within the guerrilla forces must be strengthened and great efforts must be made to enhance their political consciousness, because the guerrillas also have the task of making propaganda and agitation for the Party, and some of them have organisational duties besides their fighting tasks. The military training of the guerrillas must be a continuous process too, so that they can use whatever weapons may be at the disposal of the revolution. As for new guerrilla recruits, they must pass an educational and training course first, as mentioned above. But there is almost complete realisation and consensus that the Kurdish revolution will not emerge from and above its present framework if it does not change its current methods, i.e., without taking the battle from the rural areas to the towns of Iraq through revolutionary action, and without the formation of a different and new type of guerrilla fighters—not completely new, as our Party has rather important, good traditions in this field and has carried out a number of important operations during the course of the 26th May revolutions, such as the capture of some foreign engineers inside Kurdistan and the shooting of some characters of the fascist regime's apparatus in Iraq. However, this matter can no longer be left to chance or to individual initiative, or be considered as a hobby; the matter needs systemisation and programming, and requires the training, in modern methods in this field, of suitable cadres, and the allocation of the necessary funds for this purpose.

Revolutionary action against imperialism and dictatorial regimes has nearly become a feature of our era. How can we allow ourselves, while engaged in a continuous revolution, to confine our military operations to the mountain peaks, away from the eyes of the broad masses and far from the main interests, inside Iraq, of the racist regime that tries to hide the existence of the revolution by its propaganda at home, and that is even able to mislead

foreign observers about it? Let us look about us and see what other struggling peoples have done or achieved in the recent past or do today; let us remember Indo-China and how they struggled against, and won victory over the biggest military machine in the world; let us draw the correct lessons from the revolutionary and popular mass actions by the various peoples and their national liberation movements, especially in the Middle East area, struggling to overthrow the yoke of foreign domination, topple the dictatorships ruling over them, and restore their freedom, independence and national rights. It is true that our resources are below the resources of all the others, but it is also true that training, organisation and the deepening of the national and progressive ideology, and, consequently, the readiness to sacrifice, were fundamental factors in Indo-China's triumph and the brilliant operations of the Palestinian resistance, which can be modified for application inside Iraq. All the repressive apparatuses of the fascist regime, its characters, institutions and organs implementing its racist schemes and settlements in Kurdistan, must be legitimate targets of the revolution, and of revolutionary action in the urban centres of Iraq; this is bound to frighten the regime which is living in ease and luxury. Moreover, the regime cannot in that case conceal the real situation from the Arab and Kurdish popular masses, whose fearlessness and courage will increase as a result; at the same time, the prestige and authority of the regime will sink, the weight of the burden of the regime's terrorism will be reduced, and the overbearing of its apparatus and the arrogance of its leaders will become objects of ridicule.

Revolutionary action in the urban centres of Iraq is the best reply to the racist settlement and forcible deportation and displacement of Kurds in Kurdistan; this is bound to teach the fascists of Baghdad profound lessons and make them understand that the Kurdish masses are not their slaves whom they treat according to their whims. This will require qualitative sacrifices which we must be ready to learn to offer. A small number of well trained cadres, with the necessary requirements made available for them, can be a factor in changing the balance of power, basically and qualitatively, in the revolution's favour. This is bound to sow fear and spread demoralisation among the enemy and his reactionary allies. The emergence of the revolution means the concentration on urban operations inside Iraq, especially on those operations which hurt the enemy most and utterly expose him. The unfavourable consequences of, and the regime's reactions to such operations, should not be over-estimated, because the positive results will be much more important. This means the abandon-

ment of the old romantic methods and learning the lessons of the experiences of other struggling peoples.

3. The Kurdistan National Front:

We took up the question of the Kurdistan national front in Part One, albeit in a concise form. But we emphasised there that "the establishment of a Kurdistan struggle front is an objective necessity which it is wrong and dangerous to ignore—and which will come into being sooner or later"

Due to the importance of this question in the arena of struggle between the revolution and the fascist enemy, and because we have recently taken important steps in this field with other Kurdish organisations, we deem it necessary and useful to give the subject greater attention in this article.

Our understanding of the Kurdistan national co-operation, or the Kurdistan national front, is based on objective facts and needs. We believe, and consider it a fact, that Kurdistan society is composed of social classes and groups (this is reflected in the divergence of ideas, attitudes and organisations), and that there is a national necessity to rally all the national forces in Kurdistan against the fascist attack on our people. While confident that our Party is able, according to its national and progressive course, to embrace and rally the overwhelming majority of patriots active in the field of national action, we deem it impossible, and wrong, to organise all of them within one single party, even if it were our own party. The solution does not lie in the formation of artificial divisions and frameworks which arrest their own revolutionary potential, instead of releasing it. A party that wants to perform an avant-garde role must be able to lead the national forces joining in a front, but it cannot simultaneously perform its avant-garde role and embrace all the forces and elements active in the field of national action—in that case, it becomes a national gathering within the ranks of which grow various contradictions that will make it lose its revolutionary will, especially during crises. We must add that the responsibility to rally all the revolutionary forces within the framework of national co-operation rests with the vanguards; giving the matter the importance it deserves and carrying it through, are evidence of the vanguards' political maturity and show that they are up to their historic responsibilities; moreover, it is an indication of their efficiency. The vanguards ought to co-operate, rather than intensify contradictions, with those whom they consider as allies. The front, and action related to it, require principled commitments and flexible tactics. Efforts for the establishment of national co-operation are a

national matter, which we consider to be one of our urgent and fundamental duties—the urgency of which does not disappear from our sight. However, we cannot make or create potential partners of such a front. Moreover, any attempts to lay down wishful and pre-conceived moulds for the partners of such a front will not lead to the creation of a genuine and effective front, because it will not, in this case, be the expression of an objective reality, but rather a subjective inclination expressing a yearning for domination that attempts to replace an objective necessity by a subjective desire. Thus, paralysed forms and versions of the “front” appear that cause harm to the front, undermining its course more than propping it up. Within the framework of the front’s activities, it is not sufficient that a partner to the front claims for itself an avant-garde role. What is more important is that it be able to convince the others of its national line that does not compromise, of its mass popular course, of its sacrifices and accomplishments that are not contestable, and of its progressive thought that illuminate the road for everyone. Only in this way can the others be practically convinced that one or the other of the partners is actually the avant-garde one.

We must point out that great mental, political, military and publicity efforts and potential have been wasted during the past two years in the course of the conflict caused by the Talabani clique, despite the fact that our Party repeatedly expressed its readiness for national co-operation; this clique has been the real stumbling block on the road of national co-operation. However, now that the main military strength of this clique has been smashed, through its own abortive attack aimed at the liquidation of our national progressive revolution, this barrier has virtually been removed from the path of national co-operation.

Our Kurdistan Democratic Party, due to its firm national principles and because of its historic responsibilities, eagerly and forcefully availed itself of this opportunity and took the matter of national co-operation great steps forward, declaring, at the same time, an unrelenting struggle against vanity, against monopolisation in the field of national action, and against discounting or overlooking the others. Our Party considers its responsibilities to have increased in this respect after recent events. Therefore, it has had the honour of extending its hand of co-operation to the other organisations, while at the same time frankly expressing its view that the others are not absolved of their historic responsibilities in this matter. At the time of writing these lines, more than one positive step has been taken on the road of the building of national co-operation with some other political organisations. We

shall continue our intensive efforts towards the broadest possible front. When we study the history of our people, we find that its weakest point has always been division and fragmentation and lack of unity—a situation which has helped our people's adversaries in their operations to control Kurdistan, (although this situation has its historical explanations, there is no justification for its continuation in this era).

It is to our Party's, and its President Mustafa Barzani's credit, that the Party followed the road of the unity of the Kurdish people, and of its success in the process of unity after the 11th March 1970 agreement (even though there might be some remarks or reservations on that form of unity; although it was in fact the first achievement of the unity of the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq) and up to 1975.

Finally, we maintain that national co-operation will throw great energies and potential into the arena of struggle against the fascist enemy. Co-operation between two or more forces does not mean the total sum of their capabilities, but much more than that, because dynamic co-operation will mean the directing of all potential against the enemy, the rallying of new masses of patriots, and their mobilisation for the struggle; masses who are confident of themselves and sure of the environment in which they move.

A national front is bound to raise the status and prestige of the revolution in the eyes of our people and within all the Iraqi, Arab and international circles on all levels, in addition to boosting the power of each of its partners.

It is obvious that the establishment of Kurdistan national co-operation will speedily enhance the revolutionary process and quickly and directly change the balance of power in favour of the forces of the revolution—to the detriment of the fascist enemy—in the struggle between the two sides, because of the military, political and publicity efforts which this co-operation will safeguard against being wasted, or used against the revolution—as the case now is. The front is, then, an important factor in the arena of struggle against the enemy.

To sum up, the existence of a front is strength for the revolution and its absence, seen within the power equation between the revolution and its enemies, is weakness for it and, consequently, is strength to the enemy.

4. The Kurdish Nation and its Backing of the Revolution:

The Kurdish national dimension is the shield of the revolution, which is the embodiment of the aspirations and hopes of the masses of our nation for liberation and progress. While we have

made, and are still making efforts to consolidate the unity of struggle of the forces of our nation, the Talabani clique have done their utmost to divide the ranks of our nation by all means and methods, wherever they could; they created a splinter movement in the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE) after 18 years of its establishment, during which period no one else dared to commit this destructive deed. Not surprisingly, the splinter group they created is diminishing, whereas the KSSE is getting stronger and its position has improved, not only among Kurdish students, but also among the international students' circles. This clique also tried to create for itself some weight and a centre on the level of the Kurdish nation and was actually temporarily able to mislead some sides that have not been fully aware of the whole facts of the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The clique was aided in this by the conditions of the collapse of March 1975 and by the policies pursued by the revolution just before the collapse. However, falsehoods and lies have a short life. When millions of our people became better acquainted with the aggressive leanings of this clique, which were reflected in their treacherous attack on our revolution, they formed another opinion of it; therefore, the masses of Kurdistan, both the intelligentsia and the toilers, rose up to support the revolution. This stance by the masses had a decisive role in the finalising of the clique's attack in a humiliating manner – which the clique deserved.

This abortive attack and its results have had important consequences at the Kurdish national level, as the revolution increasingly polarised the masses towards the revolution on a large scale. Many a political side has since re-evaluated the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan in a more realistic way; many an important Kurdistan organisation has since changed its opinions – as did, for example, the monthly magazine “Roja Welat” published in Kurdistan-Turkey. These organisations increased their embracing of the national and progressive revolution. We hope that we, and other progressive forces in Kurdistan, will be successful in up-rooting the antagonistic divisions and differences which the Talabani clique (which have made the Kurdish issue an object of embezzlement in certain circles in Kurdistan) have created.

Our new programme, spelled out in “The Road of the Kurdistan National Liberation Movement”, has become an important asset to our Party on the national level; the more the Kurdistan parties and forces notice our adherence to it in actual practice, the more consolidated become the ties of friendship, fraternity and co-operation between our Party and these parties and forces. While our Party has achieved new successes on the level of Kurdistan

relations, we consider this matter a continuous process. We will continue our struggle until we accomplish the best forms of fraternal co-operation with all the Kurdistan parties and forces.

With every brick we add to the structure of our national relations, we bridge a gap that might be exploited by the reactionary forces to throw their resources against the revolution. These relations can, moreover, abort many of the racist schemes and policy co-ordination (with these reactionary forces) plans of the Iraqi regime that spends scores of millions of Dinars on these schemes and plans.

5. Iraqi National Co-operation:

We are not going to discuss here the hoped-for Iraqi national front from all its aspects. Such a front is, for us and for all the sincere national forces, a question of utmost importance; it has had such a prominent importance since World War Two. It is almost impossible to establish a democratic system of government, enjoying the support of the majority of the Iraqi people, without a front. We believe that more favourable conditions have recently emerged in the field of Iraqi national co-operation, since an irreparable crack has taken place in the "front", established by the ruling party with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), by the execution of 21 patriots, members or supporters of the latter party, and the imprisonment of about a thousand of its members and sympathisers, [Editor's note: since the writing of this article, more ICP members and sympathisers have been either executed, killed under torture or imprisoned, including ICP leading figures], who have been subjected to barbaric torture in order to extract from them information on the organisations and membership of the ICP. Besides, there are ever increasing differences between the view points of the two sides concerning the question of democracy, the Kurdish issue, foreign trade, the Palestinian question and the Arab and international situations; the regime is, moreover, steadily moving away from the socialist countries, intentionally creating problems with them in order to appease reaction and imperialism, and thus exposing in the process, its genuine anti-socialist essence. It is worth mentioning here that the ambassadors in Baghdad of the socialist countries delivered a petition to the Tikriti clique to stop the execution of the rest of the communists sentenced to death, when the news of the execution of 11 communists became known in May 1977; instead of responding to this petition, the leaders of the regime speeded up the executions of the remainder.

Moreover, the suspect Tikriti regime declared its open hostility to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, assassinating a number of

its leading figures—a deed which prompted protests and disapproval by all the patriotic and nationalist forces in Iraq, both Kurdish and Arab, and even by some sections of the regime itself.

The above two new factors are bound to create a good atmosphere for the initiative towards action to found a genuine national front.

The notion that there are only two options—either submission to the tyranny of the Iraqi Tikriti clique or annihilation at its hands—for the political forces in the country, is no longer valid. There is also the option of going over to the Kurdistan revolution, since our Party welcomes every Iraqi patriot to come to the revolution's side, and is ready—and works on the preparation of the pre-requisites—to transform the Kurdish revolution into an Iraqi democratic revolution. But, unfortunately, this matter is not entirely up to us to accomplish alone.

There is more than one arena in the Arab world for action against the regime of Baghdad.

Our Kurdistan Democratic Party, which has a long history of good relations on the national level and which has good bilateral contacts with numerous Iraqi patriotic parties and forces, is making efforts (and we must multiply these efforts) for the sake of strengthening these contacts and transforming them into tri-lateral and quadrilateral relations, with the final aim of forming the prospective national front.

We have to exert more effort to utilise recent possibilities in this field. Recent developments are bound to increase the isolation of the regime from the people and diminish the fighting spirit of the Iraqi armed forces, which the regime throws into the daily battles against their compatriots, the Kurdish guerrilla fighters. These forces, or at least, a section thereof, will realise that the guerrillas the regime is pushing them to fight are their compatriots with whom they are bound together by common patriotic, democratic and even national ties, and that the regime which throws them into these battles does itself persecute them and their relatives and ignores their national aims. The Iraqi soldier will come to realise that the regime which orders him to fight the Kurdish guerrillas, is the same regime that kills Iraqi patriots, executes communists and assassinates leaders of the Palestinian resistance. This in turn will improve the position of the Kurdish revolution and become an internal weakness to the racist, dictatorial enemy in the arena of struggle between the two sides.

6. Arab and World Public Opinion:

We have achieved success in thawing some of the ice successive

Iraqi governments have built around the Kurdish issue among Arab quarters, by exploiting the difficulties and complexities surrounding the revolution and the chauvinist tendencies within some Arab circles. A further factor facilitating these efforts of the various Iraqi governments had been the lack of a strategy and persistent action by the revolution in this field. In order to act more efficiently (and we must admit that there is still much ice left), we, and other Arab progressives in general, and Iraqi progressives in particular, must thaw the remaining ice in Arab-Kurdish relationships. However, due to its new current firm strategy based on the trust in Arab-Kurdish fraternity and the support for the Arab causes—especially the Palestinian revolution and the backing of the struggle of the Arab nation against imperialism, reaction and Zionism—our Party has made good progress in the Arab area. The Kurdish issue and its justness have become understood by many Arab progressive forces; sympathy with the Kurdish issue has become acceptable and even a test of the truth of the internationalism and humanity of these forces. It is no longer considered a breach of Pan-Arabism to sympathise with the Kurdish issue rather it has come to mean sympathy with an allied force that supports Arab causes.

It is only fair to state here that the late Egyptian President, Jamal Abd al-Nasir, always refused to back Iraq's rulers in their wars against the Kurdish revolution and always urged them to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully, on the basis of accepting the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of Iraqi national unity.

The above-mentioned observations constitute a new basis for our ties with the Arab forces, in addition to the historic relations between the two peoples. But we must work harder and more persistently and indefatigably in order to strengthen the structure of Arab-Kurdish relations.

We must realise, moreover, that acting on the Arab level is not a monopoly of the Tikriti clique. This clique follows a course which is practically hostile to the progressive Arab states; its hostility towards some of these states has been entrenched and unequalled. Besides, the regime has committed all types of hostile acts against the Palestinian resistance. Furthermore, the arrogant Tikriti clique has very strong yearnings to impose its domination over a number of Arab countries; these yearnings have aroused the suspicions, fears and reservations of these countries towards the Iraqi regime.

The permanent characteristic of the fascist Tikriti regime on the Arab level has been isolation. This isolation has recently become stronger than at any other time in the past. Our Party must act on

the Arab level continuously and especially among the Arab progressive forces. Our Party has, more than once, proved the sincerity of its support for the just Arab causes, especially the Palestinian revolution, more than the suspect Tikriti regime has done practically. We mention with pride that our Party has achieved good progress in Arab-Kurdish solidarity.

On the international level, we must continue to expose the crimes perpetrated by the Iraqi racist, dictatorial regime against our Kurdish and Iraqi people, and its persistent violations of the most basic human rights of our people. Our task in this field is easier now than in the past, because, now and after ten years in power, the gangster-like behaviour on the international level of the Tikriti clique has once again been uncovered; moreover, the regime assassinates and carries out various acts of espionage and terrorism against its own citizens, non-Iraqi Kurds, Palestinians and Arabs in the capitals of various countries. Just imagine, a government that assassinates its own nationals not only inside the country, but also abroad! a government that uses the diplomatic immunity of its missions abroad as cover for killers and criminals, whom it implants in various foreign capitals, in order to carry out outrageously illegal activities.

The Iraqi rulers have, until recently, donned a progressive guise in the international arena; but they prove, day by day, that they are a far cry from being progressive and are very intimate with the reactionary forces and the imperialists. The Iraqi economy, with its large export and import sector, has become more and more tied up to and incorporated into the world capitalist market. The "cosmetics" applied to the present Iraqi system by the spending, or rather the wasting of millions of Dinars during the last few years, to give a rosy picture of the regime and its leaders abroad, have been washed away by the regime's own gangster-like behaviour (at home and abroad), which has once again unmasked its true nature.

Our Party has, by its persistent and firm efforts, regained some of its status among the democratic and progressive quarters in the world. Our Party is most of the time virtually alone in exposing the dictatorial and racist policies of Iraq's rulers, and it prides itself in being successful in this field.

However, our Party must further increase its efforts to establish ties and contacts with the various sections of public opinion, political parties, popular and official bodies and humanitarian, democratic and progressive organisations and persons that defend justice, the rights of all peoples, the freedom of man and human rights. All these quarters must be kept informed of the sad con-

ditions under which the masses of our people are made to live.. Any form of protest against, and disapproval of the violations and infringements the Iraqi government is committing in Kurdistan, any enquiry about the Kurds and their conditions and any sympathy and solidarity with our people, are factors which boost morale within the revolution and constitute a demoralisation to the enemy.

Naturally, Arab and world public opinion is an indirect factor in the military-political equation between the revolution and its enemy – the present Iraqi fascist regime.

7. The Strength of the Iraqi Regime:

The Kurdish revolution struggles against the racist, dictatorial regime in Baghdad; it also mobilises various forces and energies against that regime. What is then, the nature of the regime?

We stated in Part One of this article that “it can be said that the regime is, by and large, strong in Iraq. But we can also state that its strength has been declining and diminishing since 1976”. We added that, “It is a great mistake to fear or dread the enemy; but it is equally wrong to under-estimate or disregard him”.

There is a correlation between the strength of the regime and its relations with the Kurdish revolution. The regime was in an unenviable shape just before 11th March 1970, but its strength and prestige increased immediately after the announcement of the 11th March 1970 agreement. It continued to gain strength and power, by various means and methods, until the resumption of fighting in 1974, when it entered a new critical situation that brought it virtually to the verge of collapse. This is why it knelt down before the Shah and signed the treacherous 6th March 1975 agreement with him in order to remain in power; this in turn led to the cessation of fighting in Kurdistan and, thus, the regime gained unprecedented strength. However, this strength was more apparent and temporary than real and permanent, because the agreement was made at the expense of the rights of the people and the national sovereignty of Iraq. With the outbreak of the 26th May 1976 revolution, the strength of the regime began to decline and this revolution set in motion all the latent contradictions between the regime and the forces that are objectively opposed to it.

There are several indications showing that the regime is moving towards weakness, rather than strength, during this year. Maybe the number of its troops or the volume of its oil revenues has increased, but this increase will not change reality. Opposition to the regime is increasing and the forms of the struggle waged by the

opposition are becoming diverse, a fact which makes it difficult for the regime to respond to and counter all of them. An opposition group assassinated President al-Bakr's son in an ambush near Baghdad on 26th March 1978—most of the guards and many members of al-Bakr's family were also killed in the incident; this same group, or probably some other (maybe inner group), has assassinated many of the regime's civilian cadres and military personnel during the past two years. Saddam Husain Tikriti, (Iraq's strong man) was, surprisingly, unhurt in an assassination attempt in June 1977. The important point in all these incidents is that the regime has failed to find out who has carried out these operations and what their political identity is, despite the regime's well known brutal methods of extracting information.

We have already referred to the cracks in the regime's relations with the Iraqi Communist Party. At the same time, there has been no improvement in the regime's relations with any other national party or force. On the basis of the most accurate information reaching us, we can state that complaints against the continuation of the war in Kurdistan are mounting; the officer corps of various ranks openly express their discontent of the perpetual state of alert, of living in sangars on mountain peaks, and of air landings which result either in stiff resistance from Kurdish guerrillas or, otherwise, find nobody. One matter, more than anything else that is to the regime's disfavour is the hopelessness of putting a foreseeable end to the war. There is also the sectarian, regional and party discrimination which is very pervasive in the army and which causes discontent within its ranks.

We have also referred to the regime's virtual isolation on the Arab level, the quarrels it picks with the forces of Arab revolution, especially the Palestinian resistance, and its closer relations and co-ordination with the reactionary regimes in the region, especially those surrounding the Kurdish revolution. The latter point, i.e. the close ties and co-ordination, must, on the one hand, be exposed before the masses and, on the other, keep our national and progressive revolution ever more alert, cautious and vigilant.

On the international level, the regime is moving away from the socialist countries and getting closer to the Western countries; these two observations characterise the regime's recent direction and actions.

Despite the regime's haughtiness, which will continue to be one of its main features until the last days of its life, there is marked weakness in its will, especially when the realisation of this will requires the action or participation of vast sections of state officials, or even of the armed forces.

However, these observations should not make us relax and rest; on the contrary, they require that we intensify the struggle, diversify its forms and develop it towards higher levels in all the above-mentioned fields, namely: (1) the Kurdistan Democratic Party; (2) the guerrilla forces, (3) the Kurdistan national front; (4) the fortification of the revolution with closer and better relations on the level of the Kurdish nation; (5) Iraqi national co-operation; and, (6) Arab and world public opinion. This is the road which leads to the defeat of the enemy and the triumph of the revolution.

We must know that the fascist enemy will not hold back any efforts at sabotage in all these fields. His known weapons are: bribery, intimidation, repression and the yielding of concessions to imperialism and local reaction and, simultaneously, covering them up with thick smoke screens emitted from his demagogic propaganda apparatus.

The more we study the reality of the revolutionary process—which we wish to push forward, and which will progress at the expense of the fascist enemy—the clearer becomes the heaviness of the responsibility our Party, leadership and rank-and-file, shoulders, the greatness of the sacrifices required of us, the enormity of the efforts which we we must mobilise, the selflessness demanded from all of us, and the revolutionary, systematic perseverance needed in our work and its methods.

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